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Introduction 
 
 
Who could imagine the youth of Ramallah celebrating Valentine’s Day or taking an 
interest in the latest episode of a Lebanese reality TV show? And yet...! Palestinian society 
has without doubt been constructed by and around its conflict with Israel; but the lives of 
young Palestinians are not limited to the strategies of political organisations or power 
struggles among their leaders. They are also made up of many other facets for which that 
conflict is merely the context. For those young Palestinians of today, history involves the two 
Intifadas and dashed national hopes, as well as personal projects aborted by the deteriorating 
economic situation and the increase in blockades and curfews. How do you get through all the 
interactions with Israeli soldiers which are part of everyday life? Some act proud and take 
risks, like the student who went to Bir Zeit University to take his exams. At the entrance there 
were twenty other students whose way was being blocked by a Jeep full of Israeli soldiers. 
Their identity cards had been confiscated and they were waiting under the hot sun. The clock 
was ticking and their exams had already started. Finally he stepped forward, walked towards 
the Israeli soldiers and said: ‘‘Go ahead and shoot if you want to, but I’m going to take my 
exams”, turned his back to them and walked into the building. “No Fear!” cried the other 
students who remained outside. 
The story of Palestinian youth is about exams failed from their inability to concentrate, 
from fear of being fired at and bombed, from the ambulances shuttling back and forth, from 
days spent playing chess while stuck at home because of the curfew, from family orange 
orchards and olive groves ripped apart by bulldozers, from families camping out on the ruins  
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of their houses.  
It is clear to them that they have been deserted by the Westerners, and also by the Arab 
countries; so they have lost interest in diplomatic initiatives. The desire for revenge towards 
Israel has taken a firm hold, like the support for suicide attacks, also associated with a feeling 
of being at a dead end and of a fruitless search for leaders and strategies. The cheers at the 
arrival of the Palestinian Authority have been replaced by bitterness for what it has become. 
For some, taking up arms is the solution that brings with it the social status of being a local 
boss. Some claim to be taking the conflict into the heart of Israel and blow themselves up 
amongst Israeli civilians. Running around in search of odd jobs to finance their families or 
studies is the priority for most people. For a growing number of them, the solution lies in exile 
– a temporary one they hope, but often guilt-inducing because it is seen as dissociating 
oneself from the Palestinian people in the Territories. But leaving is perceived as the only way 
to secure a future and plan one’s life – independent of whether or not the blockades are lifted, 
of the possibility of an Israeli incursion, of the latest bombings or reprisals. It’s like the son of 
refugees who spoke in front of his father about returning to his native village, and later was 
concerned about whether or not his girlfriend would go to the United States with him.  
Young Palestinians spend hours “chatting” on the Internet so that the world, which 
they think suffers from blindness, will finally understand the Palestinian situation – as well as 
for cruising. They get together with friends for an evening of hookah-smoking, to watch 
football games and sexy Western TV shows. A group of friends is ideal to hang out with, but 
they never discuss family affairs together. Fiancés talk discreetly in cafés. Post-Oslo stability 
(1993) enabled more young women to study and work. Some have become engineers and 
computer programmers, while continuing to be active in Hamas women’s groups. But many 
can no longer get to their jobs; and it is not an easy thing for a woman to sleep away from 
home, if a check-point is suddenly closed. Religion can be a lifestyle and a cause for hope, an 
ideological arsenal and sometimes even a final explanation, i.e. they must not be good enough 
Muslims if they are still under occupation.  
Lives with multiple facets are not specific to Palestinians, but that plurality is often 
erased when talking about their society. These facets have a definite influence on people’s 
involvement. Young Palestinians are more inclined to judge the situation based on whether or  
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not the tanks have retreated from their doorstep – or if the checkpoint is open so they can get 
to their university or their job – than to follow the flurry of diplomatic activity. This 
dimension should be taken into account in trying to understand when they mobilize. 
The First Intifada (1987/1993) was a sufficiently powerful and vivid historic event to 
turn the youth involved into a ‘‘generational group’’1 with specific references that were 
different from other generations. In fact the uprising gave them visibility, and they acquired 
their identity through being the driving force behind this First Intifada. The effect of this was 
the creation of a new heroic figure in society, that of the shabab (youth), which unseated the 
fedayin.2
                                                 
1 Karl Mannheim, Le problème des générations (1928), Paris, Nathan, 1990, p 59. 
 
2 A combatant or partisan willing to sacrifice himself for the cause. 
Regarding the transcription of Arabic terms, we have chosen above all to make the words easy to read.  
English terms have been used wherever possible, even if they are linguistically faulty with regard to the Arabic. 
For the rest, a highly simplified transcription was used where neither emphatics nor long vowels are indicated, 
the ‘ayn is shown with an apostrophe, plurals have been anglicised. My apologies to the Arabic scholars for 
these approximations! 
 
 
 When this historic moment was over, part of what these young people had derived 
from highlighting their involvement vanished. There was a different pattern in the Second – or 
Al-Aqsa – Intifada, where the ‘‘heroic’’ figure for the Palestinians was that of the shahid 
(martyr). It mainly involved young people, while not having a pronounced generational aspect 
per se. Nevertheless, this group of “young people” remained a coherent entity. But young 
women were largely absent from this process. Furthermore, only a minority of them had any 
real time for themselves before marriage. So their experience as young women was closer to 
that of Palestinian women in general than to that of the young men. Gender supplanted 
generation.  
 
Can any guidelines be drawn from the patchwork of more or less contradictory 
references and practices that has just been briefly described? In fact, there is one main line of 
tension running through the experience of Palestinian youth, which is marked by the national 
question on the one hand and by private goals on the other.  
How can a young person build his identity in the context of a national struggle? There 
are a number of different paths to take. But it is always the meaning given to the struggle, 
rather than the struggle itself, which has the greatest effect on the individual. During the First 
Intifada it was associated with the hope of soon creating a State. The possibility of having a 
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personal life was not inconsistent with this idea. On the contrary, the young people’s massive 
involvement in the fight for independence was also a way of ensuring their own future and, in 
the short term, of negotiating their place in society in the name of their legitimacy as ‘‘heroes 
of the national struggle.’’ But the creation of the Palestinian Authority did not live up to their 
expectations. It brought neither an end to the occupation nor democracy. This period ended in 
a retreat by default into the private sphere for most young Palestinians. The potential for 
linking the two spheres – involvement in the struggle and personal fulfilment – was 
drastically disrupted by the gradual rise of scepticism about being able to achieve their goal of 
nationhood. Associated with failure and death, in both the short and long term, that goal was 
no longer conceivable within the lifespan of a young person.  
This situation led Palestinian youth to live in a state of extreme tension during the 
Second Intifada, between their aspirations to build their own identities and their support for 
the national cause. Their experience was characterized at the time by a tendency to dissociate 
their field of reference – between national struggle and the private sphere. The phenomenon 
gradually worsened as the Palestinian Authority was being established, and reached a peak 
during the Al-Aqsa Intifada: 
‘‘In 1987 there was the Intifada, and we were full of ambition. People were fighting to 
obtain something and we had hope. Then Oslo came along and destroyed our hopes and 
ambitions. People have felt depressed for a long time. And now they have renewed hope in 
the Intifada, but we are really losing (...) My ambition is to feel safe above all else, to feel that 
I have a native country and that I am with my parents. My parents are in Bethlehem now and 
I’m in Ramallah. I can’t see them because of the borders separating us. And I have many 
other needs to take care of before considering my personal thoughts and dreams. That’s what I 
meant when I told you that my own future cannot be separated from that of my country and 
my people.’’3
                                                 
3 Suha, 22, a biology student who was a volunteer worker in a first aid team during the demonstrations. Her 
father was a shop owner. Interview in Ramallah, October 2000. 
 
 
Young Palestinians seem to be dragged down and absorbed by the ‘‘situation,’’ by this 
wada´ which people are always talking about that is their main subject of conversation. 
Collectively, the idea of a national struggle, a movement and an ideology, have enabled them  
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to rebuild their everyday lives in a symbolic way and to give them meaning. The importance 
of the nationhood issue is not just about obtaining a territory and sovereignty for them. 
Palestinian nationalism also comes from an ‘‘epic’’ narrative which situates the Palestinian 
exiles in 1948 and 1967 and the current occupation within a collective destiny and history, 
while also challenging it. It is a central and obligatory reference in the identity-building 
process for young Palestinians. They use it to avoid assimilating the negativity from their 
humiliating interactions with the occupier, to escape from what the other’s annihilating looks 
‘‘say’’ about them, and to see themselves as part of a collective destiny.  
As the consequence of a conflict with the Israelis over land, the daily trials are no 
longer the source of complete alienation, but have taken on a significant historical and 
mythical dimension. They then become part of the collective lot of a victimized people who 
refuse to accept defeat. The situation has been transformed by envisioning a common fate; but 
do the individuals caught up in it have room in their lives to focus on concerns of a more 
personal nature? The subjective constructs of young Palestinians are under pressure, between 
the national struggle which they cannot afford to ignore without turning into the alienated 
image of themselves imposed by their occupiers, and their private concerns relating to their 
individual destinies. In this context, it is very hard for them to separate their national and 
collective destiny from their personal fate, the two being closely intertwined, yet increasingly 
irreconcilable.  
The specificity of that experience does not reside in the ‘‘bleak future’’ of the national 
struggle; nor can it be reduced to the cycle well described by Albert Hirschman of investment 
in public action followed by a quest for ‘‘personal happiness,’’ after which the pendulum 
swings back to group involvement.4 The particular nature of the experience of Palestinian 
youth lies in the impossibility of eliminating the focus on the national struggle from their 
subjective constructs despite their disillusionment. Their belief in the possibility of success for 
the national struggle has diminished, but they cannot turn away from it. This inner division, or 
‘‘split ego’’5
                                                 
4 Albert O. Hirschman, Bonheur privé et action publique, Paris, Fayard, 1983. 
 
5 Bernard Lahire, L’homme pluriel : les ressorts de l’action; Paris; Nathan; 1998, p 46. 
 
 characterizes young Palestinians nowadays. They circulate, build up and break 
down their experiences within the general framework of that division. They come up with  
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various responses to the tension and the tendency towards dissociating their national identity 
and personal interests.  
This study, the result of long field work (see details in the annex), focuses on the 
period from the end of the First Intifada (1993) to the Second Intifada (since 2000). That 
phase began with a process of mutual recognition between the Israelis and Palestinians and 
with numerous negotiations. On 13 September 1993, Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin signed 
the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (known as the Oslo 
Agreements6). The process was temporarily postponed due to the massacre of an extremist 
settler who fired on worshippers at the Hebron mosque. This was followed by a bombing 
campaign carried out by Hamas,7 and Israel decided to seal off the Territories. In May 1994 
the agreement on the first stage of self-government for the occupied Territories was signed, 
entitled ‘‘Gaza-Jericho first.’’ After the transfer of power from the Israeli army, Yasser Arafat 
left Tunis for Gaza. The negotiations were again suspended in October 2004 and the 
Territories sealed off due to another Hamas operation. Violence broke out between Palestinian 
policemen and Islamist militants in November. The settlements continued despite the Oslo 
Agreement, prompting a clash between Palestinians and the Israeli army in December. In 
September 1995 the Taba Accord (Oslo II) was signed in Washington calling for a Palestinian 
Council, the redeployment of the Israeli army, the transfer of civil power to the Palestinian 
Authority and the extension of self-government to six large towns in the West Bank (Jenin, 
Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah and Bethlehem) and partially to Hebron.8
                                                 
6 Negotiated in secret in Oslo, they called for: the election of a Palestinian Council to oversee self-government 
during a 5-year transition period, the transfer of power over education, culture, heath, social welfare, direct 
taxation and tourism, the creation of a police force, the redeployment of the Israeli army, a liaison committee for 
security and economic cooperation, and final negotiations on Jerusalem, refugees, security agreements, borders 
and relations with neighbouring countries, three years at the latest after the start of the transition period. Philippe 
Lemarchand, Lamia Radi, Israël/Palestine demain, Paris, Complexes, 1996, p 130 and 131. 
 
7 The Islamic resistance movement, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, was created in 1988 after the First 
Intifada broke out, in particular to avoid the Muslim Brotherhood’s being politically marginalized if it didn’t 
participate in the uprising. It has a very large charity network. 
 
8 The Oslo II Agreement first created three kinds of areas: the A Areas covering 80% of Gaza and 18.2% of the 
West Bank (the large towns) had been delegated to the Palestinian Authority, the B Areas (villages) were under 
Palestinian civil and Israeli security control (22 % of the West Bank / 68% of the population) and the C Areas 
were under complete Israeli control. 
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In November 1995, Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli extremist, and Shimon Peres 
took over as Prime Minister. Yasser Arafat was elected president of the Authority in January 
1996, and the Legislative Council won a Fatah majority (the main left-wing Palestinian forces 
and Hamas did not participate in the vote).  
In May 1996, the Likud came back to power and Benyamin Netanyahu was elected 
Prime Minister. The Wye River memorandum, signed on 23 October 1998, called in 
particular for the transfer of 13% of the occupied Territories on the West Bank. In 1999, the 
Labour Party came back to power with Ehud Barak as Prime Minister. In September he 
signed the Sharm el-Sheikh memorandum redefining the interim agreement and called for a 
rapid start of the final negotiations.  
In July 2000, the Israeli-Palestinian summit at Camp David broke off over the issue of 
the status of Jerusalem and the refugees in particular. From then on the negotiation process, 
which had never really stopped, seemed increasingly disconnected from the reality in the field 
that was getting worse and worse. The visit of Likud leader Ariel Sharon to the Esplanade of 
the Mosques in Jerusalem triggered clashes that soon spread throughout the Palestinian 
Territories, marking the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada. In the subsequent Israeli 
crackdown, 70 people were killed in a few days. The lynching of two Israeli soldiers in 
Ramallah led to the first Israeli bombings against the Palestinian Authority’s infrastructure. 
Islamist movements resumed their suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, and Israel began 
liquidating activists in an extrajudicial way.  
Ehud Barad resigned in December, and several rounds of the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations failed. In February 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister. There were 
more blockades, temporary re-occupation of autonomous areas and bombings, as well as 
increasingly bloody suicide bombings. Various American reports and plans (the Mitchell 
report, the Tenet plan) went unheeded. Yasser Arafat was confined in Ramallah and declared 
politically out of the game. In March 2002, Israel launched its ‘‘Walls’’ operation of re-
occupying Palestinian towns following a particularly deadly attack. On 16 June they began 
building a ‘‘Security Fence’’ designed to create an impenetrable separation between the 
Palestinian population in the West Bank and Israel. Expropriating large sections of Palestinian 
land (ultimately annexing 10 % of it), it also increased the number of separations with the  
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West Bank. 250 000 Palestinians were closed off in enclaves to the east and west of the 
fence.9
                                                 
9 www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/ 
 
  
In 2003, the Israeli incursions took place almost daily, including in the heart of Gaza. 
The suicide bombings continued and were no longer the sole prerogative of Islamist 
movements. In April, the ‘‘Road Map’’ put together by the quartet (the United States, the 
European Union, Russia and the United Nations) was once again the focus of diplomacy, 
while in the field the Territories had been almost totally re-occupied. The Palestinian 
‘‘executive power’’ could no longer function and Abu Mazen, the man appointed to the newly 
created position of Prime Minister, resigned in September 2003. He was replaced by Ahmed 
Qoraï, president of the Palestinian Council, similarly paralysed. 
In February 2004, Ariel Sharon launched a plan for unilateral withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip and the dismantling of most of the settlements there, in exchange for maintaining 
control over the flow of goods and people, and for having the wall include the largest groups 
of settlements in the West Bank in Israel. The plan was rejected by the Likud but was 
supported by the United States. The extrajudicial executions continued, aimed particularly at 
top Hamas leaders. In May 2004, Tsahal launched large-scale operations in Rafah on the 
border of Gaza and Egypt.  
By the middle of 2004 the final toll of the conflict was 4000 deaths, 3000 of them 
Palestinians. 
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Part One: Palestinian Youth 
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Chapter 1 
 
The National Struggle and the Individual 
 
The First Intifada (1987-1993) 
 
After the evacuation of Lebanon in 1982, the PLO established its headquarters in 
Tunis. It was seriously handicapped by its deteriorating relations with Arab countries, in 
particular with Jordan. Support through Arab solidarity was indispensable, even though it 
seemed unable to provide an answer to the Palestinian problem. Israel’s policy of land 
expropriation in the Territories had intensified since 1979. In 1987, Israel controlled 52% of 
the West Bank, 42% of the water resources and 11% of the Gaza Strip.10 There was a high 
dependency on the Israeli economy, on income from the diaspora and support from UNRWA. 
It was in this context that the struggle shifted towards Palestinians who had remained in the 
territories. The task of widespread mobilization was carried out by Palestinian organisations. 
Starting in 1986, numerous incidents with the Israelis occurred, initiated in particular by the 
Islamic Jihad.11
                                                 
10 Nadine Picaudou, Les Palestiniens un siècle d’histoire, Brussels, Complexe, 1997, p 219. 
 
11 Islamic Jihad is an organisation that grew out of a split with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s. It opposed 
the latter by advocating armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. 
 
 That organisation’s activism triggered the Intifada in August 1987 through 
the assassination of the Israeli military policy commander in Gaza. The call went out for a 
general strike, and the movement spread to the West Bank. Orders from the 
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“United National Leadership” soon turned the struggle into a massive opposition with 
demonstrations and strikes.  
Young people were the key actors in the first Intifada. The radical side of these young 
people, brought up in a highly oppressive everyday environment, could be one of the initial 
explanatory parameters − although it is rather inadequate. Other factors include the high 
population growth (49% of the population is under 15, and 15-25-year-olds make up 21% of 
the population12) and a lack of job opportunities once offered by Gulf nations. That aspect is 
clearly part of the backdrop to the uprising, but it does not account for everything.13
The first Intifada began as a movement within civil society, founded on the 
Palestinians’ broad network of associations since there was no budding government at the 
time. It invented a repertoire for struggle that was unarmed (demonstrations, strikes, etc.) and 
self-sufficient (resigning from Israeli administrative positions, boycotting Israeli products, and 
developing local production). This repertoire fit in with the popular mobilization favouring 
massive methods of action, a call for non-violent struggle and civil disobedience.
 Lastly, 
the confrontation afforded young people an opportunity to challenge how Palestinian society 
was organised and to renegotiate their place within it.  
14
                                                 
12 Philippe Lemarchand, Lamia Radi, Israël/Palestine demain, Paris, Complexes, 1996, p 43 and 139. 
 
13 Paul Fargues, Générations arabes. L’alchimie du nombre, Paris, Fayard, 2000. p 212. 
 
14 The campaign to that effect by the United National Leadership (Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and 
Gaza) in 
January 1988. See also: Hanna Siniora, ‘‘An Analysis of the Current Revolt’’, Journal of 
Palestinian Studies, n°67, spring 1988, p 3-13. 
 
 The 
methods of action in the first Intifada changed towards the end with the increasing number of 
militant groups and internal score settling; and weapons began to circulate. 
Young people viewed the struggle in a positive light. They believed in the possibility 
of overthrowing the occupation. Action required sacrifices, to be sure, and the dead and 
wounded were there to prove it. But they were convinced that victory was discernible on the 
horizon. The compelling heroic figure is that of the young man with a slingshot, a symbol 
through his youth and weakness of the legitimacy of the cause and of the people’s courage. 
Young people positioned themselves as highly valued and key actors in the national struggle, 
as well as on the social front. Indeed, the first Intifada was also a challenge to the patriarchal  
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structure and power of the leading families. They laughed at the children from Rimal (a chic 
neighbourhood in Gaza) who ‘‘threw chocolate at the Israelis.’’ Young people used their 
legitimacy as spearheads in the national struggle to become proactive about their own lives 
and in society. There are hundreds of anecdotes recalling this reversal. Here is one example 
among many: it’s the story of a kid who stands in the middle of a crossroads grasping a stone 
and manages to direct the traffic. As Daoud Kuttab said so expressively: ‘‘to throw a stone is 
to be ‘one of the guys’; to hit an Israeli car is to become a hero; and to be arrested and not 
confess to having done anything is to be a man” ’15
That vision was shared above all by young men. The young women had a more 
contrasting approach. For a minority of militants the first Intifada was truly a revelation, and it 
signalled their entry into politics: ‘‘The Intifada was like an exception. Things were permitted 
and possible for women. It could be seen as an exceptional time for women. Before, society 
didn’t even allow them to demonstrate in the streets. So there was a qualitative leap. Women 
really got a lot out of it. Now they are involved in the political leadership.’’
 
Paradoxically, that period was reinterpreted ten years later as both a defeat − through 
the failure of the Oslo Agreement (1993) − and a golden age. Indeed, while the first Intifada 
was a period of mourning and difficulties, it was also a time of opening up when everything 
seemed to be moving – the Israeli occupation and the traditional decision-making structures. 
The picture seemed all the more positive because, in response to the call for national unity, 
social differences were denied as such and wealth was hidden.  
16 Others recalled 
the reinforced control triggered by the fear of dishonour in an uncertain context: ‘‘I am 100 
000 times freer now than during the Intifada. My mother was always telling me ‘don’t go out, 
it’s dangerous.’ And now, with the Authority, we have more rights.’’17
                                                 
15 Daoud Kuttab ‘‘A Profile of the Stonethrowers’’, Journal of Palestinian Studies, n°67, Spring 1988, 
p 15. 
 
16 A 33-year-old woman who is a member of the Fatah steering committee in Gaza. Interviewed in Gaza, March 
1997. I would underline the fact that she was no longer a 20-year old, and thus had more freedom of movement. 
 
17 A 23-year-old woman in the refugee camp in Jabalya (Gaza); interviewed in March 1997. 
 
  
During the first Intifada, the investment in the national struggle could therefore be 
assimilated as a positive element in one’s life story. The national objective allowed an  
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interpretation of everyday experiences that made them something other than a series of 
humiliations, restrictions and failures. It contained those experiences and linked them to a 
moment in the long history of the struggle. Giving up the national objective would be like 
accepting to be merely a victim and having that unbearable everyday life as one’s only 
horizon. This transformation of reality brought about through the national objective continued 
until the second Intifada. 
 
 
Facing the Palestinian Authority 
 
‘‘I wonder a lot nowadays about the future of this generation,’’ declared Rauwia 
Shauwa, Palestinian legislative council member. ‘‘What will they found their values on? 
What does the word peace mean to them, for example? They have lived through violence and 
the deaths of their comrades, and they have fought for peace. For them today, peace means 
living enclosed in the 365 km² Gaza Strip. The world – and its appeal for young people – is 
inaccessible to them. Jerusalem is only an hour and a quarter away, yet it is inaccessible – like 
another planet to them. They see poverty on the rise, no perspectives ahead, and frustration. 
They have lived through all that and can find no hope in it.’’18
                                                 
18 Quoted in Angela Grünert, Der längste Welt heißt Frieden : die Frauen im ersten palästinensischen 
Parlament, Munich, DTV, September 1998; p 82. 
 
  
The Palestinian Authority’s arrival in the Territories (1994) and the Oslo Agreements 
(1993) were first seen as a victory by most people. However, public opinion quickly changed 
and young people began to see the situation as a failure – first, regarding the goal for national 
liberation and, secondly, that of setting up a Palestinian state, as well as their own place in 
society. The Palestinian Authority’s status was dependent on the Oslo Agreements and their 
enforcement. But for most young Palestinians, however critical they might be of the Oslo 
Agreements, the Authority was the first step towards achieving the national objectives they 
were fighting for. It had to embody the achievement of all their hopes.  
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A Triple Failure 
 
Post-Oslo first seemed like an external failure because relations with Israel had not 
evolved. The occupation was only barely less noticeable in everyday life. The territory was 
chopped up, divided into ‘‘bantustans’’ which created more obstacles to their freedom of 
movement. The military roadblocks were still there. The settlements continued along the lines 
of demarcation, depending on water resources and strategic positions.19 The increased control 
of the territory continued by creating bypasses and extending the settlements, including in the 
B areas under civilian Palestinian control. People began to feel that the enforcement of the 
Oslo Agreements was only a delegation of power that didn’t really change anything. ‘‘What’s 
the difference between asking permission to go out from an Israeli soldier or a Palestinian 
policeman who transmits the request to the Israeli army?’’ asked one young man from Gaza.20
Within society, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority did not live up to the 
hopes of the Intifada either. A working economy seemed illusory
 
Judgements were formed from everyday experiences, not from declarations at negotiating 
tables.  
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Furthermore, this period corresponded to the end of apparent social and political 
unanimity.
 outside a few areas 
(Ramallah essentially) and certain categories of the population. People’s feelings about the 
Palestinian Authority proved to be increasingly mixed. It was accused of corruption and 
clientelism, of inefficiency and powerlessness with regard to Israel. The criticism partly 
spared Arafat himself, however, concentrating on his entourage.  
22 Disparities became visible again. Some on the political scene went along with 
the Oslo Agreements while the Islamists officially refused to. Furthermore, social inequalities 
were displayed again, in particular with the return of the ‘‘Tunisians,’’23
                                                 
19 After the Oslo Agreements, housing units in the settlements increased 62%. Peace Now, 
Settlement Watch Report, October 2001. www.peacenow.org 
 
20 December 1997. 
 
21 From 1992 to 1996, Palestinian GNP dropped 36 %. Anthony Cordesman, Peace and War: Israel 
versus the Palestinians, Washington, CSIS, 2001, p 61. 
 
22 Starting in November 1994, the Palestinian police began firing on crowds demonstrating after the Israelis 
assassinated an Islamic Jihad leader. Nadine Picaudou, Les Palestiniens un siècle d’histoire, op. cit., p 251. 
 
23 Returning from Tunis, PLO officials and their families who came back with Arafat were often called 
‘‘Tunisians’’ by the Palestinian people. 
 
 who were reproached 
for their ostentatious lifestyle and wealth.  
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Lastly, control over young people was regained by the Palestinian Authority through 
two methods. The first was by reactivating traditional structures, particularly the power of 
leading families through the use of cronyism. Not that either of these had really disappeared 
during the first Intifada; on the contrary, they acted then as an organisational system in the 
absence of any political and police power other than the occupier. However, they were 
seriously challenged by the power of the young ‘‘heroes.’’ Groups took control of certain 
territories; others took the law into their own hands. The patriarchal power structure was no 
longer enforced in the same way and the young people could make their voices heard, using 
their legitimacy as combatants in the national struggle to temporarily renegotiate their status. 
When their legitimacy vanished and the Authority’s power was established, young people lost 
a large share of that new status.  
The Palestinian Authority feared the challenges from these young Palestinians who 
had stayed in the West Bank and Gaza. They had already tried to neutralize them during the 
first Intifada by playing local leaders off one another. To bring them back into the fold, the 
Authority also employed another method – integrating them into the police force.24
                                                 
24 Laetitia Bucaille, Gaza, la violence de la paix, Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, 1998, p 95-124. 
 
 It was the 
largest supplier of jobs in the Gaza Strip, offering young Intifada militants a position and an 
income, while depriving them of any responsibility. The upper levels in the hierarchy were 
reserved for returning PLO officials. This policy involved these young people in repression 
against their former co-militants, the Islamists.  
They lost their hero status, which had allowed them to challenge the social hierarchy 
and to acquire a valued position in society, without other mechanisms of social integration – 
such as work – taking over. On the contrary, these mechanisms showed themselves to be 
uncertain. Indeed, the dream of a Palestinian Taiwan crumbled like the many empty and 
unfinished buildings constructed along the Gaza coast. The economy was undermined by the 
increasing number of Israeli blockades, the innumerable obstacles to the free circulation of 
goods, the absence of direct job opportunities abroad and the drop in the standard of living – 
not to mention the Palestinian Authority’s management. Young graduates of Palestinian  
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universities were the first to be affected by the rise in unemployment. The jobs created by the 
Palestinian Authority did not compensate for the drop in the number of work permits in Israel. 
They found no work, nothing at their level of skill at any rate. This situation also had an 
impact on the many young people who had graduated abroad and hoped to come back and 
help rebuild their country.  
The Palestinian public became alarmed in 1997 when the suicide rate doubled.25 It 
involved young people first and foremost, particularly young women. Suicide attempts were 
also on the rise. The tendency was clear, even though figures on this subject should be taken 
cautiously, given the number of suicides not declared to avoid dishonour, or conversely of 
declared suicides concealing crimes of honour. Interviews conducted by Nifuz Albaqry with 
close relatives or with young people, who had attempted suicide, as well as various 
testimonials, clearly indicate that the conflicts with patriarchal authority and the family are a 
recurring factor in suicides.26 Teenagers who had been involved in the Intifada were faced 
with a reinforced system of authority and a crisis-ridden model of legitimacy – the nationalist 
ideology of the Intifada – which had allowed them to challenge that system of authority while 
preserving an acknowledged place within Palestinian society. They were convinced of their 
right to make their own decisions about how the community should function, but no longer 
possessed the necessary arguments to claim that right. In this context, conflicts of authority 
took on another meaning. Far from a limited confrontation, they became the very symbol of a 
situation in which any hope of building a project appeared impossible, and what little was 
offered in the present moment seemed highly precarious. Thus the crisis of the assimilation 
model proposed to these young people by Palestinian society is probably the place to look for 
the cause of the considerable increase in the suicide rate for that generation. In Durkheimian 
terms these are anomic suicides, i.e. occurring in changing societies where the usual points of 
reference have been turned upside down, and the individual’s self-image no longer 
corresponds to his social position.27
                                                 
25 In Gaza-City, the suicide rate went from 17 to 36 per 100 000 between 1996 and 1997, the world average 
being 10 per 100 000. 
 
26 Nifuz Albakri, “Zaherat al intihar” (the suicide phenomenon), Ramallah, Al Hayat al jadida, 28 June 
1997. 
 
27 Emile Durkheim, Le suicide, Paris, PUF, 1930, p 234. 
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 In the framework of this extreme disappointment with the Palestinian Authority and 
the feeling of failure, withdrawal into their personal lives was the most common solution. But 
before examining it, we must consider the existence of two political responses, between the 
first and second Intifada, each of which provided a way of dealing with and of tempering that 
failure. One was offered by Fatah, the other by the Islamists. 
 
 
Two Militant Solutions  
 
Fatah’s initial political solution for getting beyond the feeling of a double failure 
consisted in denying it while ensuring access to resources. Fatah militants were involved in 
the embryonic national construction which the Palestinian Authority was supposed to 
incarnate. They were the first to be involved in the daily ‘‘fiddling’’. Although they adapted 
to it, they nevertheless sought to sustain their belief in the Palestinian Authority as the best 
solution for the Palestinians. This was their reason for protecting Arafat. Fatah militants thus 
appeared to be ambivalent. On the one hand, they were strategically involved in the 
organisation. They were always looking for information about who was responsible for what, 
who decided what, and how to be on someone’s good side, to do a favour for someone and to 
stand out from the crowd of young militants. Through such moves they got closer to the few 
suppliers of resources in an extremely closed and limited field. At the same time, however, 
they felt great bitterness at being reduced to such opportunism. While their discourse 
consisted in saying ‘‘I have no choice, I want to get through this and help my family to get 
through it,’’28
                                                 
28 A 27-year-old Tanzim Fatah militant, Ramallah, March 2001. Tanzim means organisation and stands for the 
local branch of Fatah in the Palestinian Territories. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mainly come from its ranks 
but do not represent its official line. 
 
 this did not fit into their self-image as national heroes. By protecting Arafat the 
young militants were also protecting the image of their own integrity. Fatah militants were 
well-placed to know how the Palestinian Authority really operated, but they held Arafat’s 
assistants responsible instead of him. Maintaining trust in Arafat’s policies was an essential 
condition for continuing to see the beginnings of a real Palestinian state in the current 
situation. Indeed, that vision – as it developed among Palestinians – resided mainly in  
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Arafat’s strategic ability vis-à-vis the Israelis. Thus the anecdotes recounted among the 
militants to demonstrate Arafat’s intelligence or how he played around with his deputies’ 
expectations. Fatah militants were trying to strategically improve their position in a systemic 
field structured by the Palestinian Authority. 
The Islamists’ specificity – with regard to their discourse at any rate – resided in their 
proposal to overthrow the system rather than to evolve within it. Actually, the Islamist 
movement could have attempted to negotiate with Israel and the Palestinian Authority. But in 
fact it proposed an Islamist ‘‘solution”, trying to overcome the scepticism surrounding the 
national struggle. On the one hand, it banked on a change in the struggle’s methods and cast 
the negotiations as a mistake, proven in their eyes by both the situation in the field and by 
Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. They felt that a different balance of power needed 
to be established through the use of violence, in the form of suicide bombings. By altering the 
repertoire of actions and resorting to this new kind of violence, they would open up a situation 
that was blocked.29
                                                 
29 Georg Elwert "Sozialanthropologisch erklärte Gewalt’’ in Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan (ed.), 
Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002, p 330-367. 
 
  
Furthermore, the Islamists brought about a temporal change that enabled them to place 
themselves in a victorious perspective again. The long time frame of a jihad was not that of a 
short-term failure which could be overcome. On the domestic level, the Islamist solution 
involved an honest, egalitarian and social Islamic government. Respect for justice and 
equality would automatically go along with the government’s religious nature. The Islamists 
were thus seen to advantage from the point of view of morality and integrity and, as far as 
Hamas was concerned, relied on the support of a solid charity network. While the first bomb 
attacks (1993-1996) prompted widespread hostility among the population, the Islamists’ 
arguments hit home more and more as the situation gradually deteriorated and people became 
increasingly disappointed in the Authority. However, due to the repression this gain in 
sympathizers did not necessarily result in a greater number of militants. 
Yet, on the whole, the context led to a feeling of scepticism. Some militants clearly 
joined Fatah or the Islamists, but withdrawal was the dominant reaction towards the political  
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scene. The huge wave of involvement that had followed the first Intifada subsided. Young 
people focused on their personal projects by default.  
 
 
Shifting the Focus to Personal Projects 
 
Young people distanced themselves from their former involvement in the political 
process, henceforth characterized by failure. But that feeling of failure was not the sole 
explanation for their disenchantment. 
Young people were closed out of the political scene when the Palestinian Authority 
arrived. It was monopolized by the Authority, which surrounded itself with returning 
Palestinians, rather than those who had remained, and valued the notables amongst the latter 
whose power had been challenged during the first Intifada.  
The trend among young people to withdraw from politics and focus on their personal 
lives occurred all the more easily because their personal lives were becoming increasingly 
attractive just when the national scene had closed down and was associated with failure. 
‘‘Since childhood… we have already lost everything because of the occupation. You couldn’t 
come and go or do anything else during the Intifada. I was 12-13 years old at the beginning of 
the Intifada. I was in the streets instead of getting a good education, which would have 
enabled me to express my creativity. I was wounded twice, and imprisoned twice. Now I’ve 
finally achieved many of the things I hoped for, but it would be hard for me to describe 
myself as happy.’’30
                                                 
30 Iyyad, 25, whose father was a former labourer in Israel. His brothers have minor jobs with the Palestinian 
Authority. (Interviewed in Gaza, August 1999). 
 
 
The first Intifada was a difficult time of mourning and privations for the population, 
particularly for young women. As was the case at the end of numerous other conflicts, young 
people felt like ‘‘taking a breather,’’ relaxing, celebrating and taking care of themselves and 
their personal projects, which had been set aside during the uprising. 
The arrival of the Palestinian Authority had appeared for a short time to bring stability, 
and the new order was supposed to enable everyone to focus on building their future. It was 
an encouragement for young people to concentrate on projects related to their personal lives, 
which did not involve participation in the nation’s destiny, such as forming a couple and a 
family, studying, working, etc. But given the economic context, and after the short euphoric 
phase of hope triggered by the arrival of the Palestinian Authority, these projects were soon  
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restricted to a more limited horizon. ‘‘The future is bleak – because of the social situation. I 
had thought I might be able to get an education, but we have such a large family31 that no one 
has succeeded in saving up enough for their studies. But I’d really like to work in a 
kindergarten.’’32 Setting up a family means trying to find the necessary resources to build at 
least one private room in your husband’s parents’ house.33 Going to university means finding 
a job to help finance it. Getting a job is more about making sure you’re not without resources 
than actually choosing a career: ‘‘I think my future is going to be catastrophic. The financial 
situation is very bad and has dashed all my hopes. I’ll try to pursue my studies but I don’t 
have much faith in it.’’34
Among the ‘‘solutions’’ offered, we have not mentioned the ones that could have been 
provided by leftist organisations.
  
 
35
                                                 
31 Five brothers and five sisters. 
 
32 Iman, a 22-year-old woman with a high school diploma from the Bureij camp (Gaza). Her father was 
unemployed; her brothers worked as roofers in Israel whenever they could (Interviewed in July 1999). 
 
33 A quarter of all Palestinian homes have a density of three or more people per room. Majdi el-Malki, 
(ed.), Social Monitor, Special Issue 1995-1999, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), 
n° 4, May 2001, p 60. 
 
34 Ra'ed, 20, was studying pedagogy and Arabic. He took on any job he could find. He is the eldest son; his 
father, a plumber who was remarried after two divorces, has thirteen children (Interviewed at the Jabalya refugee 
camp, August 1999). 
 
35 Basically the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), founded in 1967, of Communist and Pan-
Arabic allegiance, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which grew out of a split in 
the former group in 1969, of a Marxist-Maoist persuasion. Both of them advocated active struggle against Israel 
and conservative Arab regimes, but the latter soon adopted a more moderate position. As for the Palestinian 
Democratic Union (FIDA), which split off from the DFLP in 1990, it has backed the Oslo Agreements. 
 
 Opposed to the Oslo Agreements, and lacking the 
Islamists’ ideological coherence, they were not perceived as capable of carrying out a political 
agenda. Indeed, their inability to do anything other than refuse was often denounced. 
In fact, most of their militants fell back on what could be called social solutions. 
Wanting to continue being involved in the political arena, but unable to do so, they created 
various social projects for teenagers, women, etc. With the advent of civil society, they were 
able to preserve their hopes for changing the Palestinian situation – but from the inside, by  
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working with the population. They began working with the NGOs and human rights 
organisations. In moving to this new sector, they encountered the difficulties of working 
within a vast network of associations – once a substitute for social services for the 
Palestinians – that was losing its independence. Indeed, for these organisations, access to 
international financing became limited because it was now moving to a great extent through 
the Palestinian Authority.36 Competition arose among the NGOs hoping to preserve their own 
role and their independence, and the ministries trying to take over their activities and 
financing. However, independently of these difficulties, the ‘‘social’’ militants insisted on the 
benefit they drew from these activities on a personal level. The value of their militant actions 
resided less in some hypothetical results in their attempt to modify the situation than in what 
they gave them directly – feeling useful, creating a network of relationships, developing their 
personality, etc. This is how a young activity leader in one centre, a member of the People’s 
Party37 and also head of an athletic association, explained the benefit he got from it: ‘‘I have 
an hourly schedule. I learned how to get organised. I’m happy in comparison to a lot of other 
young people because I have a goal, and the closer I get to it the happier I feel, even if I have 
to work 12 hors a day. My personality has gotten stronger through these activities.’’38
                                                 
36 Cf. Lamia Radi, L’élite palestinienne : stratégies de survie et modes d’influence (1967/1997), Ph.D thesis, 
IEP, 1997, p 308-347. 
 
37New name of the Communist Party 
 
38 Wa'el, 28, the eldest son, studied to become a teacher upon graduating from high school, but stopped after two 
years. His father was a labourer in Israel (Interviewed in Rafah, August 1999). 
 
  
Being involved in social work would then appear to be an intermediate path signalling 
disengagement from national objectives without meaning a complete withdrawal into one’s 
personal life. Furthermore, the idea of development indirectly prompted hope for enabling 
Palestinian society to achieve a degree of normality in everyday life despite the occupation. 
Such projects depended on whether or not the Palestinians had any room for manoeuvring. 
The multiple destruction by the Israeli army during the second Intifada also aimed at social 
and youth centres (with computer rooms, etc.) and did not encourage their continuing in that  
direction. As a result, although efforts by NGOs and human rights organisations improved  
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daily life a bit, they were not seen by most young people as a real solution to bring an end to 
the crisis. They saw them as totally inadequate and uncertain.  
‘‘Social work’’ therefore did not develop into a large-scale or satisfying alternative to 
political involvement. Some young people derived financial resources and personal 
satisfaction from it. Witnessing the poverty of Palestinian society on the front lines, and 
having little room to manoeuvre, they were very pessimistic the minute their analyses went 
beyond the most modest level of action. While they were extremely positive about the 
immediate results of this or that initiative they had undertaken, they had a completely 
different attitude when discussing the possibility of carrying out more widespread changes or 
long-term projects. 
 
The return to ‘‘personal happiness’’ thus occurred ‘‘by default’’ since it was more a 
withdrawal than a real promotion of individuals and their projects. It showed them adapting to 
a restricted field of possibilities and proposed no replacement for the hero figure. The national 
objective was not abandoned, although it had failed. Young women experienced this reversal 
differently. For them, focusing on personal projects seemed less like being ‘‘reduced’’ to that 
area of life due to the failure of the national struggle. That failure and the difficulty of 
developing projects seemed to them to be linked, one being the context for the other and vice 
versa. But they did not say that one led to the other: ‘‘If our society was in good hands, we 
could all have had our own dreams, but in our situation even dreams are sometimes 
forbidden.’’39
                                                 
39 Aïsha, quoted above. 
 
 
Gender identity had already led them to restrict themselves to the private sphere, so 
having to limit themselves to it was not a source of contradiction. While they had the same 
sentiment of failure regarding the Intifada, their situation as women had improved, as it was a 
less troubled and grief-stricken period of time. Social controls relaxed a bit. The arrival of the 
Palestinian Authority also meant that a police force was established. This naturally came 
along with the society’s community-based management methods, but it nevertheless provided 
an outside authority to call upon in a conflict. Prior to that, going to the police meant turning 
to the Israeli authorities.  
After Oslo, young Palestinians felt disillusioned about politics, although they did not  
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abandon their goal for nationhood. What was their subsequent line of reasoning for becoming 
involved in the Al-Aqsa Intifada? 
 
 
The Al-Aqsa Intifada 
 
Like every Friday since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the joint demonstration 
went from downtown Ramallah to the Nablus road, closed off by the Israeli army. Five 
hundred metres before the Israeli roadblock, the thousand demonstrators stopped. On the 
horizon were blocks of cement, Israeli soldiers in jeeps and sharpshooters in the buildings. 
Two tanks sat on the hillside. Most of the participants were spectators of the Friday afternoon 
ritual. A handful of young people took out their slingshots and moved closer to the soldiers. 
Their stones fell a few metres from the Israelis. Palestinian ambulances started shuttling back 
and forth, their sirens screaming amidst the tear gas, plastic bullets, and sometimes real 
bullets. The jeeps moved forward. One person was severely wounded. The youngsters fled to 
nearby fields. ‘‘Where are the Arabs?’’ an Israeli soldier sang sarcastically from the jeep’s 
loudspeaker, referring to a well-known song calling for unity in the Arab world. ‘‘At the 
beginning of the Intifada, they even joked around with us,’’ contended Hisham, a 16-year-old 
from the neighbouring Jalazun refugee camp. ‘‘They yelled ‘those who want 1 000 dollars on 
the left, those who want 5 000 dollars on the right.’ They were referring to the indemnities 
promised by Saddam Hussein for those who were wounded or died in the Intifada.’’ But 
behind the deserted houses a few Palestinian militants with roots in Fatah took position, 
armed with M16s. The stone throwers and spectators rushed back. The Israeli soldiers 
remained out of range and retaliated with grenades. The gunmen withdrew with their 
wounded. 
Hisham’s father, a refugee from the 1967 war, was a construction worker in Israel. 
Since the Israeli blockade had been erected, he had been forced to stay at home. His other 
sons, workers and delivery men, brought home a bit of money when they could find a site in 
Ramallah. Their sister was studying at the university to become a teacher, but the family 
couldn’t afford the registration fees for the upcoming semester. In any case, the road to Bir 
Zeit University was regularly closed.  
Hisham was the only member of the family to participate in the Al-Aqsa Intifada. He 
usually hid it from his relatives, who feared that he will be wounded or killed. Generally  
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speaking, this Intifada differed from the first one through the lack of participation among the 
people. ‘‘I don’t want to get killed for throwing stones,’’ exclaimed an economics student 
from Ramallah. ‘‘Naturally we must fight against the occupation. Our towns are overcrowded, 
open-air prisons. They’re killing us off slowly here. But what can you do about it? I took part 
in the first Intifada. What have we gained from all the sacrifices? The settlements are 
gradually surrounding us; the houses are being destroyed, and olive trees uprooted to build 
their roads. And all the water is going to the Israelis!’’  
The student pointed to the hillsides covered with terraced olive groves overlooking 
Ramallah. On top, you could see the white houses with red-tiled roofs of the Israeli 
settlements surrounded by high barbed-wire fences. The lawns were green and the streets well 
lit. The water and electricity never got cut off there. ‘‘Armed resistance is the last resort, but 
we need real leaders with a strategy,’’ added one student close to the left-wing parties. ‘‘Not 
like these little groups that fire at random, not someone like Arafat, who’s willing to sign 
anything and hand over Palestinian militants as long as he stays in power. But it’s too late for 
us. As soon as I get my degree, I’m heading for the U.S. There’s no future for anyone here.’’ 
Hisham felt the same way. He would never be a student and thought he had nothing to lose. 
Sporting a T-shirt featuring Che Guevara with his beret and red star, he waved the Lebanese 
Hezbollah’s yellow flag. The green bandana wrapped around his forehead said: ‘‘there is no 
God but God.’’ Hisham had no qualms about mixing and matching symbols. The important 
thing for him was to shed his victim status and to feel like a hero when he went out to face the 
Israeli army.  
 
In fact, the Al-Aqsa Intifada occurred in an unchanged ideological context and did not 
profoundly modify the way young people viewed the future of their nation. An end to the 
occupation continued to be seen by most of them as impossible in the short or long term. That 
view was reinforced by the wall of Israeli repression which quickly deployed its highest level 
of striking power. However, a small group moved past their disillusionment and began to 
speak up, shifting their focus from personal concerns to active involvement. 
At first, this Intifada was mainly based on structural changes and on the positions of 
various political figures. Political opportunities had changed and, consequently, so had the 
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involvement of the players themselves, without any modification of the meaning attached to 
the national struggle. At the same time, living conditions worsened, and Israeli demands 
during the negotiations (a total renunciation – of refugees returning, and of Jerusalem) 
challenged some core aspects of Palestinian identity. Hoping for at least some recognition 
from the Israelis – more than actually achieving their goal – the refugees’ identity became 
more fixed on the national struggle. The ‘‘refugee’’ criterion is not a distinguishing 
characteristic. 80 % of the population of Gaza is composed of refugees; half of them live in 
the camps. In the West Bank, refugees constitute 31 % of the overall population, and about 
one third of them live in camps.40 Due to the conditions of their everyday lives, refugees feel 
clearly more concerned about the results of the negotiations than the rest of the Palestinian 
population. But above all, if the possibility of returning were to completely vanish from the 
negotiations, they would lose their symbolic status and merely be poor people on the outskirts 
of Palestinian towns. The refugees are indeed on the very bottom of the Palestinian social 
scale. They are at a disadvantage on all fronts, even if UNRWA takes care of some services – 
such as schooling – which compensates somewhat for their poverty.41
                                                 
40 Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), Agenda, Jerusalem, 2002, p 
265 and Majdi el-Malki, Social Report, op. cit., p 94. 
 
41 Access to services is better for inhabitants of refugee camps than for those living in rural areas. 
Malki, Social Report, op. cit., p 58. 
 
 Their identification 
with the national destiny is therefore particularly strong. Through identifying with that 
history, their social situation has gone from something humiliating to a symbol of the injustice 
done to Palestinians. Their resistance, and their attachment to the towns and villages from 
which they were expelled, have enabled them to transcend their lot while building up sources 
of identity for Palestinian society as a whole. For this reason the refugee camps have been 
stigmatised as dangerous neighbourhoods which are hostile to outsiders – not good places to 
wander around at night. At the same time, they have been highlighted as places where people 
have held onto the keys to houses dating from before the 1948 and 1967 exiles, and which 
continue to be organised around people’s native villages. In the extremely harsh social reality 
of the camps, identifying with their collective history – their status as victims through exile 
and as freedom fighters through the national struggle – has prevented that identity 
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from being reduced solely to their economic woes. The reference to native villages ‘‘where 
we had a big house, land, etc.’’ is another way of denying their current economic status by 
evoking a magnificent past when things were different: ‘‘Hell was in the sky and paradise on 
my plot of earth.’’42
In political terms, Arafat’s return from the Camp David negotiations in July 2000 and 
then the failure of the Taba negotiations six months later were translated internally by a 
repositioning of the Authority and a reopening towards the base, which was more demanding. 
This change came from the Authority’s desire for renewed legitimacy, all the more necessary 
now that it had no more hopes of dealing with discontent through gains obtained in 
negotiations with Israel. In that light, Fatah’s ‘‘young guard’’ – the local leaders who were 
involved in the first Intifada in the field – became crucial players.
 
43
The Palestinian Authority, a Factor of Paralysis 
 They could provide the 
Authority with a way of gaining back the support of the people. A majority of them came 
from the refugee camps and were thus in contact with that part of the population most at risk.  
 
 
 
The Palestinian Authority began to open up slightly to these local militants, 
Palestinians who had remained in the territories. This opening up was also due to increased 
pressure: ‘‘Arafat is the one who leads us, he’s our president and we are with him; but there 
are two things about which the people must decide – the refugees and al-Aqsa. And the 
refugees are more important to the Palestinians because al-Aqsa is a Muslim issue that 
concerns all Muslims, whereas the refugees are only a Palestinian issue. But if he signs 
something against our rights, we shall continue to fight. But he won’t sign something like that 
because the negotiators are defending our message, although we fear international pressure, 
especially from America.’’44
                                                 
42 A refugee, about 60 years old, in the Balata refugee camp (Nablus), Interviewed in January 2001. 
 
43 Khalil Shikaki, Old Guard, Young Guard : The Palestinian Authority and the Peace Process At Cross 
Roads, 2001. www.amin.org/eng/khalil_shikaki/2001/00nov2001.html Published under the title “Palestinian 
Divided” in Foreign Affairs, 81/1, January-February 2002, p 89-105. As Jean-François Legrain highlighted, 
Khalil Shikaki nevertheless tends to raise this internal Fatah generational and structural factor into a ‘‘unique and 
final principal for the internal dynamics of the Palestinian leadership,’’ which is too broad a statement. Jean-
François Legrain, ‘‘Les Phalanges des martyrs d’Al-Aqsa en mal de leadership 
National’’, Maghreb-Machrek, n°176, Summer 2003, p 14. We will come back to this point in detail in the 
chapter on armed militants. 
 
44 Tanzim Fatah leader interviewed in the Balata refugee camp, February 2001. 
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 The feeling of paralysis became more urgent in this context: ‘‘Today I threw stones 
but I was careful and protected myself.45 I didn’t before, in 1996, or during the first Intifada. I 
threw the stones and wanted to die. But what’s the point now, when you know that Arafat 
might sign anything at any moment, like in 1996. That’s why people aren’t getting involved. 
They don’t trust Arafat. Yesterday Arafat decided to march through the streets. People didn’t 
want to move their cars for him. He waved, thinking it was like before. Not a chance! Nobody 
reacted.’’46
The Palestinian Authority’s involvement neutralized the capacity for protest 
initiatives. The Palestinian nationalist movement was institutionalised from the outside, 
provoking a number of consequences. First, new leaders were not allowed to develop. The 
people subsequently became more detached, no longer seeing themselves as the main actors 
in this mobilization. That role was passed on to the Authority, which was nevertheless 
perceived at the same time to be ineffectual. Lastly, potential militants feared being ‘‘double-
crossed’’ by the Authority, which was liable to supply Israel with their names as part of their 
security agreement: ‘‘There was a time when I wanted to do something, when I wanted to 
work. Now I feel like many things are unclear. The situation is not clear. The Palestinian 
leaders are not clear, so I can’t take a stand.’’
 
47
Forms of Mobilization 
 
The internal Palestinian situation, pessimism about the future of the national struggle 
and the severity of Israeli repression led to poorly strategized initiatives, which were 
implemented nonetheless, and to a narrower range of possible actions. The mobilization 
remained limited. Thus, the same methods were employed at the beginning of the al-Aqsa 
Intifada as during the first Intifada, which corresponded to a specific situation and had been 
elaborated beforehand. 
 
 
 
The second Intifada cannot be understood without referring to the first Intifada and to 
the participants’ memory of it. The types of action employed during the first Intifada were 
                                                 
45 This was a demonstration in March 2001 to open up the road to Bir Zeit. For a short period of time, it 
mobilized students and professors who had not been involved in the Intifada before then. 
 
46 Nasser, a student at Bir Zeit and a follower of the PFLP (interviewed in Ramallah, June 2001). 
 
47 Ubur, 26, a graphic designer. She came from Jenin, and worked in Ramallah. Her father ran a garage and her 
mother was a teacher. Interviewed in October 2000. 
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disqualified because they resulted in the Oslo Agreements, the failure of which led to that of 
the Palestinian Authority – the symbol of that agreement in the eyes of the people. Other 
forms of struggle subsequently became a focus of interest. Although the Palestinians saw their 
situation as unique, they observed what was occurring in Lebanon. The operations carried out 
by Hezbollah as well as Israel’s withdrawal (in 2000), reinforced the reference to another 
repertory of actions. 
The memory of the first Intifada, along with the example of these other groups, had a 
strong effect on the range of options perceived as possible by Palestinian youth. At the same 
time the meaning of the national struggle remained unchanged and, due to the lack of hope in 
the short term, no renewed strategy was conceivable. The struggle became removed from any 
tangible prospects, thus becoming meaningless and no longer requiring any strategic planning. 
It got out of control and became a mechanical action, linked to the specific logic of terrorist 
political violence, as highlighted by Michel Wieviorka.48
                                                 
48 ‘‘The ends and means are confused; subsequent projects are reduced to destroying whatever is opposed to the 
person’s subjectivity.’’ Michel Wieviorka, Sociétés et terrorisme, 
Paris, Fayard, 1988, p 21. 
 
 
In this context, people couldn’t get involved in organised initiatives with a clear 
strategy. Indeed, this was the main criticism students voiced about the Al-Aqsa Intifada. It 
could, however, take on meaning based on its short-term repercussions. The most obvious of 
these was the possibility of retaliating, not with the goal of overturning the situation, but 
rather of making the enemy accessible and vulnerable in the short term. Such an attitude 
would change the Palestinians’ feeling of being totally at someone’s mercy, of having no 
options, no fallback position or forum of expression in interactions where they were at a 
complete disadvantage. Advancing a long-term cause was no longer a strategic intention. 
Rather, through killing the adversary they would show him, and themselves, that the 
Palestinians were not out of the picture, that they still had options, that the situation was not as 
hopeless as it might seem, and the enemy was as accessible and vulnerable as they were. That 
change in attitude led to a macabre ‘‘quantification’’ in which the number of dead was 
constantly compared on both sides. The gruesome daily count was staged by the Sakakini 
theatre company in Ramallah, in a play where the actors were lost in a sea of  
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newspapers and yelled death tolls at each other, the results of a morbid contest. 
In the al-Aqsa Intifada, their initiatives were reduced in strategic terms to one plan – inflicting 
human losses on the enemy. Beyond this unanimously shared initial goal of challenging the 
enemy’s invincibility and the unilateral nature of the power struggle, the Islamists’ idea was 
to use as a weapon something perceived as the Israelis’ (only) “weakness” – their different 
relationship to death. Conscious of the illegitimacy of their occupation, the Israelis would not 
tolerate dying, contrary to the Palestinians whose cause was just. By inflicting losses on them, 
whatever the consequences of their retaliation on the Palestinians themselves, they would 
ultimately make the situation unbearable for the Israelis, who would eventually withdraw 
from the Territories...  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Young Palestinian Women and Nationalism 
 
 
 
For men, the nationalist ideology has been an unequivocal command to get involved 
and pattern themselves after heroic figures. For women, the national struggle paradoxically 
linked the call to become involved – in the interest of mobilizing all levels of society 
(militants urged classrooms of girls to take part in demonstrations, for example) – with the 
command to preserve Palestinian identity. Yet that identity was expressed in particular 
through the gender differences which characterize social organisation. Maintaining the social 
structure and those gender differences was a way of asserting one’s pride against the occupier. 
Gender differences could then clearly be seen as more important than generational ones, to 
such an extent that it would be erroneous to speak of a generation with respect to women. 
Only women students enjoyed a specific generational status (5% of young women have 
benefited from higher education49
The First Call: Enabling an “Enduring Identity” 
). 
 
 
 
The ‘‘preserved’’ religious and moral values of Palestinian society are contrasted with 
the ‘‘pernicious and perverted’’ ones of Israeli society. This clash of values has mainly been 
expressed through the issue of women’s behaviour. Thus, in times of unrest, Palestinian  
                                                 
49 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, The Demographic Survey of Westbank and Gaza Strip: Preliminary 
Report; Ramallah, March 1996. 
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society would ‘‘go overboard’’ in enforcing social controls to cultivate the ‘‘purity’’ of a 
society faithful to its traditions and principles. Losing ground on the military front, the 
Palestinians began to promote an ‘‘ethical’’ plan where they would have the upper hand. The 
specificity of national struggles lies in their call for change while often emphasizing the need 
to remain rooted in the land. Other aspects of legitimacy refer to the law, in particular the 
right to self-determination; but struggles over land rights are often justified through trying to 
prove a permanent presence of the people on their land. One way of resolving this inner 
tension within the national struggle – between the demand for change and the desire to 
maintain a temporal and spatial connectedness – is to divide it up by gender. The men are 
assigned the struggle for change, while the women are asked to personify permanence. This 
link between the control of women and identity within nationalist movements is not specific 
to the Palestinian struggle. On the contrary, it is quite a general characteristic. It has been 
highlighted by Monique Gadant with regard to Algeria: ‘‘it is the women, more than the men, 
who have been assigned the task of preserving the soul of the community as it strives to 
assimilate science and technology.’’50 This was also the case for Egypt in the days of 
Nasser.51 Thus the nationalist ideal is often manifested through specific social structures and a 
focus on gender. A ‘‘mythical vision of the world’’52
                                                 
50 Monique Gadant, Parcours d’une intellectuelle en Algérie : nationalisme et anticolonialisme dans les 
sciences sociales, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1995, p 132. 
 
51 Valentine Moghadam, Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies, Cairo, The 
American University Press, 1993. 
 
52 Francine Muel-Dreyfus, Vichy et l’éternel féminin, Paris, Seuil, 1996, p 11. 
 
 based on the reconstruction of the 
‘‘eternal feminine’’ is advanced in an attempt to prove its legitimacy. During times of defeat, 
when legitimacy and identity falter, this focus on women as the upholders of a ‘‘permanent 
identity’’ is particularly strong.  
As guarantors of ‘‘permanence’’ – a crucial source of legitimacy in the struggle to 
prove an older right to the land – women and their behaviour are a deciding factor in the 
nationalist cause. In this context, national identity is shaped by reconstructing the past, a task 
of ‘‘reincarnation’’ and preservation entrusted to women. It is built on three main  
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areas – aspects of the same quest for permanence raised to the level of a gender-based myth. 
Women are associated symbolically with the eternal land of Palestine, as well as being the 
‘‘heirs’’ and guardians of a lifestyle designed to preserve their inaccessibility, and thus the 
honour of the community. The Islamists relay that message, but they are not the only ones. 
The great Palestinian poets have also associated women with the land of Palestine. The 
different areas of cultural resistance may be associated or only partially asserted.  
 
 
Women as a Symbol of the Earth 
 
The land has become the Palestinians’ motherland through its women and their 
constantly repeated gestures. Beyond the more or less martial songs sung in all struggles, the 
Palestinian struggle has produced a rich poetic tradition which has had a strong impact on the 
population as a whole, although its forms of expression are not always easy to understand. 
Anouar Mowaf associates the choice of poetry and the relationship to a lost and idealised 
land.53 Mahmoud Darwish also comes to mind. He is a herald of this subject, a poet with an 
international reputation who speaks of Palestine as if it were a woman or, conversely, 
addresses his loved one as if she were his native land.54 Women in this context lose their 
individuality and are reduced to symbols of the nation or of the land.55 Mahmoud Darwish is 
an important figure in a powerful movement56
Sons of bitches, can a woman being raped keep quiet? 
 which reaches beyond Palestine. Indeed, the 
Palestinian cause has inspired a number of poets throughout the Arab world. Palestine is 
constantly compared to a woman in these songs and poems, spinning out the same metaphor: 
 
Jerusalem is the bride of your Arabness!! 
So why did you usher all the fornicators of the night into her room, 
And stand eavesdropping  
from behind the door to the screams of her torn virginity? 
You drew your daggers, and swelled with pride  
And you yelled at her to keep quiet,  
for honour’s sake How honourable of you!!  
57
                                                 
53 Anwar Mowaf, A., Thanâ’iya al-ard/al marâ, al kalira, June 1995, p 62. 
 
54 Anwar Mowaf, A., Thanâ’iya al-ard/al marâ, op. cit., p 65. 
 
55 Birgit Embalo, Angelika Neuwirth and Friederike Pannewick, Kulturelle Selbstbehauptung der 
Palästinenser. Survey der Modernen Palästinensischen Dichtung. Beirut/ Würzburg, Ergon 
2001, p 28. 
 
56 For a complete review of this literature, see Birgit Embalo, Angelika Neuwirth and Friederike 
Pannewick, Kulturelle Selbstbehauptung der Palästinenser, op. cit. 
 
57 Excerpt from a poem Muzaffar al Nawwab. Translation into English: Bardenstein, Carol;  “Stirring words: 
traditions and subversions in the poetry of Muzaffar al-Nawwab - Modern Iraqi Literature in English 
Translation”, Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Fall, 1997. 
An Iraqi poet now living in exile due to his political criticism and membership in the Iraqi Communist Party. His 
poems soon acquired a reputation in the Arab world, in particular for their insolence and impropriety. 
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The same subject of a ‘‘raped Palestine’’ can be found in political speeches and 
leaflets. The earth is thus given a sexual personification – as a woman liable to be taken and 
raped, and as a mother. Palestine, the child-bearing, nourishing land, thus becomes a sacred 
person who should have been shown great respect but to whom violence was done instead. 
This personification of the earth endows it with feelings, and Palestine is then said to be 
suffering. It becomes a respectable but weak woman towards whom one has certain 
responsibilities, and who must be protected. The ‘‘rape’’ of Palestine reveals the men’s failure 
in their role of guardian and protector. Since maintaining honour is linked to women’s 
inaccessibility, the honour of the community is at risk.   
Associating women with the land has had an effect on how they are represented. In 
this metaphor, the focus is on sexual vulnerability and on their role as mothers. Conversely, 
Palestinian women are also observed through those two images. Nationalist representations 
highlight the need to protect them and make them inaccessible. The subject of fragility is all 
the more relevant because Palestine has been ‘‘invaded’’, and the rape has already taken 
place. While personifying the earth, this association between women and the earth also 
objectifies women. They become objects that one possesses and disposes of. Women are 
characterized as having the passivity and powerlessness of an object. They are taken and 
raped. 
Along with its corresponding image of cultural authenticity, this representation of 
women holds them responsible for ensuring the continuation of ‘‘traditional’’ culture and its 
customs, presented as unchanging. Through them, this connection to a long time period must 
continue to be perceived by others, signalling the Palestinians’ deep roots in the land and thus 
the legitimacy of their presence. 
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Women as Bearers of Cultural Identity  
 
The Israeli occupation provoked a contraction of identity, which focused mainly on 
religious aspects and morals, making women the principal ‘‘guardians’’ of cultural 
authenticity. As Nadine Picaudou has observed, ‘‘the peasant women’s embroidered robes 
seem to encapsulate the memory of the land, itself a symbol of the community.’’58
In this discourse around the national struggle, women are a vector of cultural 
continuity and denote the ancientness of their culture on the land. They supply and transmit a 
fundamental identity upon which their right to the land is also based. Indeed, they represent 
the ancientness of that civilisation’s presence there, as well as its adaptation to specific 
conditions of life (water consumption, agriculture, etc.). The women are invested not with the 
fight against the enemy but with ‘‘preserving intact’’ their rituals and customs despite all the 
‘‘compromises’’ and adaptations required in the struggle, or which arise through contact with 
the occupier. Nationalism distinguishes here between material identity on the one hand, which 
is indeed in the process of modernizing and needs this renewal for the struggle to be effective, 
and spiritual identity on the other hand. Women are the guarantors that Palestinian society 
will preserve its soul in the conflict with Israel and, as with other Arab countries, in its 
encounter with the West, which is in a stronger position ideologically speaking. That process 
is not specific to the Palestinians: ‘‘a woman’s place in Muslims societies defines the stakes in 
the process of Westernisation and, beyond the women’s actual living conditions, poses a 
general challenge to the culture and civilisation.’’
  
59
As in many other experiences, the appeal to ‘‘tradition’’ has in fact come from a broad 
process of reconstruction rather than through transmission of age-old customs.
 This is particularly evident in the 
distinction between, on one hand, technical progress and consumption (positive), and on the 
other, morals (to be preserved), which Islamists’ use as a foundation in constructing a modern 
Islamic identity. The defensive attitude in the Palestinian Territories is all the stronger 
because of the military occupation and ongoing conflict. 
60
                                                 
58 Nadine Picaudou, ‘‘Identité-mémoire et construction nationale’’ in Nadine Picaudou, (ed.), ‘‘La 
Palestine en transition’’, Les annales de l’autre Islam n°8, Paris, ERISM, INALCO, 2001, p 342. 
 
59 Nilufer Göle, Musulmanes et modernes, voile et civilisation en Turquie, Paris, La Découverte, 1993, p 
8. 
 
60 In this respect, the research conducted by Emma Aubin-Boltanski on Palestinian pilgrimages has clearly 
shown the process of re-appropriation and alteration which is taking place. Emma Aubin-Boltanski, ‘‘Moïse 
ou Salâh ad-dîn : pèlerinage religieux/pèlerinage politique en Palestine’’ in Nadine Picaudou, (ed), ‘‘La 
Palestine en transition’’, Les annales de l’autre Islam n°8, Paris, ERISM, INALCO, 2001, p 373-397. 
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Palestinian case, this has gone through the intermediary of the Islamists’ discourse. As 
Graham Usher observed: ‘‘the Islamists have also succeeded by ‘inventing’ an Islamist 
tradition, which is now experienced − particularly by the generations formed by the uprising − 
as an integral part of the Palestinian national identity.’’61
In that context, when a woman breaks with ‘‘tradition’’ it constitutes a social and 
symbolic breakdown in which one becomes a traitor to the nation, joins the enemy and is a 
weakening factor. Any desire to allow women to change their behaviour is frowned upon, 
unless it reinforces coercion in the name of a reconstituted tradition. On the other hand, signs 
of excellence regarding knowledge of customs for celebrations, cooking, embroidery, etc. are 
valued. Traditional arts are infused with nationalist themes – dabka dances to revolutionary 
songs, which are a ‘must’ at meetings, embroidery blending the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the 
Palestinian flag, etc. Tellingly, exhibitions to the memory of ‘‘martyrs’’ and the national 
struggle always have a ‘‘traditional arts’’ section with embroidered dresses, old farming tools, 
Palestinian literature, etc. ‘‘Promoting the people’s heritage, which displays their attachment 
to the land, is another strategy of passive resistance against the occupation (sumud
  
62
                                                 
61 Graham Usher, ‘‘Women, Islam and the Law in Palestinian society’’, Middle East International, 23 
September 1994, p 17. 
 
62 Nadine Picaudou, Identité-mémoire et construction nationale, op. cit., p 343 
 
).’’ 
observed Nadine Picaudou. 
 
Women have been transformed into a symbol of ‘‘womanhood’’, a respectable and 
inaccessible sacred image; and their behaviour is not meant to challenge the characteristics of 
that image. This process has been described explicitly in contemporary Palestinian literature, 
by Sahar Khalifa for example: ‘‘You see, my boy, in the first poem I was the mother. Now I 
am the land. Tomorrow I will surely become a symbol. Wake up, my boy. I am neither the  
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mother, nor the land, nor a symbol. I am a human being. I eat, I drink, and I dream. I make 
mistakes, I lose my way, I suffer, and I speak to the wind.’’63
Women’s Inaccessibility Preserves Honour 
  The metaphor goes round in a 
circle – from the personification of the earth to the objectification of women – to produce a 
kind of semiotic symbiosis. Thus the loss of the land refers back to the loss of honour, 
associated with preserving women’s inaccessibility. Losing that sense of honour related to the 
women’s reputation also means losing the land. This is evident in the Palestinian proverb al 
ârd ‘ard (The land is honour). 
 
 
 
The honour of families, and of the entire community, lies in preserving the reputation 
of women and in particular of girls. Maintaining gender-based aspects of social organisation 
vis-à-vis the occupier takes on the additional meaning of restoring honour flouted on the 
military and political fronts. Controlling women is one of the stakes in maintaining power 
within societies, as well as between them. Keeping intact a mode of functioning that 
differentiates gender vis-à-vis the enemy is also a way of holding onto power. This is 
manifested by valuing a community-based, ‘‘moral’’ lifestyle, to which the Palestinians refuse 
access to a ‘‘perverted’’ enemy. Women, overseeing a protected private space whose honour 
is based on inaccessibility, become the guarantors of an ‘‘unviolated’’ space − thereby 
limiting the extent of domination. The power at stake is also perceived by the occupier here. 
As the Bosnian conflict showed us, destroying the other is also carried out through the 
destruction of that space and thus through the raping of women.64
                                                 
63 Sahar Khalifa, L’impasse de Bab Essaha (1990), Paris, Flammarion, 1992, p 159. 
 
64 Véronique Nahoum-Grappe, « Guerre et différence des sexes, les viols systématiques en Ex- 
Yougoslavie, 1991-1995 », in Cécile Dauphin and Arlette Farge (ed), De la violence et des femmes, 1999, 
Paperback edition, "Points" collection, 2001, p. 175-204. 
 
  
This aspect is quite clear in interactions with Israeli soldiers. The latter avoid finding 
fault with women when they do not wish to be confronted with violent reactions in the streets; 
or, on the contrary, they insult them more when they want to humiliate people, especially 
during house searches. Conversely, on the Palestinian side, the men are particularly sensitive  
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to being snubbed by female Israeli soldiers. They feel doubly humiliated − as occupied people 
and as men. A young Palestinian working in Israel described his latest crossing of the Eretz 
checkpoint as being particularly and intentionally offensive. Two young women soldiers were 
doing the checking and giving the orders. They were sitting alone on a little wall as hundreds 
of workers walked by. His description significantly emphasised their attitude. Domination 
through body language is particularly striking at roadblocks, a subject I will come back to 
later on. Here it has a double meaning, as gender hierarchy is also that of bodies and space. 
The physical ‘‘freedom’’ of these women ‘‘sitting above us on the little wall, swinging their 
legs nonchalantly, with their weapons next to them’’65 was felt to be proof that the 
Palestinians were seen as totally inoffensive and laughable despite their numbers, and that 
gender hierarchy as it is structured in Palestinian society was being transgressed.  In this 
incident the pride of a person who thought ‘‘I may be humiliated but I’m still a man’’ was 
undermined. The humiliation affects gender identification, as described by Goffman here: ‘‘A 
man can take a whole day of people exercising their power over him, and endure the situation 
on nearly every level of society; yet, when he goes home at night, he’s back in an 
environment where he is the dominant one. And wherever he goes outside his home, women 
may be there to prop up his apparent competence.’’66
                                                 
65 Interviewed in Gaza, March 1997. 
 
66 Erving Goffman, L’arrangement des sexes (1977), Paris, La Dispute, 2002, p 78. 
 
  
 
Highlighting the purity of a thousand-year-old custom that has been ‘‘maintained’’ is 
done to prove it is rooted in the land and to deny that legitimacy to the ‘‘perverted and 
Westernised’’ enemy. Women are given the responsibility of maintaining their identity − the 
only place where a sense of power can be expressed and where Israeli domination cannot be 
exercised. The control over women becomes even stronger in times of trouble when there is a 
need to stress one’s difference of identity from the occupier. The ideological constructs 
around the national struggle say ‘‘show yourself’’ to the men and ‘‘hide yourself’’ to the 
women, ‘‘be active’’ to the men and ‘‘be passive’’ to the women, ‘‘occupy the public arena’’ 
to the men and ‘‘stay within the private sphere’’ to the women. Women’s behaviour no longer  
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refers solely to the community, but becomes one of the stakes in the conflict. Preserving 
women, maintaining their reputation and their inaccessibility to soldiers are all part of 
supporting the national struggle. In the case of the concrete struggle, there is a call for action; 
in terms of preserving cultural integrity, a call for ‘‘inaction’’. The consequences with regard 
to acknowledgement for participation in the national effort are not the same. Women are not 
valued as heroines for strictly following the precepts of a decent life. On the other hand, they 
are considered to be traitors in addition to being delinquent if they don’t. There is no show of 
recognition about the women’s ‘‘contribution’’, although there is a great deal of it concerning 
the woman-as-mother in her traditional costume − a symbol of eternal Palestine.  
 
 
The Second Command: Militating 
 
The national discourse also emphasized the difficulty of the Palestinian struggle and 
the need to marshal all available forces, including women. It advocated their active 
participation as militants, if not as combatants. While Palestinian television most often 
showed women weeping beside a dead child, it also showed women’s demonstrations and 
their presence in Palestinian training camps for fedayin in the 1970s. 
 
The National Struggle and Women’s Liberation  
 
Should women’s liberation be promoted so they can participate more effectively in the 
struggle, as the women’s organisations in left-wing parties asserted? Or, on the contrary, 
should the two issues be separated to avoid introducing a division within the struggle for 
national liberation? The emancipation of women would then be put off until the end of the 
national struggle, while not excluding women from being activists within the boundaries of 
their family and social obligations. Contrary to charity organisations, the political women’s 
organisations sought to bring the two stakes of women’s liberation and national liberation 
together, in the latter’s interests.  
But these changes favouring the emancipation of women were not neutral; they were 
experienced as challenges to the structure of society, and as such, as a potential weakening 
element. Therefore they were expected to remain silent about their demands in the name of  
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sacred national unity. Otherwise, their demands would appear to be created by an internal 
enemy. The national focus seemed contradictory for the girls whom it was asking to get 
involved, while simultaneously holding them responsible for the permanence of the social 
structure. That contradiction made their experience far more fragmented. 
 
 
A Limited Commitment During the First Intifada 
 
Women, especially younger ones, found themselves in an unusual situation during the 
first Intifada. Indeed, on a personal level they lost more than anyone else during the uprisings. 
Social controls, including over them, increase considerably during such times. There are 
several factors underlying this phenomenon. The first one involves the perception that women 
are prone to being less safe in public places, with the concomitant risk of dishonour. So their 
access to those places is reduced. Such periods are also times of mourning inside the 
community, and most celebrations and other public expressions of joy are suppressed or 
confined to private environments. Opportunities for legitimate outings are therefore also 
reduced. Studies in Gaza have shown that young women have given more ‘‘conservative’’ 
answers than their mothers about how many children to have, what age to get married at, what 
is permitted/forbidden, etc. This can be widely attributed to the context of mourning and 
coercion in which they have grown up.67
                                                 
67 According to two corroborating studies: M-S Abou Nijalan, The Negative Adaptation Mechanisms of Women 
Their Social Situation, Gaza, Al Azhar University, March 1997, unpublished, and Rema Hammami, ‘‘Women in 
Palestinian Society’’ in Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: A Survey of Living 
Conditions; FAFO, 1993. The observation about ‘‘conservative attitudes’’ is based in the first study on an 
analysis of how they identify themselves; the results put the young women closer to their grandmothers than to 
their mothers. The second study asks a series of questions about freedom of movement, age at marriage, money 
available, etc. Their positions show a regression compared to their mothers.  
 
 
Older women, who enjoyed greater freedom of movement, were thus able to 
participate in the first Intifada, which they readily described as a time of commitment that 
established specific modes of participation for them, with a new development in their role as 
mothers. The women would often rush at the Israeli soldiers in an attempt to rescue teenagers 
by pretending they were their sons. As for the younger women, they evoked the first Intifada 
in negative terms as a time of complete control. They in particular appreciated its end and the 
arrival of the  
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Palestinian Authority.  
During the first Intifada, according to a study by Barber, young women participated 
almost exclusively in demonstrations (80%) and food distribution (57%). Above all, the 
intensity of their involvement differed from the men’s. More than 50 % of the young men 
declared having ‘‘often’’ participated in events, against only 20 % of the women.68
Gender and Repertory of Contention 
 The study 
was carried out among young people in Gaza aged 20-27 who were taking part in a UNDP 
(United Nations Development Program) training programme and university students. Both 
were already involved in networks through which they were more likely to be politically 
active.  
 
 
 
During the first Intifada, women were able to find ways of being involved − civil 
resistance, demonstrations, promoting nutritional self-sufficiency, etc. − which could be 
reconciled with only a limited challenge to gender identity. Economic independence was 
based on a return to family businesses in exchange for Israeli manufactured goods. Initiatives 
that encouraged women to make their own bread and preserves was in perfect agreement with 
gender identity and an emphasis on tradition − the sign of their legitimacy on the land. The 
armed struggle was a different story. Although the presence of women among the fedayin and 
figures such as Leïla Khaled are often pointed to, they were nonetheless exceptions. Above all 
it corresponded to a time (the 1970s and early 1980s) when Palestinian nationalism − in the 
wake of the Nasserist movement and clearly less marked by Islamist themes − did not use the 
same constructs regarding gender and political involvement.  
‘‘It’s hard to bring girls into our organisation. It’s also because there are all kinds of 
boys − educated or not, coming from villages; there are all sorts of boys, which is great, but it 
doesn’t necessarily make the organisation very correct for the girls. Lots of things have to be 
changed for the women to become integrated. There were lots of women at the 
demonstrations at the beginning of the Intifada, but now there are none. The women’s groups  
                                                 
68 Brian K. Barber, ‘‘What Has Become of the ‘Children of the Stone’ ’’, in The New Generation, 
Jerusalem, Palestine-Israel Journal, Volume VI, n°4, 1999/2000; p 8 and 14. 
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are not coordinated and the demonstrations are not publicized enough. Maybe people are tired 
and don’t know how to fight; they kill us and we can’t kill a single one of them.’’69
Limiting the range of action to its most extreme forms reduced the women’s potential 
involvement even more. While engaging in militant actions could enable them to acquire a 
certain status at the cost of a conflict with their own gender identity, entering into such 
extreme forms of action created such a huge contradiction that their involvement was nearly 
impossible. Most of the time they remained on the periphery, engaging in marginal activities 
reminiscent of the first Intifada − like the handful of teenage girls who were gathering stones 
for confrontations at check-points: ‘‘Even though I’m little, and even though I’m a woman, I 
can still do something. But my anger won’t be vented even by doing little things like throwing 
stones. I’m never scared. Ever since I was a little girl, I’ve dreamt of being like those freedom 
fighters who used to go up into the mountains. But until now I couldn’t do it. I only made it to 
the military roadblock once in the past seven days. You feel this anger and you don’t know 
how to let it out unless you do something, even if it’s just a tiny little thing. You can express 
your feelings, even if it’s just with little stones. Lots of people make fun of these stones. But 
in my opinion these little stones are going to do a lot; even if it doesn’t affect them, it will 
affect us − as a nation expressing its opinions.’’
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69 Interview with Rana, a shabiba militant from Ramallah (see below more excerpts from the interview and a 
more precise description of Rana).  
 
70 Badria, a 16-year-old schoolgirl, Ramallah, October 2000. 
 
  
Evident in these words is the double challenge required for women to become 
involved. On the one hand, they must overcome gender representations which consider 
political involvement outside their sphere: ‘‘even though I’m a woman.’’ On the other hand, 
they were confronted − specifically in the second Intifada − with being disqualified from this 
kind of action, which was nonetheless more accessible to them than armed struggle: ‘‘Lots of 
people make fun of those stones.’’ Older women joined the first aid teams in greater numbers 
at the scene of the confrontations and demonstrations. The women militants, who already 
belonged to other groups, had a hard time pursuing their work due to the situation. 
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But despite the women’s feelings of failure being just as intense as the men’s, they 
were less tempted to take them on as a grim commitment. Other forms of involvement 
remained valid for them, however unpromising. Yet the general disqualification of forms of 
civil resistance also concerned them. ‘‘I don’t want to die just because I threw a stone. And 
the Authority will never give us any weapons; we are an unarmed people and will stay 
unarmed. Because if we were to engage in an armed struggle, international opinion would 
turn against us; but in any case, it’s already against us as it is. In France during the Second 
World War the Resistance movement carried out many operations, and no one thought 
anything of it; it was the path to liberation. But we Palestinians aren’t given those same rights. 
They don’t talk about the settler who killed a Palestinian while he was just sitting in his living 
room waiting for his mother to finish mending his trousers; they never talk about those 
things.’’71
Becoming Involved Nonetheless 
  
 
 
 
The women’s request to enter the public sphere in order to support the national 
struggle and their effective entry continued to clash with the refusal to accept the concomitant 
challenge to traditional identities. It seemed contradictory to demand ‘‘passivity’’ in the 
interests of the struggle, while officially valuing involvement. Women then had the possibility 
of playing the second command against the first, of appealing to the higher legitimacy of the 
national struggle against the community-based remnants which might handicap it. This 
‘‘neutralisation’’ of the first command did not signal freer morals, but rather access to relative 
freedom of movement and a degree of mixing between sexes due to the obligations of 
militancy. This reversal was difficult because it required challenging gender identity, albeit 
rarely in a direct way. However, since the first command was not explicitly stated, it was 
difficult to challenge directly. The women’s involvement was officially supported in 
Palestinian public spheres, even though it was seen as less important than the men’s.  
These images were reinforced by the omnipresent collaboration with the  
                                                 
71 Rana, a shabiba leader, Ramallah, quoted above. 
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Israelis, and by the rumours and information circulating about the methods employed by the  
latter to convince or force them to it. A challenge to someone’s reputation or a doubt about 
their sexual conduct had serious consequences, particularly for women. Testimonials by 
repentant collaborators broadcast on Palestinian television insisted on the existence of such 
methods. A book of testimonials distributed by resistance committees from the first Intifada 
left a strong impression on people’s minds. It tells the tragic story of a young woman who was 
drugged while having her hair done, then stripped and photographed with a man. Rather than 
collaborate because of the compromising photographs, the young woman committed suicide. 
Rumours circulating about Israeli recruiting methods fed the feelings of insecurity regarding 
young women’s reputations and thus of control over their conduct. 
The case of former inmates in Israeli prisons was particularly significant. Their time in 
prison endangered their reputations. Contrary to the male prisoners, they were considered less 
as victims or heroines than as women at fault who may have been raped. Their families often 
hid them when they got home and allowed them no social life.72
Still, some young women became involved in militant structures, defying social taboos 
in the name of the supremacy of nationalism and the national struggle. Such cases were rare, 
but the cause of nationalism − and sometimes religion for Islamist women − helped them to 
confront these taboos, while being challenged and criticised all along the way by their 
extended families. The following is a testimonial
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72 According to an unpublished study carried out by Shadia Sarraj, director of a rehabilitation centre for women 
in Gaza. Interviewed in Gaza, March 1997. 
 
73 Ramallah, June 2001. 
 
 from Rana, 28, quoted above. She was a 
member of the executive committee of the shabiba (Fatah) in Ramallah. The shabiba claimed 
6,000 members in Ramallah and its environs. Rana had a BA in economics. She was from a 
middle-class family from Ramallah. Her father was a hairdresser, two of her brothers were 
civil servants with the Palestinian Authority (a teacher and an accountant), another brother 
was at university, and her married sister lived in the United States.  
‘‘I was 15 when the first Intifada began. My whole family is in Fatah, but at the time I 
wasn’t involved in anything. I participated in demonstrations with the other girls at school, 
but we went to the demonstrations of all the parties without distinction. My older sister 
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belonged to Tanzim Fatah; I went into the Fatah women’s organisation. I got into trouble with 
the family right away because they thought I was too young to be involved. But I stuck to my 
guns. But the women in the organisation were all older than me, and I felt like being involved 
with people my age. At the time the Fatah youth group (Shabiba) didn’t exist, but there was 
the (Fatah) students’ union, so I started working with them.  The boys and girls were together; 
we held our meetings in the library. Then I joined the Fatah organisation (Tanzim), where the 
work was much more secret.  But it was shortly before high school examinations, and my four 
brothers and sisters were in prison. So my mother said to me: ‘you’ve got to stop this and get 
your diploma; what will we do if you end up in prison too?’ I stopped and got my diploma. 
Then I went to Bir Zeit University. I became a highly active militant in youth movements. My 
brother and sister got out of prison. They were in a Shabiba at the university and I started 
working with my brother. In 1995, the Fatah Shabiba was created. I was a member of the 
executive committee with nine other women and twenty-five men. It was hard to bring girls 
into the movement because their parents usually didn’t want them to. In my case, my parents 
are very open-minded, and they knew I wanted to work with Fatah after getting my diploma. 
‘‘Now it’s different. It’s harder because of the situation. For instance, I used to take 
food to the Palestinian security force roadblocks and get home around midnight. Now my 
mother keeps saying: ‘stay at home; what will people say? All she does at home is sleep and 
shower.’ My father doesn’t talk about it much, but my mother! I hear remarks like that all the 
time. The problem here is that people talk about each other a lot, especially the old women. 
Our neighbours are very conservative, close-minded people. They did nothing during the first 
Intifada. On the contrary, they insulted us when we wrote slogans on the walls. That’s also 
why my mother is afraid they’ll start talking. So she tells me I’m a woman and should stay at 
home. I’ve stuck to my guns so far.  
‘‘I think things have also changed now because I’m the only woman at home. My 
sister is married and lives in the United States, and she was a leader. During the first Intifada, 
though, my mother used to stand in the doorway to see if there were any soldiers so she could  
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tell us to go a different way. Don’t forget that in those days the soldiers were inside the town. 
But now I’m the only one of all my friends who isn’t married and continues to militate. I’m 
different from them. I really want to get out and do something to change the ideology and 
people’s mindset. My mother says: ‘people forget the ones who die. After a while, during the 
first Intifada, they forgot that there had been a martyr in So-and-So’s house. If you’re 
wounded, even your closest friends will forget you after a while and stop coming by to see 
you.’   
‘‘But I get the same remarks from the men on the executive committee. Now I’m the 
only woman among 14 men. I’m trying to survive. If you want to work here, you really have 
to be willing to overcome all the problems and not get stopped by obstacles along the way. 
For example, if they see me working in the evening they say: ‘Go home, what will people 
say?’ But they can clearly see that I’m working. They tell me I have to get engaged and 
married, then people will stop talking.’’  
 
Young women can therefore make use of the contradiction in the national agenda − 
where the call to join the national struggle is combined with a demand for passivity in order to 
maintain the national identity. They can strive to neutralise the second command through the 
first one. The relationship between participation in the national struggle and the subjective 
construct then takes on a different meaning than for the men. For the women, there is the 
additional fact that in taking up the nationalist ideology they had challenged the gender 
identity which was restricting them. They thus acquired greater freedom of movement, as well 
as the possibility of asserting themselves more broadly than simply in their role as women. 
‘‘There’s a lot that needs to be changed in the way men see women. I have lots of ideas about 
our organisation, especially about how to give women greater independence. With this 
situation, many men no longer want to get married because who will be there to look after 
their families if they are wounded or killed? And if a woman can’t go out and has to stay at 
home and has no education, what will she do if her husband is killed? Wait until someone else 
comes to take care of her? I’d like to set up classes in English, in self-defence, and courses 
about our society; I’d also like to do social work, visit the wounded and families of martyrs. 
(...) But I’m having a hard time with the members of the executive committee; they don’t  
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want to work with me or help me. Perhaps because I’m the only woman. They always think 
I’m plotting against them. It’s really hard trying to get them to change the way they talk to me 
and think of me. It’s really hard, but I’m still trying. I hope to change their way of thinking 
little by little. (...) It’s a lot to change in a short amount of time. I’m not sure what motivates 
me to do it, but I really hope to change many things.’’74
                                                 
74 Interview with Rana. 
 
 
For these militant women, their involvement in the second Intifada, however 
desperate, held fewer contradictions than it did for the young men in that, despite the 
difficulties, it also signified an immediate benefit in the private sphere. That immediate 
benefit helped create a new link between the national struggle and the private sphere. A 
similar phenomenon can be seen concerning Fatah militants, when the immediate economic 
and social benefits they gained from their involvement counterbalanced the pessimism about 
political results.  
For young women, the national struggle held a different meaning than it did for the men, and 
gender identity prompted specific negotiations. Their experience was far more fragmented. 
The gender variable casts a crucial light in analysing the relationships between the national 
agenda and the private sphere, as well as their evolution. This is summed up in the following 
table: 
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Private Sphere and National Struggle from the first to the second Intifadas: 
different significance for young men and women 
 
 
 YOUNG MEN YOUNG WOMEN 
FIRST INTIFADA 
1987-1993 
 
 
Young stone-throwers 
occupy the political scene 
and their victory seems 
possible. Link between 
national struggle and 
private sphere 
They are called upon to get 
involved, but are also 
responsible for the 
‘‘permanence of identity’’ 
and are subjected to 
increased social controls. 
A contradictory double 
relationship 
 
PALESTINIAN 
AUTHORITY75
Bleak future. 
Retreat by default to the 
private sphere  
1994-2000 
A feeling of national 
failure, but greater 
freedom of movement. 
Constructive retreat into 
the private sphere 
 
SECOND INTIFADA 
2000-2002 
 
 
 
Prospects on the horizon 
get smaller and smaller. 
The national goal is 
pursued, but considered 
unachievable.  
Dissociation between the 
two poles:  
a desire for exile or a grim 
commitment  
They are less concerned 
about taking on the 
national struggle, and when 
they do become activists, it 
also means greater freedom 
of movement. 
Moderate Dissociation 
between the two poles due 
to the double significance of 
the national struggle for 
women 
 
                                                 
75 The Palestinian Authority was greatly affected but did not collapse completely; on the contrary, reconstituting 
power was a crucial aspect of the second Intifada. 
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Chapter 3  
 
 
Why the National Objective has not been Abandoned 
 
 
 
The Palestinians’ image of the national struggle is an essential tool in interpreting 
daily life. Of course, there are other places where everyday life is also unbearable − composed 
of humiliation and alienation − but is not reinterpreted in the same way. The Palestinian 
specificity lies in having built up, with regard to that experience, a conflicting counter-
interpretation embedded in nationalism: ‘‘The Palestinians have survived crushing defeats and 
overcome them, and have in a way integrated them into their identity-related legends as 
triumphs (…) or at least as heroic perseverance against an impossible fate.’’76
Hisham is a good illustration of how a nationalist and conflictual interpretation can help an 
individual rebuild his self-image when faced with physical and symbolic violence. Hisham’s 
private life has been gradually destroyed through pressure from the Israeli security services to 
become a collaborator. The crucial point is that he lives in Area B of the West Bank but works 
in Jerusalem, thus requiring a special permit to get there. ‘‘I was 15 during the first Intifada. 
There was no secondary school in the village. So I had to go to Jerusalem. During the Gulf 
War, Palestinians from the West Bank were forbidden to go to 
   
Once that image has been developed, it can only be maintained, no matter how belied 
by reality. Indeed, its function is not only resistance in the field. It also plays a symbolic part 
in building a positive self-image.  
                                                 
76 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, New York, Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 194. 
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 Jerusalem. I got there by various means. I was thrown out several times. It was extremely 
difficult to get to school, which was also closed six months out of the year. I was permanently 
thrown out before graduating because of my orange card (a card for Palestinians from the 
West Bank, which doesn’t allow them to go to East Jerusalem). My brothers were in prison 
and married. At home I was forced to work, as my brothers were going in and out of prison 
due to their political activities. I worked in construction and cleaning. My father is elderly. 
From ten to eighteen I worked on Fridays and Sundays. I used to go get aluminium and 
leather from the garbage dump. Then I cleaned the streets of Tel Aviv from six to eleven p.m. 
I had no childhood or adolescence − I never went out, relaxed or had fun. It would be a lot 
less tiring to work with the Israelis, but I prefer to collect garbage and keep my dignity. I went 
to Jerusalem without papers. At the Kishleh or Maskubiye police station they arrested me and 
humiliated me physically. They held me responsible for a theft and for throwing stones: ‘You 
did it!’ Then they acted nice: ‘You’ll earn money, and if you need anything we’ll do it for 
you. Sign this paper.’ I refused to sign. So they started insulting my honour − my sister, my 
mother. They did that three or four times. Then they came to the house two years ago: ‘He has 
to come to the police station!’ I didn’t go. Fifteen soldiers came during the day looking for 
me. People were going to think I’d done something bad, either a theft or something political. 
They said to my father: ‘We just want to talk to your son; it’s an honour to have a son like 
that.’’ My father said: ‘they say you’re good; what did you do?’ They told me what day to 
meet them in Jerusalem, and I refused. I have family in Jordan, so I went there. They took my 
passport at the border and I waited three hours. A guy came and said ‘Hi Hisham’ in a really 
friendly way. He forced me to shake his hand as if I was his foster brother − to sully my 
image. It was impossible to keep my distance. I followed him and we talked: ‘They need you 
in Maskubiye. Why didn’t you go? You can’t travel.’ I told him I’d go see them when I got 
back and he let me go. When I got back I waited five hours. No one talked to me. They took 
my papers and told me to go to the Maskubiye police station.’’  
Then his new job in Jerusalem was at risk: ‘‘they called me at work and told me to go 
over there: ‘come after work.’ I didn’t know what to do. It was going to be bad if I went, and  
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bad if I didn’t. They told me: ‘If you don’t come, we’re going to come and get you.’ They told 
me to come by at around 7 o’clock, after work, so I went to the police station. The 
interrogation went on from seven o’clock until one in the morning. The place is known for 
people walking in and being taken away in an ambulance. I was scared. Should I refuse or 
accept? ‘We’ll help you. You have debts. If you have the slightest problem, just call us.’ I 
needed to get out, to talk to someone, to get help. They had taken off all my brother’s clothes 
and beat him on the testicles. I was scared. ‘You’re tired. We’re your friends, don’t be scared. 
Come back at two o’clock tomorrow and we’ll talk, we’ll work together.’ Since then I’ve felt 
ill-at-ease.’’  
Furthermore, his relationship with his fiancée in Jordan became impossible: ‘‘I have a 
wife in Jordan, but it would be impossible to bring her here. It would put even more pressure 
on me. One day they’d get her, and what if there was a baby too? I want to do the right 
thing.’’ This process − condensed here − was spread out over several years. Hisham found a 
symbolic way out − enabling him to regain his dignity − by adhering to a nationalist and 
conflict-framed reinterpretation: ‘‘They said, ‘Hisham, help your people; help the peace 
process.’ But I had changed and was stronger. I said ‘If I do something one day, it will be 
against you. This is our land, and you are the thieves.’ They said: ‘We thought you were more 
intelligent than that.’ Whenever they saw me, they used that word − ‘intelligen t’. I hate that 
word. Intelligent to them meant being a traitor. I started hating myself. Now I feel stronger. 
Nothing is too dear for Palestine. Rather than living like a mouse in its hole and never going 
out, except to take down notes on someone or at demonstrations, rather than living like a 
traitor. They beat me: ‘Hisham, you had a chance to get married, to have a car and a pass. 
You’ll be coming back here and kissing our shoes to talk with us.’ But I never went back or 
kissed anyone’s hands or shoes.’’  
But his life was destroyed: ‘‘I don’t want to work for you, and life doesn’t even 
interest me if you’re living on our land. (…) I won’t go into all the ways they pressured me. 
My life was governed by papers (…) It extinguished my love. The woman I loved vanished 
from my heart, all of a sudden, when she said: ‘what do you say?’ when her brother told me to 
pretend to be working for them in order to bring her here. ‘Some people work for them and 
don’t give them any information. It’s just to get the pass.’ I felt like saying ‘make love, not  
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war’ but I lost what I was looking for. I lost my past when I lost my land, and my past is my 
soul (…) The Israelis talk about giving but never about giving back. I can’t tell my story to 
everyone. And I can’t just tell myself ‘you’re young, live your life; you can’t make love 
anymore and you’re full of war inside.’ The only thing I have left is my work. I’m waiting to 
see what happens next time, how they’ll get in touch, and what kind of pressure they’ll use.’’ 
 
The national image was both a real and figurative response to this symbolic and 
physical violence. Failure in the field did not mean that image was unsustainable on a 
symbolic level. On the contrary, it gained even greater importance that way. The vision was 
sustained all the more because the images surrounding the Palestinian national struggle had 
been so well developed. They included a system of symbolic and mythical constructs linked 
to Arab culture, expressed through a rich cultural output that is extremely widespread and 
rooted in the Palestinian population. Thus it is hard to find a Palestinian who doesn’t know a 
few excerpts from Mahmoud Darwish’s poems by heart.  
However, the disaffection for the national struggle was also expressed by young 
Palestinians through their relative disinterest in that nationalist culture. Asked about their 
favourite songs, young people in 1998 generally responded with the latest Arab hits, and far 
more rarely with nationalist songs. But one of these, The Arab Dream, calling for unity in the 
Arab world and featuring most of the stars of Arabic song, was often mentioned. It seemed to 
be an intermediate proposition − highlighting identity issues while staying within the variety 
singer genre. Yet, while the nationalist culture no longer corresponded to people’s everyday 
concerns during this intermediate period between the first and second Intifadas, it remained 
present as a backdrop, enabling them to transform humiliating daily experiences into myth. 
Arafat, in particular, illustrated the ambiguous figure of a national hero, yet one whose 
managerial style was much debated. 
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Getting through Military Roadblocks 
 
‘‘I have border sickness,’’77 remarked Amr. The daily humiliating experiences were 
linked to one place in particular − the checkpoints − especially after the A Areas78 were 
created. We will come back to these checkpoints because they are part of people’s daily 
experience and are the main focus of interaction with the Israeli army. They have proven to be 
extremely important in terms of the Palestinians’ experience, which can be seen through many 
stories about the psychological impact of crossing them: ‘‘I got to work after having to cross 
the checkpoint the Israelis had put up on the road again. They made all the men get out of the 
taxi, lined us up on the side of the road and inspected us one after the other. The soldiers stood 
in front of us, and if you looked them in the eye they’d hit you; they slapped some of us just 
for the fun of it. After I got home, it took me three hours to get my concentration back before 
I could start working again. It’s the same for students; you can tell they have a really hard 
time concentrating.’’79
Many similar examples could be cited where concentration has become a recurring 
problem after such experiences. A young athlete had to leave the national volley-ball team for 
the same reason. According to his trainer: ‘‘He can’t focus on the ball or concentrate anymore 
due to the situation.’’ The young man himself was not eager to talk about any psychological 
problems, which are hard to discuss in Palestinian circles. He simply said it was a pity 
because he felt in fine physical shape: ‘‘At first I used sports to ease the pressure on me. I 
found release in sports from all the problems and pressures of the situation.’’
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77 Amr, 29, works in a democracy study centre in Ramallah. April 2001. 
 
78 The autonomy of the A Areas has been challenged since an increase in the temporary or lasting occupation of 
those areas began in June 2002 when certain areas were put under an almost continuous curfew. 
 
79 Conversation with a 32-year-old computer programmer at Bir Zeit University, Ramallah, May 2001. 
 
80 Interviewed at the Jabalya refugee camp sports center, August 1999. 
 
  
The important aspect here is not so much the facts themselves, ranging from simple 
comments to extreme brutality − which for that matter did not necessarily cause the greatest 
impact. The key element in this experience lies in its meaning. The tiniest details began to  
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take on a great deal of significance, encapsulating the whole situation of Palestinian 
oppression in one single interaction. Crossing the roadblocks daily, the Palestinians have 
stopped believing they could ‘‘escape’’ in any way from their situation. On each occasion it is 
the expression of a power struggle in which they are always at the greatest disadvantage. That 
disadvantage is also in evidence in many other situations, such as curfews, houses being 
searched and destroyed, etc. But the particularity of the roadblocks is that they operate even in 
calm periods and are part of everyday reality. One could say they are a form of ‘‘humiliation’’ 
in that, in their relations with Israeli soldiers, the Palestinians’ self-determination has been 
taken away and they are faced with a definition that negates them as individuals. The keynote 
in these interactions is the refusal to acknowledge them. So it is no accident if the look in a 
person’s eyes has become such an important part of the Palestinians’ perceptions. For 
instance, they mention the dark glasses hiding the Israeli soldiers’ eyes, and the stakes 
implicit in the act of lifting or lowering one’s gaze. The refusal to acknowledge them is also 
expressed through various gestures at the checkpoints.  
Being at the mercy of Israeli soldiers is also tied to their unpredictability.81
                                                 
81 ‘‘The power exercised by an individual or a group – in short, any actor in society – is indeed a function of the 
amplitude of the area of uncertainty which the unpredictability of his own behaviour allows him to control vis-à-
vis his adversaries.’’  Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg, L’acteur et le système, Paris, Seuil, ‘‘Points 
Politiques’’, 1981, p. 74. 
 
 
 Indeed, for 
the Palestinians, the soldiers’ decisions lie within an area of total uncertainty, ranging from 
crossings without any checks whatsoever to flat refusals to let people get through, which may 
be accompanied by a variety of forms of verbal and physical humiliation. In addition to this 
range of options, there is a shifting of the rules from one day to the next − and even from hour 
to hour. New checkpoints are set up, and movable roadblocks established. Furthermore, 
decisions are usually made by the person in charge of the roadblock, which increases the 
variability between checkpoints. 
Each person in charge of a roadblock can interpret the rules in his own way. Thus the 
rules regarding crossings are all the more unpredictable to Palestinians, who have no way of 
knowing the logic behind them. Indeed, roadblocks often do not seem to be set up for security  
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reasons. For instance, the Israeli army sometimes allows lines of taxis to go around them, 
right under their eyes. The taxis make a detour on a parallel road to get back to the main road 
about twenty yards from the roadblock. Thus, even security cannot be used as a criterion in 
trying to assess the rules. And getting across is not the only area of uncertainty represented by 
the checkpoints. There are also other options − employed mor e rarely, but nevertheless 
available to the Israeli soldiers − including arrest and imprisonment, pressure and threats to 
collaborate, physical violence and sometimes death.  
For the Palestinians, crossing the checkpoints means entering a space in which they 
have absolutely no control over the parameters. It means penetrating into an area where one is 
completely exposed. To a certain extent the soldiers have the power of life or death over the 
Palestinians, who nonetheless invent strategies in an attempt to reclaim a small part of the 
decision-making and to offset the balance of power. Their strategies are part of a game in 
which the criteria are not reliable for them and their chances of success are highly uncertain. 
The Palestinians’ relative success in challenging the blockades therefore depends mainly on 
how quickly they react and on their constant adaptability. Thus, they immediately take up any 
communications technology such as the Internet and cell phones, which eliminate the need to 
move around and increase their reactivity and adaptability. Because of the incompatibility of 
the Israeli and Palestinian networks and their different coverage, it isn’t unusual for a person 
to have at least two cell phones (with a Palestinian and an Israeli company). These are crucial 
working tools, especially for shared taxi drivers − to establish their itineraries and multiple 
detours. In their attempt to get through despite the roadblocks, they obtain regular information 
about the checkpoints and their directives from those who have gone through before them. 
They also pass around the latest ways of getting through fields, down dry riverbeds and rocky 
hillsides. Given the highly variable nature of these situations, exchanging rapid and ample 
information is crucial to the Palestinians. They rely as much on technology as on close 
networks where ‘‘strategic’’ information about which routes to take is constantly passed 
around. A continuous network of information is thus created, with the shared taxi drivers at  
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the base. It enables them to get around the blockades to a certain extent, if they aren’t too 
strict, especially in the West Bank where the various sectors have only been partially fenced 
in,82
The positive self-image that could therefore emerge − from using wiles against 
strength − is mostly limited by the Israeli army’s little consideration for its own security 
measures during periods of relaxed checks. Succeeding in getting around roadblocks in such 
cases − which they consciously allow people to bypass, and which handicap and slow down 
the circulation of cars and human beings to an extreme degree without totally stopping it − 
cannot be seen as a real challenge to the balance of power. Therefore, in most cases the 
 contrary to Gaza.  
Other strategies for getting around the roadblocks involve playing with the criteria 
required for crossing. Putting these into practise is extremely difficult, however, due to the 
changing rules at the checkpoints. When cars are only being checked randomly, as opposed to 
systematically, tactics are used to reduce the chances of being picked out for a check. 
Since women are (were) checked less often, they sit in the most visible seats so that the Israeli 
soldiers giving the car a quick glance will be less likely to look at the entire vehicle. When no 
pedestrian checks are in effect, the young men – the most suspicious category – and those 
who don’t have papers to get into East Jerusalem, can ask to be dropped off just before the 
roadblock, which they cross on foot and are picked up afterwards by the shared taxi. If an 
untimely check is made on a young woman or man without the necessary papers, family ties 
can be staged, with elderly women passing themselves off as their mother, which sometimes 
works. The presence of foreigners, journalists or health care workers, who usually enjoy 
greater freedom of movement, is also sometimes highlighted in an attempt to get everyone in 
the vehicle across. This strategy fails more often than not, since the relatively specific status 
granted such persons is rarely extended to the shared vehicles they are in, and is often 
challenged in any case. These multiple strategies are only effective, relatively speaking, if the 
blockade is not total and the crossing is not completely hindered.  
 
                                                 
82 The ‘‘separation fence’’ 30% of which has already been built, will lock off the West Bank, like Gaza, creating 
81 closed enclaves where 490,000 Palestinians are to live. 
http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp 
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Palestinians’ methods for bypassing the roadblocks are experienced less as positive signs of 
an ability to challenge the checks imposed on them than as additional examples of humiliation 
for having to walk hundreds of yards under the hot sun, to climb down a cliff in a suit and tie 
with a laptop under their arm, or along a rubber water pipe fifty feet away from where the 
soldiers are blocking the road, and so on.  
Thus, a positive self-image − where interactions were presented as unfolding in the 
Palestinians’ favour − developed from situations where the soldiers seemed more accessible . 
To ‘‘succeed’’ in such interactions, you had to draw the Israeli soldiers out of their ‘‘studied’’ 
nonchalance, which seemed to show how little they worried about the perfectly submissive 
Palestinians. Perceiving fear in a soldier’s behaviour represented a victory, even if it led to an 
even more brutal and violent encounter for the Palestinian. Indeed, if the soldier was scared, it 
meant that the situation was not so clear and one-sided, and that the relationship was not 
totally in his favour. The Palestinians seemed to have a bit of room to manoeuvre, since the 
Israeli soldier at least thought so. There are many anecdotes describing the soldier’s 
disproportionate reactions to a threat: a soldier on watch who jumps up when a little girl 
walks up, another soldier who nervously aims his gun when a Palestinian makes a move to get 
out his papers, or the one with his M16 slung over his shoulder who jumps back when an old 
handicapped woman without the proper papers has trouble getting out of the car, etc. Such 
scenes also show the soldiers’ state of mind. Although armed to the teeth in order to control 
the civil population, they feel exposed both by the sheer numbers (a huge flow of human 
beings controlled by just a few of them) and by their isolation.  
Although the impact of such strategies cannot be denied, their challenge to the balance 
of power remains minimal. They cannot be considered to have truly overturned a self-image 
of being completely at the other’s mercy in such interactions. Being repeatedly confronted 
with that image, where even the slightest acknowledgement is refused, explains the profound 
impact of their experience at checkpoints – like that of being in prison83
                                                 
83 About Israel’s incarceration of adolescents and its consequences, see Cook, C.; Hanieh, Ad.; Kay, A.; Stolen 
Youth: The Politics of Israel’s Detention of Palestinian Children, London, Pluto Press, 2004. 
, although to a 
different degree. Under such conditions, perceiving oneself as belonging to a community 
engaged in a national struggle and being a member of a victimised people becomes a decisive 
factor. These references to Palestinian identity are symbolic resources which enable them to 
give meaning to such  
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interactions, to no longer simply allow those in power to impose their meaning, and not to be 
confronted with them on their own.  
The group element is important in this process. Indeed, the interactions are based on a 
balance of power which brings individual people face to face. The key to this process of 
reinterpretation lies mainly in the possibility of going beyond that level and adopting a 
broader, more general vision. In order to overcome what such interactions ‘‘say’’ about the 
individuals involved − and since they lack the ability to overturn the balance of power −  they 
must turn them into episodes of a different story. The narrative is then built around 
axiological issues which speak of things other than the ruling power’s concerns.84
In the Palestinian case, that reinterpretation needed a collective dimension in order to 
go beyond the threshold of individual experience. Collaborators, the information agents 
recruited by the Israeli secret service, often stress that the most painful part of their experience 
comes from the fact of suddenly finding themselves excluded from the process of 
reinterpretation and especially from its collective aspect. In betraying, they become isolated, 
with no possibility of connecting to the collective fate, which puts them even more at the 
mercy of the Israelis.
  
85 To counter this kind of collaboration − without going into the 
summary executions carried out by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades here − the parties strive to 
connect the individual involved with a group experience and show him that he is only one 
case among many victims of such well-known techniques. ‘‘I know someone like that. Then 
they asked him to get his sister to collaborate. In the end he talked to a close friend about it. 
He was about 17. But they took him under their wing. They told him: ‘It’s their usual way. 
You’re not the first one; that’s how they go about it.’’86
                                                 
84 A comparable phenomenon can be seen in the way the Indians sought to interpret the phenomenon of the 
Spanish invasion. cf. Wachtel Nathan, La vision des vaincus, Paris, Gallimard, 1971, 
Coll. Folio/histoire, p 52. 
 
85 It should be noted, however, that there are cases of group collaboration; certain villages and families have 
been designated as such, for example. This kind of information should always be handled with caution. 
 
86 Interview with a PFLP militant, Ramallah, May 2001. 
 
 After going through this trial 
individually − and having no way of dealing with it alone − he now finds support through the 
group. However, these methods − mainly used by the left-wing parties − can only  
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be applied when the person involved has talked about undergoing such pressure, which is 
rare. It is difficult to build a vision or reinterpretation of history on an individual level. It must 
be shared by the group in order to be effective. 
Conversely, the Israeli soldiers strive above all to refuse any personal aspect in their 
relations which could bring out an individual dimension in the Palestinians. Their behaviour is 
generally based on an image of ‘‘the dangerous masses,’’ of Palestinians who are by nature 
violent and thus deserve the kind of treatment they are being given. On the contrary, one of 
the Palestinians’ strategies consists in trying to personalise their situation for the soldiers. 
They explain their personal case, their motivations, the reasons for their movement (I’m 
taking medicine to my sick mother; my boss is expecting me, etc.). In short, they try to take 
the soldiers out of the context of the conflict over the territory and put them in a different 
context which has nothing to do with that issue − a private exchange with another set of rules 
from the ones governing the clash between two peoples. Naturally the Israeli soldiers must try 
to avoid entering into this kind of exchange in order to continue playing their role of soldier 
correctly. This strategy, like the other ones, is most often destined to fail. Highlighting 
personal motivations makes you more vulnerable, providing the soldiers with information and 
power − unless the reasons given were untrue and just a way of arguing.  
The Palestinians have another resource at their disposal − by setting the interaction 
within the context of the national struggle. Although this doesn’t help them get through − on 
the contrary − the interaction takes on a heroic dimension . The Israeli soldier is looked 
straight in the eye, silence is maintained no matter what, or nationalist slogans are uttered. 
Naturally this is a difficult attitude to maintain because of the violence inherent in the balance 
of power. But it enables them to identify with the national struggle and thereby make the 
interaction relatively insignificant on a personal level, and even validating. It is further proof 
of the Palestinian people’s endurance.  
Indeed, unable to overturn the balance of power, the ‘‘heroes’’ of Palestinian 
nationalism identify with a group image of endurance and durability symbolised by the words 
‘‘we shall survive’’, the famous Palestinian sumud.87
                                                 
87 Constance, the ability to ‘‘hang on.’’ 
 
 Shifting to a longer time frame  
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allows them to move out of the context of defeat. This is displayed in an extreme way through 
the case of the ‘‘martyrs,’’ as we shall see. But without even taking part in this religious 
temporality, validating endurance and stoicism in a group process is already a way of entering 
a longer time frame and of imagining victory in the long term. Every daily experience of 
domination is then felt to be another trial for the Palestinian people, whose pride lies precisely 
in its ability to endure and − they hope − finally ‘‘wear out’’ their adversary. 
This image can be found in numerous Palestinian paintings featuring a woman 
walking forward while holding symbols of Palestinian identity like a heavy burden. The 
following is one example. A taxi driver is going from Jenin to Ramallah. After many detours 
and after being turned back at ten checkpoints and having a gun aimed at him at one of them, 
he suddenly notices the way to get through. A railing on the side of the road was removed to 
allow cars to drive down a steep incline into a field; after crossing the field, one could reach 
Ramallah by going through a refugee camp. He suddenly veers into the ditch. A car behind 
him with a journalist inside is unable to avoid him and they have an accident. The taxi is 
smashed up; the passengers and driver are a bit shaken up. Without saying a word the driver, 
who has just lost his means of livelihood, in addition to his day’s work, transfers the 
passengers to the next group taxi, gives the driver the three audio tapes he wanted to take to 
Ramallah, and calls a friend to come and get his taxi. The passengers don’t utter a word 
either. Handling such everyday experiences involves pride in knowing how to adapt and 
endure; thus it would have seemed totally incongruous in the Palestinian context to get 
worked up about it.88
This vision of heroic endurance as the shared identity of a people hinders other kinds 
of self-expression, in particular complaining. During the interviews, the Palestinians were 
often glad to have a place where they could express such issues: ‘‘I’m sorry but I wanted to 
talk to you about all this because there’s no one else to talk to about it.’’
  
89
                                                 
88 Jenin-Ramallah route, May 2001. 
 
89 Kamal, 20, an English student. His father works in Israel and his mother is a teacher. He lives in an area with 
new buildings for inhabitants of the Jabalya refugee camp (who can afford it). August 1999 
 
 Verbalising is part 
of the process of building a victim image,  
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but it also underscores the narrow margin of expression available to the Palestinians: ‘‘Since 
everyone has his own problems, no one listens to me and I can’t talk about it; then I feel 
tormented by inner conflicts, and problems could arise because of that at some point. It was a 
good opportunity for me to express myself.’’90
Humour is another means of self-expression, in addition to the heroic vision of 
endurance. A humorous account of certain events is indeed one way of distancing oneself 
from them.
  
91
Israel: a Fascinating Enemy 
  
 
 
 
An image of the enemy is built up through interactions with it, such as at military 
roadblocks. As in a mirror effect, that image owes a great deal to the way the Israelis 
characterise the Palestinians. Palestinian nationalism has largely developed as inverted 
Zionism. In a certain sense the two societies are involved in a ‘‘dialogue.’’ It’s not that they 
are developing a space for communication within which to understand each other; but the 
conflicting visions they have built up − and their criteria for legitimacy − respond to one 
another. 
The difference lies in the balance of power. Israeli characterisations of the Palestinians 
are filled with symbolic violence for the latter, who express these internalised definitions 
through a process of self-denigration described long ago by Erikson: ‘‘In any system based on 
repression, exclusion and exploitation, the oppressed, excluded and exploited unconsciously 
accept the image with which the dominant group characterises them.’’92
                                                 
90 Ra'ed, quoted above. 
 
91 Palestinian jokes, which are very political, often involve interactions at checkpoints (in addition to the 
innumerable jokes where the humour lies in comparing Yasser Arafat with a donkey). A collection of jokes has 
been published in German: Sharif Kanaana and Pierre Heumann, Wo ist der Frieden ? Wo ist die Demokratie ? 
Der palästinensische Witz : Kritik, Selbstkritik und Überlebenshilfe, 
Zürich, Chronos, 2001. 
 
92 Erik Erikson, Adolescence et crise : la quête de l’identité (1968), Paris, Flammarion, 1972, p 60. 
 
 Thus the Palestinians 
have taken up certain remarks about the congenital incapability of the Arabs, their leaders, 
etc.: ‘‘If we practised our religion in the proper way, we would be united and there would be  
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no occupation. We would all be together and would live better. It’s because Muslims are 
dogs. We should all be united on the same path.’’93
Israel, an Outpost of Western Modernity 
  
Similarly, the image they have of Israel is far from unanimous. In fact, while Israel 
appears to be the enemy within the context of the conflict, its dominant position in the balance 
of power and the symbolic violence it can wield have also led to associating it with the 
positive image of a ‘‘winner.’’ Thus, there is a kind of ambivalent ‘‘fascination/hate’’ 
construct with regard to it. To be sure, Israel evokes an enemy which is destroying, killing and 
taking away the land. But it also represents strength, modernity, technology, consumer 
society, a high standard of living, and so on. 
 
 
 
This characteristic explains why Israel’s image is more widely linked to Western 
modernity. The double relationship with the West of ‘‘fascination and demonization’’ is a 
widespread characteristic of young Arabs. Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi noted this in young 
Moroccans, for example.94
                                                 
93 Tala‘t, 22, a student and salesman in his family’s shop. His father, now deceased, was a politician. Hebron, 
May 2001. 
 
94 Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, Soumis et rebelles : les jeunes au Maroc, Paris, CNRS Editions, 1994, p 65- 
74. 
 
 Technology and comfort have appeal and are cast as positive 
values. An ambivalent relationship develops between the desire to possess them and the 
refusal to owe anything to the enemy. A group interview of three young women shows this 
ambivalence: 
Ahlam: ‘‘The West is an advanced world, especially in terms of technology. (...) It’s 
obvious that they have reached a level we haven’t attained, and we can learn something in that 
area.’’ 
Roz: ‘‘No, we don’t want to learn anything from them.’’ 
Ahlam: ‘‘I’m just saying we should take in their knowledge and technology.’’  
Roz: ‘‘They got it from us!’’ 
Ahlam: ‘‘It doesn’t matter who started. Now we’re interested in that knowledge, and 
the important thing is that they have it. Knowledge is for everyone and has no limits; it should 
be accessible to Europeans and Arabs. (...) There are many things that we simply don’t know 
about. I hope we’ll acquire that level of knowledge with or without the help of the West. 
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Roz: ‘‘We don’t need their help.’’ 
Ahlam: ‘‘Of course we do − since we want to acquire that knowledge.’’ 
Normine: ‘‘I hope we reach their level without needing any help.’’  
Roz: ‘‘Without their help and without adopting their ideas.’’ 
Ahlam: ‘‘I’m not saying we should adopt their ideas or their lifestyle.’’  
Normine: ‘‘I don’t agree with you at all. They live comfortably, so you can’t compare. 
There’s a difference. They have technology and advanced knowledge. Why? Because they 
have a good, comfortable life. They don’t have to think about how to drive out the occupiers. 
Now we’re just thinking about how to have a good life, how to feel safe and have a secure 
life. That takes up a lot of our time.’’95
There is a clear rejection of Western lifestyles, associated with amorality and 
selfishness: ‘‘They have technology in the West, but I don’t like the West at all, mainly 
because of one thing − sexual freedom − which is really not good.’’
 
96 This is a way of 
attempting to turn around the balance of power on an ethical and spiritual level, where 
Western domination is transformed into an inferior position. Building Islamic modernity is 
largely based on this approach, which combines a desire to acquire a consumer society and 
technology while refusing ‘‘libertarian’’ lifestyles: ‘‘Western countries are developed and 
civilised. It’s good to have all those things, but it’s even better to have them and preserve 
religion and traditions. If I lived in France, I’d keep my religion and traditions. I prefer to 
belong to my own traditions and religion.’’97
                                                 
95 Three 20-year-old students from Bir Zeit University. Alham and Roz are from Ramallah, Normine lives in the 
Qalandya refugee camp. Their fathers are, respectively, a plumber, a carpenter and a surveyor. 
Interviewed in Ramallah, October 2000. 
 
96 Mouna, 23, who is looking for work after studying to be an engineer. Her father is a shop owner and her 
mother runs a centre for social work. Nablus, October 2000. 
 
97 Roula, 26, a business student and secretary at the Nablus town hall. She is married and has a daughter. Her 
father is a university English professor and her mother teaches Arabic. Interviewed in Nablus, October 2000. 
 
 
As a representative of technological, consumer-driven modernity, Israel offers the 
promise of an appealing combination of know-how and material well-being. Calls to boycott 
Israeli products are not well heeded, particularly as Palestinian consumers prefer them over 
Palestinian or Arab products. While they are more expensive, they convey an image of quality  
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and modernity.98
One approach to avoid this kind of ambiguity towards a fascinating enemy consists in 
dissociating the West from Israel. In this interpretation, the former is supporting the latter 
because it has been fooled by its propaganda, and Israel has achieved its level of technology 
and consumerism through a transfer rather than through its own devices: ‘‘Westerners listen 
to and repeat what the Israelis tell them. If only the Israelis would stop distorting the truth for 
the media! The European media are against our fight in this new Intifada and are supporting 
what the Israelis are doing to us.’’
 Similarly, while Israeli soldiers may be hated, they are also symbols of 
strength and power. So their style is copied by the young militants, from the military clothing 
to the sunglasses, as well as their casual, superior attitude. T-shirts covered with Hebrew 
writing sell very well at markets. Sellers stress the product’s ‘‘Israeli quality’’ to convince 
potential buyers, and so on.  
99
Symbolic Violence and Conflict  
 
The ambivalent relationship to the West and Israel has made the Palestinians even 
more sensitive to the way they are portrayed. Their experience of this symbolic violence is 
even harder for them as they are committed to the idea of modernity yet feel rejected by the 
image it projects of Palestinians.  
 
 
 
Symbolic violence affects self-esteem and results in suffering. The stronger it is, the 
greater the risk of political violence. The humiliated group can oscillate between two 
attitudes: apathy or violence. As for young Palestinians, violent phenomena have long been 
seen as part of a strategic vision and conflict-driven intention, in which a political solution 
seemed possible. The conflict played an integrating role, as observed by Georg Simmel.100
                                                 
98 Interview with Odeh S. Zaghmouri, president of the Federation of Palestinian Industry, February 
2001. 
 
99 Rula, quoted above. 
 
100 Georg Simmel, Le conflit, Paris, Circé/poche, 1995, from p. 40 on. 
 
 
But that possibility has disappeared, political solutions seem out of reach, and violent 
phenomena have lost their strategic meaning and turned into a means of self-affirmation, or a 
‘‘staging’’ of one’s situation and trying to make the other vulnerable despite his power. It is 
also an  
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attempt to overturn symbolic violence and at the same time assert one’s despair by associating 
one’s own death with that of the adversary. Even without any hope of success, the conflict is 
thereby sustained, not only in its strategic dimension but also because it affords the possibility 
of self-affirmation countering the destructive images described above. When the realm of 
behavioural possibilities becomes disfiguring no matter what, and there is no protected space 
left, violence is as much about making oneself and one’s despair visible as about pursuing a 
structuring conflict, whatever the price.  
 
 
Mythical Reasoning 
 
The idea of mythical reasoning may be useful in the Palestinian context to indicate a 
change in the dimension and temporality of explanatory models by drawing on and 
transforming available cultural resources. When these resources do not offer a satisfying 
enough meaning, new references may be adopted that are more or less well-known, but do not 
belong to the immediate repertory. The ‘‘mythical’’ way in which reason operates evokes a 
‘‘de-historicising’’ of the explanatory processes. The latter are then linked to a certain number 
of symbols, heroic figures and values − courage, sacrifice, etc. − which provide ways of 
reading and interpreting experiences and are highly motivating. Indeed, they imbue everyday 
life with intense meaning, where the slightest action is part of a mythical narrative that 
transcends its prosaic nature.  
According to Michel Wieviorka, engaging in ‘‘mythical reasoning’’ is characteristic of 
social antimovements: ‘‘The identity principle, which defines the individual and the 
population in whose name he is speaking, ceases to be a reference to a social identity (...) and 
becomes an appeal to a human being, an essence, or abstract or mythical figure. Whether 
deified or naturalised, that identity is then meta- or infra-social; the protagonist in the struggle 
expresses himself in the name of principles – justice, morality, freedom – more than in the 
name of any real social force. He defines himself through belonging to a community rather 
than through his involvement in a social relationship.’’101
                                                 
101 Michel Wieviorka, Sociétés et terrorisme, op. cit., p 17. 
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Independently of such extreme forms, however, it should be noted that myth-making is a 
general phenomenon characteristic of national mobilisation.  
Young Palestinians are attuned to poetry and the Koran, which are readily evoked to 
supply analyses of situations or to justify one’s conduct. Many proverbs have also been 
attributed to al hadith,102 although their origin is uncertain: ‘‘I’m learning English. If you 
learn the enemy’s language, you can understand how he thinks. The Prophet Mohammed said: 
‘Whoever learns a nation’s language protects himself from its wickedness.’’’103
‘‘We won’t obtain our right to Palestine through talking. It will come from Jihad. 
There is a poet from the pre-Islamic period (Jahiliya) who said: ‘‘There is no future other than 
the sound of swords, which will answer for us. Unsheathe your sword. There is no future that 
can allow it to be put back in its sheath.’’
  
104
Samir is a waiter in a restaurant in Ramallah. His boss has tried everything − from 
threats to lunch invitations − to stop him from going to demonstrations at military roadblocks. 
At one of these, he began drumming on a military Jeep after the crowd had surrounded the 
soldiers and prevented them from throwing tear gas. A soldier promised to target him at the 
next clash. He continued to go to the demonstrations wearing huge sunglasses and a baseball 
cap: ‘‘When I go to a demonstration and hear ‘Unadikum,’ I go into a trance and forget about 
the danger. I forget about everything and just go ahead.’’
  
 
Palestinian nationalist poetry − like it s songs − are one of the support mechanisms 
through which an acceptable meaning can be given to everyday experiences by raising them 
to the status of myths.  
105
                                                 
102 Al-hadith designates the corpus of the Prophet’s words and deeds, or his approval of words spoken or deeds 
carried out in his presence. There are several compendiums. The hadith is considered to be the second authority 
after the Koran.  
 
103 Tala’t, quoted above. 
 
104 Badria, quoted above. 
 
105 May 2001. 
 
  
Unadikum (‘‘I call on you’’), written by poet Toufiq Zayyad, long-time mayor of 
Nazareth, and sung by Ahmed Qa’bur, is one of the emblematic anthems of Palestinian 
nationalism: 
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‘‘I call on you, 
I squeeze your hand and kiss the earth under your feet 
and say to you: I sacrifice myself. 
I give you as a gift the light of my eyes and the warmth of my heart. 
The tragedy I live is my share of your tragedies. 
I did not humiliate myself in my homeland and I did not 
 lower my shoulders. 
A barefoot, naked orphan, 
I have risen against the oppressor 
 I have felt my own blood on my hands,  
but I have not lowered my flag.  
And I have cared for the green grass 
over the graves of my ancestors”. 
 
 
For Samir, his real life clearly starts when he enters that altered state at demonstrations 
where − quite peacefully and without throwing the slightest stone − he gets beat up or 
narrowly escapes flying bullets. But that isn’t the important thing. Through that commitment 
he is identifying with the barefoot orphan who has nothing but stands up and says no. He 
enters the heroic epic and his entire experience is changed. 
Through the images in these songs, weakness and defeat are reinterpreted. The weak 
rise with infinite courage and pay a high price for it: blood, tears, mourning and death are 
everywhere. Suffering is not hidden. On the contrary, it is staged, but transcended at the same 
time by being part of a network of symbols and meanings. Thus, however powerless and 
defenceless, the hero will prevail through endurance and his bond with the land. His tenacity 
is not only a reference to his own personal time. It is combined with that of all the previous 
anonymous heroes who have already died and all those who will die. Perseverance and 
everlastingness are rooted in a bond with the mythical land for which one is fighting and 
where the dead are resting − a land covered with olive trees, which are long-lasting and 
symbolise his understanding of his people.  
Mahmoud Darwish’s poetry, for example, develops this kind of theme, but also 
includes very different poems which challenge the martyr figure. Similarly, contemporary 
literature has approached these themes in a very different way. But this approach has a very 
slight following, involving only a small circle of people. While knowing many expressions, 
quotes and poems by heart is part of their cultural heritage,  
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young people have massively adopted the most lyrical nationalist writings in their discourse 
rather than a broader spectrum of Palestinian works of literature and poetry. What they are 
looking for is a heroic reinterpretation of reality.  
 
 
Heroic Palestinian Figures 
 
There are two kinds of heroic figures that have been created and used by the 
Palestinians − the impersonal and the personalised. The former are by far the most numerous. 
Throughout its history, the Palestinian national struggle has generated anonymous heroic 
figures who have become part of the militants’ mythology. Their transformation tells as much 
about the changes in the struggle as it does about the meanings and images attached to it. 
Thus, the anonymous Palestinian hero went from being a fedaï, a resistance fighter willing to 
sacrifice himself, to one of the shabab during the first Intifada, and finally to a shahid, or 
victim-hero. They went from being fighter heroes who put themselves in danger but didn’t 
always die106
                                                 
106 The relationship with death was nevertheless already highly present; when Fatah militants signed up and 
changed their names in the 1970s, they provided a photograph to be used for the poster that would be made if 
they died.  
 
 to young people armed with rocks.  The act is important, less from the results 
obtained than from the gesture of putting oneself in harm’s way in the public arena and 
expressing the continued refusal of the occupation. Finally, the last figure is that of the martyr 
who is only fulfilled through dying. We will explore this idea later on.  
Impersonal heroes are mainly celebrated in songs and poems, as well as in film 
footage continually replayed on Palestinian television. The figure of the shabab is presented 
in this form in particular − as stone-throwers, young men taking down an Israeli flag, a child 
walking towards a tank, etc. The scenes are broadcast to the tune of nationalist songs and with 
images of the land of Palestine. 
Impersonal figures are highly valued and help the identification process. Above all, the 
process of myth-making around the Palestinian national struggle uses them to project an 
image of a people rising up rather than of a few strong figures. Because victory is associated 
with a future beyond a human lifespan, it becomes necessary to draw on the longer time frame 
of an entire people. Thus, numerous anonymous figures are highlighted, like signs  
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of the mobilisation of the population at large. Yet there are posters in the streets of a few 
personalities who were particularly illustrious fedaï, such as Abou Djihad.107
A lack of prestigious internal figures is one characteristic of the current Palestinian 
movement underscored by many young people, who mention in particular their need for a 
leader. Young people are looking for heroes to identify with in order to give meaning to their 
everyday lives. The movement’s tutelary figure vanished when Arafat lost prestige and was 
challenged by a whole segment of the population.
 Furthermore, in 
order to root the Palestinian national struggle more firmly in a thousand-year-old jihad, the 
Islamists readily evoke Saladin and ride by on horseback carrying aluminium swords to evoke 
that illustrious personage. But the heroic figure offered up for identification remains above all 
impersonal.  
 
108 Various processes may explain the lack 
of an alternative charismatic leader. Arafat’s strategy first aimed to prevent the emergence of 
a potential competitor. Local organisation and the division of Palestinian territory also made it 
very hard for anyone to break through outside his own area. Sheikh Yassin,109
                                                 
107 Abu Djihad was one of the founders of Fatah in 1959. In the 1980s he ran the Occupied Territories office in 
Amman and coordinated the first Intifada for the PLO. He was assassinated by an Israeli commando on 16 April 
1988 in Tunis. 
 
108 From November 1998 to June 2002, Yasser Arafat’s popularity went from 42% to 24%. 
 a key figure for 
Palestinian Islamists, was never really recognised beyond it. Marwan Barghouti, who was 
often mentioned, was mainly established in Ramallah and its environs. He grew in stature 
through his imprisonment, but was never a truly charismatic figure with a broad base.  
Young Palestinians therefore went far off in search of heroic figures. Judging from 
symbols highlighted during demonstrations, currently the most popular ones are foreigners 
who are very distant from one another: Nasrallah, the head of the Lebanese Hezbollah and 
Che Guevara. Nasrallah’s success is not hard to understand. He has been victorious against 
the same enemy as the Palestinians. Young Palestinians emphasise the fact that he deals with 
the Israelis on an equal level: ‘‘Nasrallah isn’t like other Arabs. He isn’t cowed by the  
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, www.jmcc.org. He died in November 2004. 
 
109 Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, one of the founders of Hamas, was assassinated by the Israeli army on 22 March 
2004. 
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Israelis. He talks to them in a natural way, about point 1, point 2, point 3, and just says you 
either accept or you don’t, and that’s it.’’110
Furthermore, unlike other Arab leaders, Nasrallah isn’t the double-dealing type, since 
he has at least partly overturned the balance of power. He can say the same thing to his troops 
and to the Israelis. And people particularly appreciate the fact that he keeps his promises. So 
as a symbol of victory, the Hezbollah’s yellow flag flies during demonstrations, and new 
rumours often spread announcing the arrival of Hezbollah teachers and the creation of new 
cells for the movement. Many young Palestinians see the Hezbollah and its leader 
Nasrallah
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In the same process of identification, young Palestinians readily watch American TV 
shows featuring soldiers in Vietnam, but they change what the director intended. Despite the 
highly negative role attributed to the Vietnamese, they are the ones with whom they identify 
in the series: ‘‘When I watch TV alone at night, I look at those American films with a lot of 
violence and fighting. (…) Those American films − such as the ones in Vietnam − show us 
their patriotic myths and how they save their soldiers who were taken prisoner; but I see the 
Palestinians in the Vietnamese, and how the American soldiers kill the people and slit their 
throats. I equate their actions with those of the Israeli soldiers.’’
 as the only ones who can liberate them.  
The charismatic figure of Che Guevara is not that of a winner. First made popular by 
leftist movements and then adopted in a more widespread way, his image is that of a victim-
hero who died struggling to help a legitimate cause. He died, but he was justified; his name 
will remain in people’s memories and the fight will go on after him. In this opposition 
between Nasrallah and Che Guevara, the choice between the two figures is not based on the 
social projects they embody but rather on the meaning and reinterpretation they may bring to 
the situation. The important aspect lies in the heroic figure’s capacity to transfigure everyday 
life and change the images associated with the balance of power.  
112
Shiite References 
  
 
 
 
The need to adopt heroic figures and ideologies that provide meaning to their suffering 
by giving it mythical status goes beyond more or less contemporary historical references. One 
can see a tendency in Palestinian youth − which can be attributed to Hezbollah, although it is 
not the sole influence − towards a fascination for the Shiite pantheon and its rituals that allow 
men to express great grief in public: ‘‘I got into an argument with my religion professor 
during the Intifada. The Shiites are always getting criticised, but despite everything that’s said 
about them, one thing is for sure: Hussein was right and he wasn’t given his rightful place. I 
often thought about Hussein during the first Intifada. Sometimes I cried thinking about 
him.’’113
                                                 
110 A 24-year-old engineer in Ramallah, June 2001. 
 
111 whose name means God’s victory. 
 
112 Interview with a student in sociology, organiser at a youth centre and member of the Fatah Youth (Shabiba); 
his father owned a small local restaurant, Gaza, August 1999. 
 
113 A computer programming student in Berlin, originally from the town of Gaza. His father is a taxi driver. 
Berlin, February 2002. 
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Palestinian students in Berlin were particularly affected by a Shiite ceremony 
organised after the death of a friend: ‘‘At first they told us that whoever wanted to could stay 
on the sidelines. I sat down in a corner. Everyone at the university knows I’m not religious. 
But it didn’t feel right. I could see them praying and felt caught up in it, so I joined them even 
though I couldn’t remember the prayers very well. The most impressive part was when the 
Sheikh told the story of the death of Ali. He cried, and then everyone started crying one after 
the other, hiding their faces with their hands. At first I thought they were pretending, but no, 
they were really crying. And the Sheikh kept on talking and talking. It was very moving, and I 
began thinking about Palestine, and all the deaths. Tears were welling up in my eyes and I 
was embarrassed. I looked over at Ahmed (another Palestinian student) but he was choked up 
too.’’114
Thus, when the cultural resources at hand are not well-adapted, or on the contrary 
when those coming from abroad are particularly well-adapted, these references are taken up. 
The Sunnis could look on the Shiite reference with hostility, but they are starting to take it up 
because it is a means of grasping the Palestinian situation and of expressing it. Bernard Lahire 
has evoked the cognitive gaps of someone who does not have access to the proper models 
required to grasp a particular situation.
  
115
                                                 
114 A 29-year-old Palestinian student in Berlin, March 2002. 
 
115 Bernard Lahire, l’homme pluriel, op. cit., p 69. 
 
 One way of dealing with it is by taking them  
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from somewhere else. The level to which they have adopted other models is quite relative 
here, since these young people have not become Shiites. But they remain fascinated by its 
heuristic capacity. 
The more a person’s freedom and possibilities are restricted, the more they develop 
mythical interpretations that enable them to modify the playing field. The less influence the 
person has over his fate, the more he tends to resort to these kinds of references quite 
unequivocally.  
 
 
Rumours and Conspiracy Theories  
 
Conspiracy theories that have flourished in the Arab world − Jewish conspiracies, 
Israeli conspiracies, by secret services, and so on −  are ways of accounting for a feeling of 
weakness with a single explanation. At the same time, they erase the humiliating side of 
defeat by underscoring the all-powerful nature of the adversary. Although the general theme 
of anti-Semitism is present here, in this context it mainly expresses how the defeated strive to 
recount their failure without losing their positive self-image. The enemy was extremely 
powerful; moreover, even Western governments have submitted to it. This interpretation of 
reality through a unique causality is generalised, and most events are included in it. This 
tendency has been reinforced by the opacity of political decisions and the nature of the 
conflict, which involves collaboration, secret service and undercover units.116 The context has 
encouraged the Palestinians to generalise this ‘‘shadow’’ mode of explanation centred around 
the theory of an all-powerful secret service mysteriously informed about everything. Here, as 
elsewhere, rumours are built on conspiracy theories.117
                                                 
116 The duvdarin or ‘‘musta’ribine’’ are Israeli units disguised as Arabs whose job is to 
assassinate wanted persons directly in the Palestinian Territories. 
 
117 This is a classic characteristic of political rumours and is not specific to Palestinian ones. See Jean Lambert, 
‘‘Rumeurs et légendes jordano-palestiniennes’’ in Riccardo Bocco, Blandine Destremau, Jean Hannoyer. (ed.), 
‘‘Palestine, Palestiniens : territoire national, espaces 
communautaires’’, Les Cahiers du CERMOC; n° 17, 1997, p 387. 
 
 The rumours feed on the group’s 
insecurities and usually recount situations where an individual feels totally at the other’s 
mercy: ‘‘Beyond their irrational aspects, rumours are part of a strategy for group survival. In 
their own way they express the thousand sufferings, frights and hopes of a people whose fate 
hangs on events that are beyond its control. Rumours are a long-lived form of myth and  
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legend which probably make that dreadful uncertainty more bearable.’’118
                                                 
118 Jean Lambert, Rumeurs et légendes jordano-palestiniennes, op. cit., p 386. 
 
 Rumours and 
conspiracy theories are attempts to provide interpretations of reality. They speak of the 
person’s helplessness, which they simultaneously transform by associating it with the 
interplay of dark forces.  
 
The national objective has been maintained independently of its chances for success, 
because the meanings attached to it are what allow the individual to construct an identity. But 
these images have gradually lost their roots in social conflict and have ceased to be part of 
what is considered possible. They have been constructed as increasingly uniform, timeless 
myths in an effort to perpetuate one reading of the national situation despite its being closed 
off. Shifting into the realm of myth preserves the heuristic impact of the national struggle 
against the disavowal of reality. The individual is reconstructed in this way despite his lack of 
acknowledgement during interactions with the adversary. But as this reconstruction of identity 
gradually occurs through increasingly unequivocal mythical forms, conflict − the basis of this 
reconstruction − loses its capacity to integrate. Having become enemies, the two adversaries 
create their relationship through images that answer each other by evoking the same simple, 
absolute differences so characteristic of myth-building. The conflict goes from being a factor 
of integration to one of total incompatibility and exclusion. The images answer one another, 
but they no longer rely on the common social basis within which the conflict must be 
expressed. I would emphasize that this is an ongoing process that does not appear to be 
irreversible. Mythical reasons are invoked all the more so because the future seems blocked 
on the Palestinian side. Yet there is still a powerful tendency to employ a discourse and 
images that refer back to the integrative conflict agenda and, above all, regain their 
importance once positive changes can be seen on the horizon. From this point of view, the 
fascination with the West and Israel limits the process of dehumanisation of the enemy.  
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Chapter 4  
 
The Individual and the Community 
 
For Palestinian youth, life is not limited to the national struggle. In fact the private 
sphere is a specific issue at stake within this society, where communitarian logic is much in 
use. Meanings associated with that private sphere operate within a more or less conflicting 
relationship concerning references to the nation on the one hand, and to the community on the 
other. Earlier in the book we referred to this idea of the private sphere involving political 
stakes, through the fragmentation of experience and the relationship to honour within the 
national struggle. The private sphere is what must be preserved in a situation of insecurity and 
must remain inaccessible to the occupier. The situation becomes even more impossible for 
people to live with when that sphere is challenged. The violence experienced by the 
Palestinians also comes from the disappearance of a protected private sphere. That private 
space therefore involves crucial political stakes. 
In the case of Palestine, and Arab countries in general, the private sphere lies at the 
crossroads of different forms of reasoning and does not only pertain to the binary opposition 
between public and private as it is chiefly presented in the West. Indeed, one can distinguish 
three dimensions that reflect different processes, although they overlap in people’s everyday 
experiences. The public space corresponds to the national objective; the private sphere to the 
individual level; and what could be called the local space, whose importance to the 
Palestinians has been highlighted by Aude Signoles,119
                                                 
119 Aude Signoles, ‘‘Réfugiés des camps, réfugiés des villes et familles autochtones vers une 
reconfiguration des pouvoirs locaux en Cisjordanie’’, in Nadine Picaudou, ‘‘La Palestine en transition’’, 
Les annales de l’autre Islam n°8, Paris, ERISM, INALCO, 2001, p 315-338. 
 
 corresponds to the community-based 
logic. Information  
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about community-based networks − who belongs to what family, which family is for or 
against which other family, etc. − are often consid ered to be one of the most sensitive issues 
to Palestinians, perhaps even more than involvement in the armed struggle. Political networks 
often overlap with community-based networks, and in that respect the former type of 
information leads to the latter. 
In analysing the private sphere one must therefore consider the relationship between 
individuals and the community. That relationship cannot be reduced to a mere opposition 
between individuals and the group. Farhad Khosrokhavar introduced the idea of the ‘‘quasi-
individual,’’ to indicate that the process of individuation is both possible and limited by the 
reference to a more or less imagined community.120 The reference to community, however, 
does not necessarily signify a loss of the individual in a group-based logic. As communitarian 
philosophers have shown,121
One development is worth noting. From 1997 to 1999, there was a clear change in the 
answers to the interviews I conducted. In the first interviews they distinctly challenged the 
situation − in particular regarding the loss of status for young people − and showed a desire to 
fight back. Two years later it was no longer a time for challenges, but rather for adhering to 
the patriarchal hierarchy. A vast majority of young people answered “my father” to a question 
about 
 being involved in a community can also be a source of support in 
structuring the individual. The relationship between individual and community should not be 
considered uniform. 
Community is a powerful frame of reference in young people’s experience, and not 
just with regard to national identity − in particular concerning the issue of honour.  For 
Palestinian youth, it is part of their individual history. Indeed, communitarian logic is a 
resource through which one can carve out a local, relatively well-protected space, and in 
which the individual can find a measure of stability, particularly when other means of action 
are no longer options − such as becoming involved in the national struggle or through 
economic integration. 
                                                 
120 Farhad Khosrokhavar, ‘‘Le quasi-individu’’, in François Dubet and Michel Wieviorka, Penser le sujet. 
Autour d’Alain Touraine, Paris, Fayard, 1995, p 235-255. 
 
121 See for example: Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and Politics of recognition, Princeton, New 
Jersey, Princeton Press, 1992 and Ayse Ceyhan’s analysis: Ayse Ceyhan, ‘‘Le communautarisme et la 
question de la reconnaissance’’, Cultures et conflits, n° 12, Winter 1993. 
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who their heroes and models were. Fathers were presented as an ideal to follow −  for both 
men and women − as an image of power and strong personalities: “My father is my ideal. I 
don’t know why; I love him a lot. I have a lot of respect for his strong personality and I’d like 
to be as strong as he is.’’122 When mothers were mentioned − far more rarely an d always in 
association with their fathers for the young men −  it was with some reservations due to their 
‘‘compromises’’ with society, as opposed to the fathers who had succeeded in imposing their 
own will, being loved and respected: ‘‘My mother is my ideal − but not for everything. She’s 
so patient with so many people who haven’t been very nice. I couldn’t stand that myself − to 
have someone put that kind of pressure on me − but my mother goes along with it.’’123 The 
times were no longer about opposition, but rather about restructuring around community-
based skills: ‘‘My father died when I was one year old, so I didn’t know him. But based on 
what everyone says about him − friends as well family − I hope I can be like him. He founded 
our driving school. He was the eldest, he had the power to do anything and was responsible 
for everything.’’124
When the father didn’t live up to this image of a social figure who could fix 
‘‘problems’’ and knew how to work the social system, other male figures in the family were 
sought out, such as a grandfather, older brother, a ‘‘successful’’ uncle, etc.: ‘‘Since my 
grandfather was so perfect, he was well-loved by people and conducted himself very well; the 
same goes for my father, but not quite as much. My grandfather was the oldest member of the 
family, so everyone listened to him and loved him a lot.’’
  
125
                                                 
122 A 21-year-old woman in the Jabalya refugee camp, who left school at 17. She is doing a training course in 
ceramics at a women’s activity centre. Her father, a bigamist, runs a small shop. Interviewed in Jabalya, July 
1999. (4% of marriages were polygamous in the Gaza Strip in 1997, PASSIA 2002, p 287) 
 
 
123 Hayat, 24, from the Shati refugee camp (in Gaza), a sociology student and social worker at a women’s 
centre. Her father opened a small shop after he became too old to continue working as a taxi driver (interviewed 
in Shati, July 1999). 
 
124 Ra’ed, 19, a business student and dishwasher in a small restaurant. The family owns a driving school where 
three of his brothers work (interviewed in Gaza, July 1999). 
 
125 Mohammed, 22, a portable phone repairman. His father is a labourer in Israel. (interviewed in Gaza, July 
1999). 
 
  
In 1998/1999 there was what might be called the end of a certain ‘‘youth-oriented’’ 
ideology. They went from the ‘‘we’’ of the shabab who were proud of ‘‘leading the 
revolution’’ to ‘‘my father, the hero.’’ Unable to obtain status through a revolutionary heroic 
identity or  
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through economic integration, young people focused on assimilating through their family 
identity and their fathers’ social skills. In fact, the new position proved to be inferior to the 
one they lost. But by highlighting their identity not as young people, but rather as members of 
a family with an honourable position in the community and a well-respected father, they 
assimilated back into society. Unable to progress by constructing a specific identity, they 
reclaimed their position through family.  
However, the image of the individual conveyed by this development stands in 
opposition to the process of individuation and of creating a truly private space for oneself. 
Belonging to a community proves to be ambivalent, as it provides access to resources of 
identification and a support network, yet it also entails behavioural obligations and even 
obstacles − especially for women : ‘‘What I love in this society is the mutual trust and 
assistance. But at the same time I dream of walking down the street and not knowing or 
saying hello to anyone. People here make themselves sick by trying to find everything out 
about each other. They think they have to meddle in your affairs and help you even if you 
don’t want them to.’’126
The Private Sphere and Community  
   
The relationship of Palestinian youth to community is driven by tension. The 
community allows them to carve out private space, yet at the same time it is opposed to 
individuation due to its group-oriented reasoning. Furthermore, the reference to the individual 
has powerful axiological connotations because it is considered to be a Western value. 
Therefore the process of individuation cannot be perceived or presented as an action which is 
exclusive to Palestinian society.  
 
 
 
Young people have to respect a number of rules of conduct that indicate their inferior 
status within the family. Certain attitudes are not permitted towards one’s father or eldest 
brother, whose decisions must be respected. As far as young women are concerned, this holds 
true for all the male members of the family as well as for older women. This is a general rule, 
and  
                                                 
126 Mahmoud is very involved as a leftist leader and psychology student. He suffered a severe leg wound during 
the First Intifada and walks with a crutch. He has a visa to go to Canada to have a leg operation and to pursue his 
studies thanks to a grant; but the Shin Beth has made it hard for him to get through due to his militant activities.  
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interactions change from one family to another, respecting that structure to a greater or lesser 
extent and always open to variations depending on whether the family is dealing with the 
community at large or with its own members. In the former case, it must show that the 
community rules are being respected so that the father can ‘‘save face’’. 127 The strong 
hierarchical nature within the family unit has led young people to single out several areas of 
private life depending on their degree of freedom. Being with one’s group of friends is not the 
same as being at home with one’s father.128
Young men adopt a different attitude when among family and if the father is present. 
They do not stretch out on the sofa, smoke or talk about certain topics, etc. Their group of 
friends has a different set of rules. It is a space in which they feel greater freedom, and it is 
referred to as a place where they feel more ‘‘themselves’’: ‘‘Generally speaking, I don’t talk a 
great deal at home. With my friends, on the other hand, I laugh, tell jokes and talk a lot. I 
don’t talk very much with my parents because they’re old and can’t understand me. It’s not 
like with my friends. We’re the same age, from the same generation, so we know how to 
relate and talk with each other. There may be a difference between male and female friends 
too. I have both men and women friends. I can say whatever I want to my male friends, but 
you have to be more careful and more serious with the women.’’
 For young women there is no real equivalent to 
the group of friends. Older women may get together, but it is rarer for younger women to do 
so. Time spent outside the home is more limited and it doesn’t allow them to develop that 
level of sociability, except with regard to students − in particular for boarders.  
129
                                                 
127 ‘‘An individual saves face when the line of action he is pursuing projects a consistent self-image, i.e. 
supported by judgements and indications from the other participants and confirmed by what is revealed in the 
impersonal aspects of the situation (...) During a specific contact, any interacting person whose personal 
attributes are known or visible may consider it normal and morally justified that people should help him to save 
face. (...) As soon as a person enters a situation where he has to save face, he takes responsibility for assessing 
whatever events are encountered. He must be sure to maintain a certain expressive order.’’ Erving Goffman, Les 
Rites d’interaction, Paris, Minuit, 1974, p 13. 
 
 
128 These distinctions also exist in societies where the reference to community is extremely weak. Basically, the 
stronger the hierarchy, the greater the distinction.  
 
129 Samir, 21, an architecture student in charge of a computer room. He comes from Salfit, a village near Nablus. 
His father is a doctor.  
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Family problems are rarely spoken about within one’s group of friends because 
community ties are at stake. Trust within the group is sometimes challenged when family and 
community quarrels enter into it: ‘‘The difference is in the way you talk about things. There’s 
a particular way of talking with friends, and certain subjects you may talk about, such as 
women. I only talk about family issues with my family. It’s different with the eldest 
brother.130 There are things you can’t talk about in front of him.’’131
Although behavioural norms must be respected, the family (including the extended 
family) is usually presented as a resource network rather than as an obstacle  − ‘my uncle got 
me out of prison, another family member is helping me find a job,’ etc. As a result, when 
young men talk about the limitations imposed on them, it involves the situation at large or 
money: ‘‘The limits I experience in my life here are solely due to the economic situation.’’
  
132 
‘‘Money and the Israeli government are the obstacles in my life. Palestinians are always afraid 
of doing anything.’’133
Not directly mentioning the family − or possibly the extended family − doesn’t mean it 
isn’t involved in the decision-making process. An individual would not necessarily feel this 
kind of intervention to be an unwanted interference. He might accept the role he is being 
asked to play. Moreover, young men have much greater latitude than young women. The 
latter, on the contrary, emphasise above all the restrictions imposed on them through social 
controls: ‘‘It’s very difficult to do anything in our society. Everything is restricted. What’s 
more, my freedom of movement is even more restricted because I’m divorced. They’re 
always watching, to see where I’m going.’’
 
134
                                                 
130 When the father died, his responsibilities were assumed by the eldest son.  
 
131 Tala’t, quoted above. 
 
132 Razmi, 23, an engineer. His father now runs a small supermarket after working for a long time as a 
construction site manager in Saudi Arabia (interviewed in Ramallah, October 2000). 
 
133 Sahir, 22, is studying business while working in his father’s dry cleaning shop (interviewed in Nablus, 
October 2000). 
 
134 Leïla, 22, is a journalism student at Gaza Islamic University, and a secretary. She lives in the Bureij refugee 
camp in Gaza. Her father is a jeweller. 
 
  
Marriage remains a key factor. Between the desire to let the family pick a suitable wife 
and the wish to keep it a personal matter, marriage is definitely one of the current areas of 
tension  
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between individuals and the community: ‘‘I want to get married through my family, of course 
− because of tradition. In any case, it won’t work any other way.’’135 ‘‘Depending on my 
destiny, I’ll either meet her through my family or through my circle of friends; but it would be 
better if it was through my family.’’136 ‘‘Definitely not through my family. That doesn’t exist 
anymore. It’s sheer folly to allow your family to pick a wife for you. I’ll find her myself, 
when the time is right.’’137
Thus, finding a wife through the family is not presented as the only way of getting into 
a relationship, even if it is hard to come in contact with young women any other way, except 
through student circles. Various strategies are employed to get around these difficulties and to 
start a relationship without the community knowing about it − such as sitting next to each 
other at an internet café and communicating through email on a screen so that no one will 
suspect they are conversing. One young man from a refugee camp became a newspaper 
delivery boy in order to correspond with his neighbour through messages he slipped inside the 
newspapers, which she was always careful to be the first person to fetch.
 
138 In any case, 
consent from both families remains crucial: ‘‘We got married out of our own choice, like in a 
dream. But then there was a disagreement between our two families and we had to 
separate.’’139
Relations between the two families and between the daughter-in-law and her in-laws 
(with whom she usually goes to live) are a crucial issue often mentioned in interviews. The 
young men want a young woman ‘‘who won’t create problems’’: ‘‘I want an obedient wife, 
with high morals, who accepts my situation as it is without making any comments about 
it.’’
 
140
                                                 
135 Khalaf, 22, who has a Master’s degree in Literature and Geography, is a house painter like his father. Gaza, 
August 1999. 
 
136 Mahmoud, 23, a psychology student who lives in the al-Maghazi refugee camp (Gaza). His father is a 
labourer in Israel. Interviewed in August 1999. 
 
137 Ashraf, quoted above. 
138 Mahmoud, 19, lives in the Jalazun refugee camp (Ramallah) and serves coffee at a company in Ramallah. But 
his story took a bad turn. After a long correspondence with the girl, they met once in a café in Ramallah, and her 
father found out. Since then she has not been allowed out, and they communicate by telephone from time to 
time. 
139 A 23-year-old woman interviewed in Gaza City, August 1999. 
 
140 Jamal, quoted above. 
 
 ‘‘I want a woman who has high moral standards and is well educated − someone who 
finds everything to her liking. If we live with my family, I don’t want her making remarks or 
saying she doesn’t want 
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that kind of a life and doesn’t want to live with my family. I don’t want that kind of pressure 
from her.’’141
These obstacles speak of their reputations, and therefore of the attention they must pay 
to gossip if they are to continue living on good terms with the others. Furthermore, all women 
hoping to undertake anything have stressed the fact that they must start by getting free of 
these concerns and distancing themselves from remarks of this kind from their families. 
Young women’s strategies for fighting community coercion and their own fear of rumours 
rely in part on the existence of support groups, where the trust built up may enable them to 
overcome obstacles to their freedom of movement. Young women therefore seek first of all to 
play the family unit off the community or hamula:
 
 
The situation is different for young women. The involvement of the family and 
extended family in decision-making is vital. When asked about what obstacles they encounter, 
they usually mention the extended family and the way society sees them: ‘‘There are lots of 
problems at home with my sisters-in-law. At first there were just problems between them and 
me; but then they started talking about me, saying I was doing this or that, and everyone 
began to watch me.’’  
142  ‘‘I’m really happy when there’s no one 
at home and nobody meddles in my life. I only feel unhappy when people want to intrude in 
our private life. They’re always asking questions − What are you doing? − and it offends me. 
And now they’re saying: She finished university, so what’s she doing, where’s she heading? 
Whenever my cousin the taxi driver sees me, he asks: What are you doing here? Go home!, 
and so on. I tell him that my own family is aware of what I’m doing and trusts me, so it’s 
none of his business!’’143
                                                 
141 Mahmoud, 21, a student at al-Hazar University, July 1999. 
 
142 The hamula is usually defined by the Palestinians themselves as their relatives from the same patrilineal 
descendance and is characterised by being linked to the same patronym. In fact, the formation of the hamula is 
also based on other links, such as matrimonial, matrilineal, neighbourhood, political and economic ones. The 
definition of the hamula as a ‘‘patronymic association’’ is therefore more precise. Dale F. Eickelman, The 
Middle East and Central Asia. An Anthropological Approach, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 
2002, p 144-145. 
 
143 Aïsha, quoted above. 
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In relying on these emotional bonds, women acquire negotiating room regarding 
community constraints. They spend a considerable amount of time trying to influence 
decisions on that level − by putting off wearing head scarves, by going to university, by not 
marrying such and such a person, etc. Obtaining support from their family can then enable 
them to free themselves from certain constraints. Consequently it is important for them not to 
enter into head-on clashes, but rather to focus on the emotional level and a sense of trust in 
order to develop the best arguments. ‘‘I do my best to find my own way in society, but as a 
woman I encounter many obstacles. Most girls have the problem of being in a patriarchal 
society. I live far away from my family. I live two hours away from them, alone with just one 
female roommate. I work. They can’t accept that. They have a hard time accepting it, but I 
have the right to live alone. But they’re always pressuring me to come home. Even though my 
own family has accepted the fact that I live alone, the extended family and the people around 
us haven’t. It’s easier to get my own family to accept it, because they know me, than the 
hamula. But I don’t think I have to live with the hamula.’’144
Similarly, as it is very hard for them to be in the forefront, they lay great emphasis on 
the idea of being an independent couple and on establishing their own family unit to counter 
the influence of their extended family and especially of their in-laws: ‘‘My husband supports 
me if I have to come home late from work, for example, or if I have to go somewhere. Before, 
I had five brothers and it was hard for me because I had to ask all five of them for their 
approval. Whereas now there’s only one person to ask, and my husband understands me, so I 
can ask him things and we speak freely about them.’’
 
145
                                                 
144 Ubur, 26, a graphic designer. She is originally from Jenin, and works in Ramallah. Her father runs a garage 
and her mother is a teacher. Interviewed in October 2000. 
 
145 Salma, 24, a supervisor in a women’s centre and a sociology student. Her husband is a technician. They live 
in the Bureij refugee camp. Interviewed in July 1999. 
 
 
Since they cannot act directly, their chances of creating such a unit reside in their 
husband’s ability to oppose the in-laws’ and extended family’s instructions. This is why they 
stress their desire for a husband with a strong personality who can take decisions 
independently:  
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‘‘I want to marry a man with a strong personality vis-à-vis those around him. There is always 
a fuss with other women, like when his mother says he has to do things this or that way. He 
must do as he wishes, not as she tells him.’’146
Being in a couple is endorsed by young women as a means of escaping coercion. That 
endorsement is only possible with the husband’s ‘‘understanding’’ − an extremely important 
feature for these young women. How much latitude they have depends on it: ‘‘There’s not 
much hope for any improvement in my life. I’d like to learn and become educated, but for 
personal and economic reasons I can’t. My husband doesn’t want me to continue my 
education and can’t provide economic assistance. He doesn’t want me to work either, 
although we haven’t come to a definite decision about that yet.’’
  
147
For young men, however, being in a couple is associated more with tradition, while 
their group of friends represents an area of more freedom. Being in a couple ensures their 
position in the community. Maintaining their honour and status depends on their wife’s 
irreproachable conduct. Therefore they want a ‘‘religious, moral and obedient’’ woman who 
will guarantee their inclusion in society under the best conditions. The following is the 
reaction of a student questioned about the expectations of young women hoping for a husband 
‘‘who has a strong personality, is responsible and understanding’’.
  
148 ‘‘I possess the first two 
qualities. I am independent and responsible, and will support my family. As for the third 
adjective, it indicates a stupid aspect of modernity − letting your wife go out a lot without 
asking permission, and so on. I can’t accept that. Those are my principles. It’s not about being 
underdeveloped; but my wife is under my authority and she has to take me into account and 
respect my decisions.’’149
                                                 
146 Afife, 22. She left school at 15. Her father is deceased. Her older brother is a labourer in Israel and  the 
second brother is a tailor. Interviewed in Gaza, July 1999. 
 
147 Lamis, 21, whose husband is a tailor. Interviewed in Gaza, July 1999.  
 
148 These adjectives were taken from my survey of 50 young people in Gaza in July and August 1999. The 
answers to the question ‘could you give three adjectives to define the qualities you expect from you husband (or 
your wife)?’ proved to be unvarying from one interview to another.  
 
149 Udey, quoted above. 
 
 
While some young men found the adjective ‘‘understanding’’ acceptable, this kind of 
reaction shows the conflict of interest between a man who wants to preserve his honour and 
authority and a woman seeking greater freedom through being part of a couple. Clearly this 
gap  
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partly explains the recent phenomenon of unwanted celibacy in young women who have 
attended university and whose work is related to their qualifications. These young women −
from conservative families who allow them to go to university but feel unable to deal with 
their success − do not want to return to their villages and sacrifice their careers. Since it is not 
acceptable for them to live ‘‘alone’’ with other young women as roommates, they live in 
residences for young girls with curfews and other controls.  
 
 
Young Women in Refugee Camps 
 
Building up the private sphere against the community is not a widespread phenomenon 
and presumes there is some manoeuvring room. While conducting a survey in a refugee camp, 
I noticed that this dimension had totally vanished from the young women’s discussions, which 
only denoted ‘adi (normal, habitual) as an answer to my questions.150 They no longer 
understood the reason for the interviews, as it was totally incongruous to question them 
regarding a fate so perfectly set and integrated, involving no conflict or distance. Their 
aspirations and social role were one and the same. The image of an individual who might have 
taken other decisions lost most of its meaning. ‘‘I see my future life as a normal one. We’d 
also like to have a house of our own if the economic picture gets better. I don’t want anything 
more than that, as long as we don’t have any more money than that. My father hasn’t earned a 
shekel in the past three months.’’151
Their fate is subsequently robbed of any originality and is seen as an answer to the 
normal aspirations of every woman: ‘‘What would you like to do in the future?’’ – ‘‘The 
usual, nothing special. Like everyone. Everything comes from religion; it’s natural. There’s 
nothing else. There are no women who don’t want to get married, have a family and children. 
Who wouldn’t want that?’’
  
152
                                                 
150 Nine young women were interviewed in the survey, conducted in the camp at Jalazun near Ramallah, 
between January and April 2001. 
 
151 Ilham, 23, left secondary school in order to get married. She has two children. Her father and her husband 
sometimes work as labourers in Israel.  
 
152 ‘Abla, 25, left school at age 13. her father is an electrician in a settlement. Interviewed at the Jalazun refugee 
camp, April 2001. 
 
 
Gender identity in itself is not seen as an obstacle. On the contrary, respect for 
interdictions shows that the family functions well within the community: ‘‘I don’t want to 
work  
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outside the house. It’s normal. My father is very nice. He gives us everything. We never lack 
anything. My mother doesn’t work. It seems natural to me.’’153
Their aspirations involved corresponding perfectly to the community ideal rather than 
forming a couple to obtain greater freedom. The young women’s position in the community 
depends on how well they correspond to that ideal. Within this context − of people from a 
poor background −  the future husband is mainly expected to be morally upright and to ensure 
a sufficient standard of living. The young women left school between the ages of 13 and 16, 
either because they were failing or because continuing would have meant leaving the camp, 
since it was not equipped with the educational infrastructure required. They do not appear to 
have developed a discourse − observed elsewhere − challenging the obstacles to their freedom 
of movement. It was nearly impossible to carry out an interview with them, since it had lost 
all meaning − except through the fact of explaining local customs to a foreign woman. And 
even that dimension faded to the extent that gender identity had supplanted nationality. As a 
woman, a foreigner should have had the same aspirations. However, one way of reviving the 
interviews was by talking about television. Television programmes − virtually their only 
entertainment, along with visits, due to their confinement within the camps −  give them a 
view into another world. One Mexican TV series was very popular. The freedom enjoyed by 
the women in the series was unanimously and severely criticised as amoral and antireligious. 
But the amorous storms featured on the show fascinated them, even though they denied any 
possible link with their own lives: ‘‘There’s one Mexican TV series I like to watch. The actors 
are foreigners, but they speak in Arabic. It’s nice. We also watch Arab and foreign films. 
They talk about social issues. Problems between people are the same everywhere. Problems 
about money and marriage are the same everywhere. But in real life there are no love stories 
like the ones in films.’’
 
154
                                                 
153 Inas, 23, whose father is a nurse’s aide. Jalazun, April 2001. 
 
154 Inas. 
 
Other women find support from their families or through emotional ties in their 
attempt to open up space for negotiation. These women do not even have that option and 
wouldn’t even consider it. But they give themselves space for dreams in the series. ‘‘I love the 
TV series that are  
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about love. They’re different. There’s more freedom between the men and women, which 
isn’t good. But the lives shown on those shows are much better. There’s no occupation. 
Everything is possible. They have so many rights over there.’’155
These interviews were conducted in a refugee camp where working in Israel and in the 
neighbouring settlement of Psagot has spared them from complete poverty. Even though it 
was divided into upper and lower Jalazun, and between richer and poorer, as well as good and 
bad families, the camp isn’t (wasn’t) in completely dire straits. But there were cases where the 
living conditions were far worse, such as in the Shati refugee camp in Gaza.
  
156 Images of 
what constitute a normal life have not changed for the young women I met. But their 
discourse did not have the serenity of a totally adequate habitus. Girls from Shati were the 
first victims of the utter destitution that prevails there and casts doubt on the possibility of 
achieving a community way of life, however limited. Within this context, questions about 
projects or the future caused the interviewees to break down on several occasions. Having 
generally spent very little time in school and been saddled with household chores and 
babysitting for their brothers and sisters at a very early age, these young women could see no 
prospects for the future. They also suffered from extremely difficult sanitary conditions. They 
are seen above all as burdens to their extremely poor families, for whom they bring in no 
money, contrary to men and even older women and young boys, who often enter the informal 
economy and try to improve everyday life by selling things on a small scale. Furthermore, 
many men could not raise enough money to get married,157
                                                 
155 Ilham, 23, whose father is a construction worker. Jalazun, April 2001. 
 
156 Interviews with five girls were conducted in this camp in August 1999, along with participatory observation 
in the women’s centre. 
 
157 Due to the many people who died, the collective mourning around the Al-Aqsa Intifada forbids any 
conspicuous celebrations. Some couples were thus able to get married because the ceremony was far less costly.  
 
 which removed one potential way 
out. Their window of opportunity was closed. Situated at the very bottom of the community 
hierarchy, and completely dependent on the rare resources which they could not provide, 
these young women are the ones who suffer the most from the economic situation.  
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As long as that situation ensures the proper functioning of the community, they have the 
status of dominated individuals, but with certain rights and obligations. On the other hand, 
when the situation deteriorates to the point where the community no longer functions 
properly, they are seen as a burden to the rest of the community. While an older married 
woman may be allowed to look for work in a pinch − despite the resulting dishonour − this 
would be totally unthinkable for a younger woman. However, a certain number of initiatives 
have been undertaken for them in Shati, where they have been given manual training in 
embroidery and craftsmanship for instance, and where an attempt has been made to sell their 
work in order to provide them with an income and to change their image as burdens.  
 
The private sphere is thus a blend of one’s family, group of friends and marriage 
partner, signifying both one’s attachment to the community (through the family hierarchy and 
the transmission of community expectations) and protection against its expectations. This 
protected space – where an individual can develop his own logic – and its preservation or 
assimilation constitutes an area of political importance. In this context, promoting a certain 
form of individuation which could thrive in that space is far from neutral. ‘‘I am the eldest son 
but I don’t want to be responsible for my sisters and brothers. When I go home my father 
looks at me askance and says ‘welcome’ in such a despairing way. One day I said I wanted to 
go to Canada. He asked, ‘Why Canada? You could go to Chicago, for instance, where we 
have family. – No, I want to go someplace where no one knows me.’ He just looked at me and 
sighed.’’158
                                                 
158 Hisham, an engineer in Ramallah, September 2001. 
 
  
The individuation process is in tension with a communitarian self-representation that 
stresses hierarchical order. When the actor must integrate the communitarian dimension to 
such a high degree in the process of constructing his identity, it then has an effect on his self-
image. The association of individualism with Western ideology and values is also an obstacle 
in the process of individuation 
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 Fulfilment or Betrayal? 
 
Young Palestinians often use vocabulary involving self-actualisation: ‘‘I want to be 
master of myself and owner of myself.’’159 ‘‘I won’t relinquish my right to define myself.’’160
                                                 
159 Souha, 22, a pharmaceutical student and volunteer in a first-aid team. Interviewed in Ramallah, October 
2000. 
 
160 A 22-year-old student studying business at Bir Zeit University, originally from Gaza. Answered on an 
anonymous questionnaire. December 1997. 
 
 
This kind of reference cannot be seen as neutral, however, as it clearly refers to the West. 
Palestinians customarily try to dissociate personal fulfilment and individualism, and to 
associate self-actualisation and a rejection of individualism. But trying to promote the private 
sphere − particularly if it is to the detriment of the national struggle −  is not a neutral 
proposition for young Palestinians since they then have to deal with the reference to the West 
signified by this attempt. The Arab world is searching for a kind of modernity that is 
synonymous with well-being, consumerism and technology. At the same time its relationship 
to Western domination is balanced by a symbolic shift in favour of spiritual values. This 
change of level is occurring according to a principle we have already explored with regard to 
Palestinian nationalism and its construct of honour against Israel. Individualism is associated 
with materialism and hedonism, contrasted with spirituality and Muslim religiosity, as well as 
with solidarity among Arab countries. This construct is particularly valid regarding the 
endorsement of Islamic modernity. Yet its ideological coherence, and above all the fact that it 
shows a proud face to the West, have enabled it to be assertive enough to enter into the 
modern world while preserving certain values and avoiding alienation.  
In this context, the reference to individuality or to personal projects is made possible 
when it does not appear to be promoting individualism. Otherwise it suggests support for 
values that take issue with those of the community and of solidarity for the national cause, as 
well as for the West − perceived as an adversary due to its domination and above all to its 
support for Israel. Supporting individualism therefore becomes a double betrayal. On the one 
hand it is seen as the Trojan Horse of Western ‘‘perversion;’’ and on the other hand, by 
advocating individual destinies  
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as more important than the national or collective destiny, it could signal a weakening of the 
struggling Palestinian people. 
Rather than being associated with individualism, personal projects are therefore 
presented as a source of personal fulfilment which allow you to be more involved in society 
and help it progress: ‘‘Naturally each of us has to work and do something, but in the end it 
should be of help to other people. I’m studying pharmacy. My goal is to work in scientific 
research, and as Palestinians we should have the goal of achieving great things. Studying 
cannot be separated from society. We must work in order to help society and people to 
develop. I’m working for this organisation161 for that reason. One of my goals is to feel that 
I’m benefiting young people in society.’’162
As one might imagine, this dimension is particularly strong in young women, who 
always stress the social aspects of their projects and their desire to help others: ‘‘After 
finishing my studies I’d like to found an orphanage.’’
 
163 ‘‘I’d like to work to help 
handicapped and abandoned children.’’164
                                                 
161 A first-aid team. 
 
162 Souha, quoted above. 
 
163 An 18-year-old student in humanities at Bir Zeit University, originally from Gaza. Answered on an 
anonymous questionnaire. December 1997. 
 
164 A 20-year-old student in pedagogy at Bir Zeit, originally from the Khan Younis refugee camp in Gaza. 
Answered on an anonymous questionnaire. December 1997. 
 
In hoping to handle everything together − their children, jobs and social work − these 
young women correspond to a gender identity which forbids them to advance their personal 
goals, even more than it does the men. The men lay more emphasis on their desire to succeed 
in their work. 
 
Nevertheless, while highlighting one’s social involvement may neutralise accusations 
of individualism, it also transforms the meaning of this act of solidarity, which goes from 
being mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. Support is provided on the basis of the 
impersonal status of someone in need rather than on community-based family ties. Not 
involving a frontal opposition, solidarity projects cannot be perceived as imposed by Western 
values. Moreover, Islamism  
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does use the same process. Its highly active charity networks also redistribute aid based on 
social criteria and have established a system of solidarity that has nothing to do with 
community solidarity, and therefore also changes the significance of the individual within 
Palestinian society.  
Palestinian youth’s experience of the ‘‘private sphere’’ has developed in relation to the 
national struggle, to the community and to the ambivalent promotion of the process of 
individuation, which is hard to separate from its reference to the West. The community 
provides status and social resources, but it is also a hierarchical network which young people 
− particularly young women − must often oppose in order to develop their individual plans.  
 
 
Domination and the Fragmentation of Experience 
 
Palestinian youth live within a split field of experience. They do not correspond to 
Bernard Lahire’s model in which the plural individual may not see different behavioural 
patterns as contradictory, as long as they come from distinct ranges of experience.165 Indeed, 
the individuals find themselves caught in a vital opposition here − between life and death − 
which cannot be separated into different areas. However, while this opposition fundamentally 
concerns the same scope of experience, one way for the individuals to “deal with” this 
contradiction is by not considering it as such. Their discourse thus involves both death and 
life projects as two different temporalities. The same young person might give a well-argued 
explanation about wanting to die and go on a shoot-out every night, etc., then take you a few 
minutes later on a thorough visit of his garden, where he has just planted some trees he hopes 
to see come to maturity in 25 years: ‘‘I want to die. Tonight I went out shooting and didn’t 
crack open a book.166 That’s good news about there being no test.’’167
                                                 
165 Bernard Lahire, op. cit., p 47. 
 
166 A student at Hebron University and Fatah activist. He was referring to his English books. May 2001. 
 
167 The English test was cancelled because the professor couldn’t get there due to the blockade.  
 
  
Similarly, an activist convinced that he may die any day now −  and has in fact 
narrowly escaped death on several occasions − refuses to get married because he feels he has 
no 
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future. But he wants to build a house, even though he just escaped from a bombing.168
This way of coping − involving a rejection of the contradiction in and separation 
between fields of experience − can be found on other levels as well. Thus, as with the 
colonized people analysed by Abdelmalek Sayad and Pierre Bourdieu,
 The 
refusal to take the apparent contradiction into account is also expressed in other areas, 
although in a less extreme way. One young man explained at length why religious precepts 
had to be respected. Although he was deeply convinced of this, he then went on to describe in 
detail − and without finding fault with himself − how he did not respect them in his own 
behaviour. He acknowledged the contradiction in his discourse, but at the same time refused 
to see it as a problem. Indeed, it isn’t a problem unless one is looking for coherence on the 
part of the individual. Yet in the case of such divided experiences, the fact of refusing to look 
for coherence may also be a way of dealing with the contradiction, which the individual 
accepts because he has no other choice. He has given up trying to bring his various 
experiences together. When talking about the national struggle, he is speaking of death. When 
talking about his personal projects, he is speaking of life. But he can no longer link the two. 
Accepting the contradiction then becomes a way of coping with living in a contradictory field 
of experience. Moving through this gap without trying to unify experience then appears, 
paradoxically, to be a means of staying connected.  
 
169
                                                 
168 A Tanzim Fatah activist, Ramallah, March 2001. 
 
169 Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, Le déracinement, la crise de l’agriculture traditionnelle en 
Algérie, Paris, Ed de Minuit, 1964. 
 this double game − 
which can be seen in some Palestinians − is a strate gy for responding to domination. To a 
significant extent, Arafat’s double discourse − for which the Israelis have criticised him 
abundantly − has been viewed as indispensable by Palestinians, given his position in the 
balance of power in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on the international diplomatic scene. 
For the Palestinians, he did not possess enough power to have the same discourse on both the 
Israeli and Palestinian scenes. Dominated on the Israeli scene, he was forced to do what was 
expected of him there. But that did not mean he was unable to develop other ideas − on the 
domestic stage where the balance of power was different − corresponding to the people’s 
expectations rather than to those  
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of the international scene or the Israelis. What was seen as hypocrisy by the Israelis was 
understood by the Palestinians as a way of dealing with pressure. They often didn’t take 
Arafat’s international speeches into account, making do with what he said on the domestic 
scene. The limits to this mode of operation were reached when Arafat was called upon to take 
decisions to enforce what he had said. Then his domestic legitimacy fell because his actions 
contradicted the people’s expectations. Furthermore, it was no longer possible for the 
Palestinians to maintain the double discourse theory. There was no domestic scene anymore, 
and the domination was spreading.  
The issue of domination is crucial here. To be dominated is to see one’s experience 
split up, broken apart and no longer have the means to provide oneself with a sense of 
coherence coming from within: ‘‘dominated individuals and groups have been dispossessed of 
their capacity to unify experience and to give it an independent meaning.’’170
As Sylvie Mansour has shown, the images of Mohammed el-Dourra –in which the 
father was incapable of defending his child – have had a powerful effect on Palestinian 
children in that they were tackling a strong figure and have destroyed a protected space.
 With 
domination, the injunction to develop coherence comes from the outside and attacks 
everything that escapes it. There is no protected space left. The feeling of vulnerability 
became extreme for younger Palestinians when one of the last protective figures − that of the 
father − was struck down.  
171
Is it possible for an individual to find unity within this kind of situation?
  
172
Touraine, ‘‘you can’t talk about a dependent society and look for ‘positive’ social actors. The 
peculiarity of this kind of development is that everything seems upside down. Exploitation 
becomes exclusion, work becomes loss of work; but also, class becomes community, and 
political action becomes both submission to demagogic manipulation and sudden 
violence.’’
 For Alain 
173
                                                 
170 François Dubet, opus cité, p 256. 
 
171 Sylvie Mansour, ‘‘Les enfants dont on ne parle pas’’, Ici &là, Jerusalem, Centre culturel français, 
March 2001. 
 
172 ‘‘A world that is torn apart and disoriented can only be transformed (...) through the demands of an 
individual who cannot bear to be divided within himself or be subject to double dependency. It is not the 
individual as such who seeks to rebuild himself, to reclaim his inner unity and his awareness of it. He can only 
be restored by acknowledging and asserting himself as the Subject, or the initiator of meaning and change, and 
equally of  social relationships and political institutions.’’ Alain Touraine, Pourrons-nous vivre ensemble ?, 
Paris, Fayard, le livre de poche, 1997, p 105. 
 
173 Alain Touraine, Les sociétés dépendantes, Gembloux, Duculot, 1976, p 154, quoted in Michel Seurat, 
L’Etat de barbarie, Paris, Seuil, 1989, p 127. 
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Indeed, in the case of extreme domination and totally divided experience, the demand 
for coherence might appear to be further domination. The conflict built around the image of 
national struggle provided the Palestinians with a coherent structure to frame their experience 
and challenge the idea of alienation. But when the domination intensified, and it became 
impossible to associate victory with the conflict, the latter’s structure-building nature came 
undone and developed into something grim.  
In this context, an individual’s strategy might consist in trying to separate the different 
areas of experience, even if they appear in fact to be linked. Here, dissociation is a means of 
preserving certain areas through the following line of reasoning: ‘‘sometimes it is better to 
lose part of the territory and ensure one’s independence than to fight on all fronts and risk 
losing everything.’’174 Nevertheless, the level of domination here has affected the people’s 
relationship to life itself, as well as their overall self-image. It excludes any protected areas 
that might totally escape from it. Within this context, the only way to create such areas 
consists in denying the contradiction and living within a frame of experience that has been 
split up and accepted as such. The individual denies the reduction of his experience to the 
fundamental questions of life and death which merge there. However, refusing this simple 
kind of coherence doesn’t mean there is no attempt at all at coherence. In fact it has become 
more complex, as shown by Carmel Camilleri175 regarding North Africans in France, who 
develop conflict-avoiding strategies when confronted with different identity systems which 
are asymmetrical. Indeed, ‘‘the effect of this asymmetry on identity-building processes seems 
to be constant; the attribution by the dominant group of a set of characteristics to the 
dominated group is most often induced by the negative value the former associates with the 
latter. (…) It is the value of the individual, and thus his self-image, which is more or less 
severely challenged through this prescribed identity.’’176
                                                 
174 Bernard Lahire, op. cit. , p 88. 
 
175 Carmel Camilleri, ‘‘Identité et gestion de la disparité culturelle : essai d’une typologie’’, in Carmel 
Camilleri, et al., Stratégies identitaires, Paris, PUF, 1990, p 101. 
 
176 Carmel Camilleri, op. cit., p 89. 
 
 In order to limit the effects of this 
command to take on a negative identity, young Palestinians use procedures such as diachrony 
− temporal separation − and differentiating objects. In that way, they can move forward while 
calling upon contradictory kinds of logic.  
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Chapter 5   
 
 
Religion’s Place in Society 
 
 
 
 
Religion permeates the experience of Palestinian youth, a requisite reference that few 
individuals reject. Even the extremely rare cases who call themselves atheists stress their 
cultural immersion in Islam. The omnipresence of religion, however, does not indicate an 
unequivocal relationship to it − far from it. Its importan ce changes from one young person to 
another and from one situation to another. There are four principal modes of relationship: 
traditional Islam, Islam as culture, Islam as ethics, and political Islam.   
Individuals can move between these different modes, which range from a mere 
cultural context to a form of spirituality. In its most absolute form − usually involving 
Islamists, although not always − it results in a life principle that guides one’s entire 
experience and is presented as a socio-political plan. As Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi has shown 
with regard to Moroccan youth, there is a potential here for the ‘‘coexistence of several kinds 
of truths, each containing its own specific form of logic’’177
                                                 
177 Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, Soumis et rebelles : les jeunes au Maroc, op. cit., p 92. 
 
 within the same complex attempt 
at coherence.  
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Traditional Islam 
 
Islam may evoke a traditional form of religion based on a set of precepts experienced 
as customs that mark the community’s specificity and constitute its identity. This kind of 
religious involvement is characterised by a discourse expressed by a ‘‘we’’ rather than an 
‘‘I’’:  ‘‘The Koran is our path and our way of thinking. It is very important to us. We are 
Muslims.’’178
Here, religious rules and community rules are one and the same. The former may 
never be used to cast doubt on the latter. Respecting religion involves observing other 
customs as much as religious duties such as prayer and fasting: ‘‘For us, a pregnant woman 
must stay with her in-laws when her husband is away.’’
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A study of young women students has helped to identify this type of relationship to 
religion. It mainly involves women from villages permeated by traditional Islam, in particular 
during their first year at a university. Confronted with intense stigmatisation and seen as 
‘‘backward’’ by the other students, they adopt a defensive position by trying to recreate the 
rituals from their villages − especially dietary ones − alo ng with other women from the same 
place. Their relationship to religion is thus the basis for legitimising their community 
practices. In religious matters, respecting these legitimised customs is far more important than 
the purely religious rites themselves, in particular with regard to personal practices such as 
prayer. Group rituals, such as Ramadan, are far more widespread. Thus, in the same breath a 
young woman may assert the vital role of religion and the unimportance of her own personal 
practice: ‘‘Everything comes from religion. That’s the normal way. There is nothing else. I 
don’t have time to pray. I do what feels right. I forget.’’
  
180
                                                 
178 Alya, 21, a fourth-year electrical engineering student in Nablus. Her father is a shop-keeper. Interviewed in 
October 2000. 
 
179 Interview with a 27-year-old worker at the Inash al Usra organisation in Ramallah, November 1997. 
 
180 ‘Abla, quoted above. 
 
  
Group ceremonies around which the community renews its bonds are vital during  
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times of trouble and upheaval, where it is also a matter of reasserting the unity and identity of 
society faced with threats of destruction. The festive nature of Ramadan disappeared almost 
entirely during the Intifada, as they were mourning victims, had grown poorer and couldn’t 
make as many traditional purchases. Furthermore, they could only visit a limited number of 
people due to the difficulty of getting around.181 However, many young people joined in the 
fast who do not usually observe Ramadan, mainly to show they belonged and express their 
solidarity in a process that was also due to the increased social pressure at such times. Indeed, 
in this context, not practising would no longer simply mean distancing oneself from religious 
practices; it would be seen as a challenge to the unity of a weakened society, tantamount to 
‘‘betrayal’’: ‘‘It doesn’t play any kind of role in my life. I don’t like religion very much. OK, 
I believe in Allah, but I don’t pay attention to the details, the dictates, praying 5 times a day, 
etc. I don’t usually observe Ramadan, but I think I will this year because the young people 
I’m living with will, and everyone at the university says you should.’’182
For Palestinian students abroad, observing Ramadan may also connect them to a 
society about which they feel guilty for not sharing in its hardships, even though they send 
home as much money as possible: ‘‘I decided to observe Ramadan this year, to feel like I was 
back in Gaza. I never observed it when I was there. I ate in secret; and, naturally, I didn’t here 
in Berlin either. But this year I want to feel like I’m back there. I want to go back, to fight and 
die with them. What’s the point of what I’m doing here − my studies and all that − in this 
situation?’’
  
183
Thus, traditional Islam, which above all provides religious legitimacy for community-
based customs, can also prove to have political significance. Its practises bring the 
jeopardized community togethertaking it out of historical time and into the longer time frame 
of a people, its gestures and ‘‘ageless’’ customs. Arresting time through their circular 
repetition, those customs become one of the political stakes. The identity thus created and 
made sacred 
  
                                                 
181 For a study of the month of Ramadan in 2001, see Stéphanie David, ‘‘Un Ramadan sous Intifada’’, in 
Bernard Botiveau and Aude Signoles (ed.), D'une Intifada l'autre : la Palestine au quotidien, Egypte/Monde 
arabe, n°6/ 2003, p 111-123. 
 
182 Samir, quoted above. 
 
183 Mounir, 28, originally from Gaza, has been living in Berlin for 8 years. He is working in his field while 
finishing his studies. He was a Fatah militant during the first Intifada and is currently a volunteer with an NGO.  
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 through Islam is also a part of nationalism. 
 
 
Cultural Islam 
 
Linking Islam to a cultural foundation is in keeping with traditional Islam, where 
religious matters are defined above all as an identity marker denoting the society’s specificity. 
There is one major difference, however. Islam as a cultural reference loses its transcendent, 
sacred dimension as well as its legitimising function. The Muslim religious dimension 
becomes just one element of Arab culture. Interdicts are only followed in the public arena, in 
order to avoid reprobation and not to shock practising Muslims. But they no longer have any 
value in themselves and are associated with old-fashioned customs − characteristic of the 
society − wherein  lies its charm for some people. This kind of relationship to religion is 
mainly found in the wealthiest circles, and especially among the more ‘‘detached’’ from 
Palestinian society. Young engineers from well-to-do families who have studied abroad feel 
as comfortable with ‘‘Western’’ lifestyles as with Palestinian society. They do not use their 
relationship to religion as a frame of reference for their own lives or for society; but they 
nevertheless appreciate the ways in which it is expressed in society − as markers of their 
identity and their deep roots in that culture.  
Little opposition is expressed towards these interdicts, since the individuals are 
detached from them. But ‘‘modern’’ young women in Ramallah are often very critical of 
these prohibitions since they affect their lives. They face great difficulties in trying to get 
around them; and there is a substantial amount of reprobation and control weighing on them. 
Young men, on the other hand, may behave more or less as they please, at the cost of a few 
superficial compromises in certain situations and places. As long as they remain within their 
own milieu − of young engineers for example − they develop a different view of these 
customs and interdicts. They readily exchange anecdotes about the deeds of their 
grandparents, highly appreciated as the archetypes of that Arab and Muslim identity. Thus, 
even with respect to young people who call themselves atheists, Islam is clearly an 
indispensable reference that is part of their cultural identity. 
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Islam as a Code of Ethics 
 
The prevailing relationship to religion lies somewhere in-between spirituality and 
social orientation: ‘‘Religion is a personal matter for me; it is the line I walk down and 
decides my destiny in life. That means it’s what I use to weigh things up. If it’s something 
bad, then I don’t do it.’’184 In highlighting Islam as a moral philosophy of life185 they are 
confirming an agreement about the principles that must regulate society: ‘‘I feel in harmony 
with my religion. There are certain things − limits in our religion − and we conduct ourselves 
only according to our religion; we know what we are supposed to do and how to stop, and that 
doesn’t create the least problem in our lives. There is nothing which I feel is forbidden 
because of religion. I can do whatever I want, whatever I like. On the contrary, true religion 
helps me to find solutions to the problems I face.’’186
Through the notion of a ‘‘life path’’ −  advocated very frequently in this kind of 
religious practice −  individuals emphasize an idea halfway between a purely private 
relationship to religion and a more social orientation. However, the mastery of religious 
‘‘principles’’ in a direct, individual manner is valued. Consequently, the relationship to 
religious matters has become more individualised. This has resulted in a refusal to judge other 
people’s conduct. This approach is designed to underscore one’s detachment from 
community-related religious customs and to stress their individual nature: ‘‘As a Muslim 
woman, this is between God and me. It doesn’t affect the way I treat others, or perhaps only in 
a positive way; but it doesn’t mean I don’t wish to meet people practising other religions. I 
don’t pray. When I was 14, I wore a head scarf. It was my choice, and I prayed all the time. I 
prayed until I was 20, then I stopped. I stopped because I had long days at the university and 
gradually could no longer do it, and now I don’t pray anymore. Sometimes I still pray, when I 
feel really bad.’’
   
187
                                                 
184 Elyas, 23, lives in the Al Maghazi refugee camp (Gaza). His father used to run a small local restaurant, but is 
too old now. Elyas is studying psychology and sociology while working as a coordinator at a youth centre. 
Interviewed in July 1999.  
 
185 Mounia Bennani-Chraibi has observed the same key role of Islam as a moral philosophy of life in young 
Moroccans. Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, Soumis et rebelles : les jeunes au Maroc, op. cit., p 90-91. 
 
186 Alham, quoted above. 
 
187 'Ubur, quoted above. 
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While religion is held onto as the ultimate referent that determines what is good or evil 
and gives life an orientation and coherence, people still want it to be an individual matter, 
especially with regard to reading the Koran. They do not want intermediaries. When one girl’s 
family pressured her to wear a head scarf at university − although she had refused to wear one 
outside her village − she responded by saying: ‘‘I’m the one who’ll go to hell.’’188
Some people admit rejecting or not understanding certain aspects of Islam. While not 
casting doubts on it, they claim the right to ask questions: ‘‘I’m a Muslim woman, and there 
are many things in the Muslim faith about which I am 100% convinced; but there are some 
things I’m really not sure about, and others which I don’t understand. There are many things 
that limit your thoughts − m any things and systems that restrict your thoughts. I don’t like 
those things. I want to have an open mind and to express myself. Now there are several things 
I’m not sure about − maybe later, but not for the moment.’’
  
189
Here, the individual approach to religion has been taken to its farthest limits. It allows 
you to create your own interpretation and to oppose traditions in the name of a ‘‘purer’’ 
Islam, based on principles rather than on traditions. Young women, particularly concerned by 
behavioural restrictions, can challenge them in the name of this direct, individual relationship 
to religious matters: ‘‘Some people say our religion forbids women to do certain things. On 
the contrary, it makes us freer; we can study, and come and go as we like.’’
 
190
This individual relationship to religion sometimes permits arguments that might be 
opposed to certain traditions. However, the tension thus introduced does not always play out 
in favour of the religious argument: ‘‘I perform all the religious duties. I pray 5 times a day 
and fast during Ramadan. I wanted to wear the full veil
 
191
                                                 
188 Islah, 28, in charge of customer service for an insurance company. Originally from a village near 
Qalqilya, she studied at Bir Zeit and now works in Ramallah. Despite pressure from her family to go back and 
look after her elderly parents since her sister married and left home (she is the youngest), she has remained in a 
residence for girls in Ramallah. 
 
 
189 Raja, 22, a pharmaceutical student and volunteer in a first-aid team. Interviewed in Ramallah, October 2000. 
 
190 Normine, quoted above. 
 
191 The various ways of wearing a veil or head scarf are far from neutral. Wearing a full veil, through choice or 
usually through the husband’s wishes, contrasts sharply with the usual Palestinian head scarf and may be seen as 
shocking: ‘‘when I run into my sister-in-law wearing a veil over her face in the street, I feel like I’ve just seen an 
extra-terrestrial,’’ exclaimed one woman at a family meeting in Gaza. At the other extreme, women wearing the 
‘‘sexy’’ head scarf − tied tightly around the head and mainly worn in freer circles such as by the students at Bir 
Zeit or young women working in Ramallah − are sometimes informed on, as they are not considered properly 
veiled.  
 
 (which also covers the face) but my  
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father didn’t want me to. It’s not that he isn’t religious; but he said if I did it and − after 
getting married − it turned out my husband was against me wearing a veil and took it away, 
that it would be his fault in God’s eyes. So he told me to wait until I got married to find out if 
my husband would accept it or not.’’192
                                                 
192 Moufida, 21. She studied up to her A-levels in Egypt. Her family belongs to the group of returning 
Palestinians, but is not among the more well-to-do. Her father, a mid-level manager with the PLO, came back 
when the Palestinian Authority was established. Moufida is currently giving private English lessons.  
 
 
Tensions may arise between traditional Islam linked to community-based rules and 
other forms of religious behaviour that go beyond its bounds. In this example, the patriarchal 
rules have the upper hand. Yet the young woman’s demand − to ‘‘wear the full veil’’ − did 
not imply a request for greater freedom of movement, even if Islamic dress has often been 
adopted on first contact with new places, jobs or studies. That kind of challenge is the basis 
for the developing ‘‘Islamic feminism’’ that is very frequent among militants and Islamist 
sympathizers, whose modes of operation and limits we shall examine later on in the book.  
The massive discourse internalising and individualising religion among young people, 
whether Islamist or not, implies individual immersion in the texts, or a spiritual concept of 
prayer. Apparently common, it may in fact include various perceptions of how religion is 
involved in political and social issues, and of how its legitimising principles and rules have 
been introduced. For young people who have developed the notion of an individual 
relationship to religious issues through the idea of returning to Islam’s pure principles, true 
religious value lies in one’s inner ‘‘conviction.’’ Given that criterion, they may refuse to 
judge behaviour in the public arena. Religion is thereby made personal, since it only has the 
authority to judge within a relationship to oneself, within a moral code. It would be a mistake 
to see this as a process of de-socialisation in which the individual develops a private, ineffable 
form of religion. Life’s rules of conduct and orientation, affirmed through this process of 
individualising one’s relationship to religion, indeed imply certain perceptions of social  
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matters. But by removing the religious issue from the public arena in the name of ‘‘purer’’ 
religion − in other words, positioned by moral principles rather than customs −  these 
perceptions lead to a separation between politics and religion, and thus to a quest for other 
sources for legitimising, founding and organising politics. The foundation provided by 
religion that transcends good and evil is no longer situated at the community level, but rather 
at the level of the individual; and politics therefore becomes dissociated. However, the option 
of returning to the text − to a ‘‘pure’’ Islam and its principles, which in fact provides the basis 
for individualising the relationship to religion − does not necessarily result in a desire to make 
religious matters more personal. It may, on the contrary, help promote a new form of social 
organisation. Then Islam turns political.  
 
 
Political Islam 
 
The issue of political Islam − i.e. the desire to include principles and rules of conduct 
in politics that are presented as having religious legitimacy − alludes to the existence of 
Islamist movements which see themselves as its expression, mainly Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
in the case of the Palestinians.193 The position of political Islam in Palestine is based on two 
principles. The first alludes to the setting of moral standards within politics by applying 
religious precepts; the second refers to the perception of nationalism as sacred. The Islamic 
State is thereby presented as a perfect State where equality and justice reign − an ideal State 
due to the equivalence between each believer’s personal rules and those governing public 
affairs: ‘‘In an Islamic State all people are equal and have the same rights, protected by the 
State.’’194
                                                 
193 With regard to political Islam in general, see François Burgat, L’islamisme en face, Paris, La Découverte, 
1996; Gilles Kepel, Djihad, expansion et déclin de l’islamisme, Paris, Gallimard, 2000 and Olivier Roy, L’échec 
de l’Islam politique, Paris, Le Seuil, 1992. For a more specific analysis of Palestinian political Islam, see: 
Pénélope Larzillière, ‘‘L'Islam politique et le nationalisme palestinien’’ in Michel Wieviorka, (ed), ‘‘L‘avenir de 
l'Islam en France et en Europe’’, Paris, Balland, 2003, pp 155-165, various works by Jean-François Legrain, in 
particular ‘‘La Palestine : de la terre perdue à la reconquête du territoire’’, Cultures et Conflits, n°21-22, Spring-
Summer 1996, Bernard Rougier, ‘‘Dynamiques religieuses et identité nationale dans les camps de réfugiés 
palestiniens du Liban’’, in Jean-Francois Legrain, (ed.), ‘‘En attendant la Palestine’’, Maghreb-Machrek, 
n° 176, Summer 2003, pp 35-59. 
 
194 An 18-year-old science student, originally from Hebron, in her first year at Bir Zeit University. 
This is an answer to the question ‘‘What does an Islamic State mean to you?’’ on an anonymous questionnaire 
handed out in December 1997. 
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         Political Islam is different from community-based Islam and may challenge its rules. In 
young people’s minds, this form of Islam aims to set moral standards within politics and 
society. It is based on a double ideal of equality and justice meant to institute a political plan 
to create an Islamic State and a social plan to establish moral standards at the grassroots level. 
Connected to a large charity network, this ‘‘moralisation’’ process is to be carried out in 
particular through enforcing sharia, conceived as a locked code for which it possesses the 
definition and whose potential jurisprudential interpretations (ijtihâd) are extremely 
limited.195
An important debate was triggered within Palestinian society in 1998 by women’s 
groups intent on bringing about a reform of individual rights and a unification of Palestinian 
law.
 
196 Indeed, Palestinian law reflects the territorial divisions and the various administrations 
that have succeeded one another, and it is far from unequivocal.197 In 1997, Palestinian M.P.s 
made sharia one of the main sources of legislation (rather than the main source198
                                                 
195 This position is not that of the majority of the Ulema. Modifications and interpretations based on historical 
and social circumstances have been a continual process in the history of judicial Islam. 
 
196 For an in-depth analysis of this debate and its ramifications, see Bernard Botiveau, ‘‘L'Islam dans la 
construction nationale palestinienne. Le débat sur le droit de la famille’’ in Nadine Picaudou, (dir.), ‘‘La 
Palestine en transition’’, Les annales de l’autre Islam n°8, Paris, ERISM, INALCO, 2001, p 135-154. 
 
197 ‘‘Regarding individual rights, Palestinian Muslims are subject to at least four different regulations: an 
outdated ‘‘Egyptian’’ code of law from 1954 survived in Gaza without ever being amended; in the West Bank, a 
Jordanian code of law from 1967 was in effect to which all the improvements effected in Jordan were applied; 
Jerusalem was under the same system, while taking Israeli law into account to a certain degree. Lastly, in Israel, 
an Islamic variation of Israeli family law was in effect.’’ Bernard Botiveau, L'Islam dans la construction 
nationale palestinienne. Le débat sur le droit de la famille, op. cit., p 144. 
 
198 Botiveau, L'Islam dans la construction nationale palestinienne, op. cit., p 146. 
 
). While the 
reforms proposed in the debate do not really diverge from Islamic law, the Islamists and the 
Ulema are highly critical of them. As Bernard Botiveau has pointed out: ‘‘Islam is certainly a 
referent, since it can produce at least a consensus, if not unity. Through Islam, everyone can 
reinforce whatever certainties he needs to believe in and confirm the fact that respecting 
demands for social justice is highly useful in times of shortage. At the same time, no one has 
managed to define what Islamic law might bring to the reform, other than in a negative way 
through interdicts and interpretive restrictions which are also characteristic of times of crisis. 
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(…) In these unsuccessful claims of equality, social opportunities and pluralism, it is hard not 
to see a kind of competing force for legitimacy that has not managed to establish itself for the 
moment.’’199
The social plan is more crucial to the Islamists’ strategy than the political one,
 Indeed, young Islamist sympathizers endorse political Islam and sharia above 
all by referring to principles of justice and equality. Given the consensus around these 
principles, the debate has focused on the issue of determining whether or not the strict 
enforcement of Islamic law − unclear regarding the Palestinian Territories − is the best way to 
achieve them.  
Contrary to what we have observed about the process of making religion a personal 
issue, the ‘‘moralisation’’ process has targeted public conduct and does not merely refer to a 
question of conscience. With its aura of religious legitimacy, this agenda is automatically 
assumed to provide what is best for people and to show the proper way. For those who 
propose this plan and are supposed to know the truth, setting moral standards of behaviour is 
also a public mission designed to elevate the people. It can therefore be prescribed so that −  
failing a profound change − at least believers will not be  sullied or shocked in their everyday 
lives. Founded on religious legitimacy, the imposition of behavioural norms in the public 
arena has made it possible to thwart certain Palestinian social developments. The Islamists’ 
social profile is far from clear or unequivocal, and is often close to that of local Fatah 
militants. They are often found within the same family. While partisans of the Islamist project 
may not be identifiable within a single class, we can clearly distinguish their enemies − those 
who profited from the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, known as returnees or 
‘‘Tunisians’’. The Islamist plan directly challenges their way of life and the role of the 
prominent people to whom Arafat looked for support when he returned. For the young 
university graduates who cannot find their place within the Palestinian economy − mainly 
because they don’t have the connections required in an extremely limited marketplace − 
Islamism presented in this way has enabled them to question the elite and their ‘‘depravation’’ 
while at the same time taking part to a certain degree in modern technology and the material 
comforts associated with it. The Islamist movements contain elements of a class struggle.     
200
                                                 
199 Botiveau, L’Islam dans la construction nationale palestinienne, op. cit., p 153-154. 
 
200 Jean-François Legrain, ‘‘Le fantôme d'Arafat’’, Critique internationale n°16, July 2002, p 46. 
 
 and 
 108 
they focused at an early stage on quietist Islam when the hazards of the political scene 
subjected them to repression that was too severe and could have been dangerous for them. 
Through their charity network and assistance to the population, they have developed a social 
image that explains to a great extent the support they have gained and the respect they 
sometimes prompt − even from political opponents − as men of principle and conviction. 
However, promoting ethical Islam may also ‘‘catch up’’ with them. Their social and political 
agenda is based on ethical principles, and its achievement may be criticised in the name of 
those same principles, over which the individual is in control, independently of elected 
authorities. It is not uncommon to hear severe criticism of all kinds of institutions from the 
same young people who are supporting the establishment of an Islamic State and organisation 
of society. Thus the Islamic State is presented as a nearly inaccessible ideal, and in any case 
one that has never been achieved; for them, the Iranian government is not a valid example: 
‘‘The Islamic State is a dream which I do not think can be achieved. But it has great meaning 
for me − security, peace and inner peace, for example. But I think it’s very hard for it to exist 
in the situation we’re currently experiencing.’’201
The Palestinians’ domestic social and political plan of Islamism is coupled with 
nationalism, a key element in their strength of conviction: ‘‘The day the enemies usurp a 
country belonging to Muslims, every Muslim has an individual religious obligation to fight. 
We must wave the flag of Jihad in face of the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews.’’
 The Islamists themselves may even be 
criticised for betraying the plan they have been promoting.  
202 In its 
Charter,203
                                                 
201 A 20-year-old student, originally from  Hebron, in her third year of English studies at Bir Zeit University. 
She is a member of a religious organisation. This is an answer to the question ‘‘What does an Islamic State mean 
to you?’’ on an anonymous questionnaire handed out in December 1997. For other examples of this kind of 
answer emphasising ideas of justice, equality and security, see Agnès Pavlowsky,. Hamas ou le miroir des 
frustrations palestiniennes, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2000, p 121-143. 
 
202 Hamas Charter, article 15, 18/08/1988. An English version of the charter is available in Khaled 
Hroub, Political Thought and Practice, Washington, Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000, p 267-291. 
For a French translation, see Jean-François Legrain, Les voix du soulèvement palestinien, Cairo, 
CEDEJ, 1991. 
 
203 Article 11 
 
 Hamas names the Palestinian lands as a waqf. As Jean-François Legrain has 
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 shown,204
But regardless of the Islamic validity of these doctrines, nationalism is in fact a crucial 
ideological element for many young Palestinians, more often than the social plan. ‘‘There are 
many connections between religion and politics − far more than in other countries. For  us, 
religion includes our holy places and our country, since we have holy places in this country. 
That’s why there are many connections between religion and politics. There is no racism here 
in our country. We make no distinction between Christians and Muslims. Naturally, there are 
movements like Hamas, which is pursuing its goal of creating an Islamic State, but that means 
nothing as long as Palestine is occupied.’’
 this allocation is not accurate in terms of Islamic jurisprudence: ‘‘The author of the 
Charter has totally confused the idea of Dar el-Islam, which indeed implies that lands 
conquered by Muslims must forever remain ‘Islamic land,’ and the idea of waqf, a judicial act 
complying with a very specific law and applying to a particular piece of property.’’  
205
                                                 
204 Jean-François Legrain, ‘‘La Palestine : de la terre perdue à la reconquête du territoire’’, Cultures et 
Conflits, n°21-22, spring-summer 1996, p 192. In this article Jean-François Legrain analyses the way in which 
Hamas has endorsed the question of land and associated it with eschatological issues (p p189-196). 
 
205 Raja, quoted above. 
 
  
In the relationship to religious matters, sacralized nationalism and social projects can 
be considered separately. Indeed, the religious legitimacy of nationalism, rooted in a sacred 
land, can be dissociated from supporting the Islamist movements’ social and political plans. 
The relationship to Islam is thus translated by an eschatological vision − with which the 
Palestinian national struggle is associated − that is thereby removed from historical time and 
enters a religious time frame. Religion provides the national struggle with a transcendent and 
unchallengeable legitimate foundation −  and with an image of a victorious future. We shall 
come back to this question later in the book.  
Paradoxically, adhering to an Islamist movement does not necessarily mean 
associating the national struggle with jihad. Thus, certain Islamist militants are keen on 
separating religion from the national struggle and its methods: ‘‘Acts of martyrdom have  
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nothing to do with religion. They are not forbidden by religion; but they are a weapon, not 
something religious.’’206
This assertion −  surprising at first sight from an Islamist militant − underlines two 
processes. The first one alludes to the clearly more nationalist than religious nature of the 
Islamist movements, since many people enrolled for nationalist reasons when these 
movements seemed to be the only force continuing the struggle. The second process − in
keeping with what we know about the individualisation of people’s relationship to religion −  
has tended towards ‘‘spiritualising’’ and internalising the latter in order to preserve its 
symbolic transcendence
  
207
The two faces − nationalist and social − of Palestinian political Islam, as it is perceived 
by young people, are not necessarily linked; and the latter has made gender a key issue. Social 
reform has indeed focused mainly on controlling women’s behaviour. As Joan Scott has 
shown,
 and to maintain a space sheltered from the hazards of the national 
struggle.  
208 this is an issue of power, and controlling women is another way for the Islamists to 
manifest their hold on society. Yet many women are sympathizers or members of various 
Islamist women’s groups. How can one explain this kind of commitment? In fact, their 
response to Islamism is different from the men’s reaction to it in many ways. They often use it 
to legitimise activities they would otherwise be forbidden to engage in. As Olfa Lamloun has 
shown, ‘‘their involvement, which cannot be perceived exclusively from the angle of a 
fundamentalist religious act, has helped them to assume a new identity. The latter is often 
constructed against the traditional family, the power structure and the West.’’209
                                                 
206 Kifah, a student and Hamas militant in Hebron.  
 
207 As Farhad Khosrokhavar has shown with regard to Iran, the Islamic revolution − which identifies religion 
with politics − has ended up sapping religion of its symbolic transcendence. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Le nouvel 
individu en Iran, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien (CEMOTI), n° 26, 
1998, p 146. 
 
208 Joan Scott, ‘‘Genre une catégorie utile de l’analyse historique’’, Les cahiers du GRIF, n°37/38, 
Spring 1988. 
 
209 Olfa Lamloun ‘‘Les femmes dans le discours islamiste’’ in Olfa Lamloun and Bernard Ravenel (ed.), 
‘‘Femmes et islamisme’’, Confluences Méditerranée, n°27, Autumn 1998, p 9. 
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Islamic ‘‘Feminism”? 
 
Young Islamist women stand out through their use of religion as a unifying principle 
that orients their entire experience. It is an all-encompassing principle manifested through an 
ideal moral life that is valid for both the private and political spheres. Rights, justice and 
respect are at the heart of their involvement in Islamism. As Fariba Abdelkhah has pointed 
out: ‘‘to see Islamic designs only as a device for dominating women is once again to confuse 
on the one hand ideological and theological references (…), and on the other hand, the social 
movement which by definition cannot be limited to its expression by its own leaders.’’210 
Indeed, these women see their form of Islamism more as a frame of reference enabling them 
to assert their rights than as a set of interdictions. Thus, as we have seen, the idea of an 
Islamic State evokes the ideal of an egalitarian, just, safe and peaceful State, which also 
guarantees women’s rights: ‘‘An Islamic State is the key to security. It signifies a dream to be 
achieved. It signifies political, social and economic peace. It means full rights for women, no 
more suffering for the people, more chances of studying and equal opportunity in the 
workplace. It means a society that guarantees civil, political, social and religious rights for the 
minority. Everyone takes part in political decision-making.’’211
                                                 
210 Fariba Adelkhah, Femmes islamiques, femmes modernes, Pouvoirs, n° 62, Paris, PUF, p 94.  
 
211 A 22-year-old student, in her 4th year of English studies at Nablus University, who belongs to a religious 
organisation. Answer to the same questionnaire quoted above. 
  
Beyond the general issue of equality, young Islamist women see the reference to 
Islamic sharia as a chance to obtain greater rights than those currently granted them by the 
community. For instance, sometimes women are completely robbed of their inheritance even 
though the Koran grants them half (or more, depending on the circumstances). The women 
can then base their rights on the Koran, thanks to which they have a text recognised as 
legitimate by the society as a whole. Furthermore, ‘‘going back’’ to the original text enables 
them to orient the interpretations in a more favourable way. In the same stroke, these young  
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Islamist women base their rights on sharia and use that legitimacy to contest certain social 
and familial restrictions: ‘‘Society and the family set up obstacles, but they don’t interest me 
because my religion allows me to do what I’m doing and no one can take away a right that has 
been given to me by God.’’212
The rights which these young women insist upon are not seen as a direct challenge to 
gender identity within the community. On the contrary, religious legitimacy represents a way 
to make greater freedom of movement compatible with that identity. However, their 
insistence on the right to work, study, etc. is in fact opposed to gender identity as it has been 
developed within the community and has altered its image from the inside. Young Islamist 
women either say they don’t have to take the community’s ideals into account − due to the 
higher religious legitimacy they allude to, as in the above example − or else they deny that it 
is challenging anything. They then proceed to emphasise the compatibility between asserting 
their own rights and the social framework within which they live, developing the idea of 
‘restricted freedom’: ‘‘Are there women’s rights? Yes. First, there is a woman’s right to live 
in restricted freedom, on the condition that her freedom doesn’t conflict with the image of 
Islam, its traditions and culture; her right to freedom of expression; her right to be respected, 
and her right to benefit from those rights stipulated by our religion; her right to study and to 
receive alimony in the event of a separation; and her right to choose her own husband and to 
be treated well. Islam has defined these rights, and women must be pro-active in order to 
obtain them.’’
 
 
213
                                                 
212 A 22-year-old student, in her 4th year of English studies at Bir Zeit University, who is originally from 
Qalqilya and belongs to a religious organisation. Anonymous questionnaire, December 1997. 
 
213 A 19-year-old student, in her 2nd year of computer studies, back home after spending several years in Abu 
Dhabi.  
 
   
For these women, their Islamist involvement helps them to enjoy both political self-
affirmation and a personal trajectory aimed at pursuing studies and finding a job. Affirming 
one’s Islamist involvement and accentuating the man/woman separation − through belonging 
and through one’s conduct − has the added advantage of limiting the risks of dishonour that 
could arise from the coeducational nature of universities. Wearing a head scarf and Islamic 
dress enables them to avoid certain kinds of sexual harassment, given that the slightest  
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ambiguity could endanger a woman’s reputation and ruin her future. At a very well-attended 
lecture214
                                                 
214 On 6 November 1997. 
 at Bir Zeit University, a social worker spoke of numerous cases involving students 
who had left the university due to sexual harassment. The following is an excerpt from a 
discussion prompted by the lecture: 
The Professor: ‘‘The harassment issue is about men, because they think: ‘Nothing 
will happen to me.’ Whereas the women have to bear everything − the rumours, no one 
wanting to marry her, etc. Some women have even dropped out of university because of 
sexual harassment. It was making life too difficult for them. Making remarks about the 
clothes worn by a girl one doesn’t know is also a form of sexual harassment. Whether or not a 
women wears a head scarf, sexual harassment is forbidden and the laws will be enforced in 
the same way.’’ 
A Woman: ‘‘Two days ago Hamas said we must stop discussing these issues because 
they are not part of our religion.’’  
An (Islamist) Man: ‘‘The problem is that women wear jeans and don’t wear head 
scarves, and so on.’’ 
The Professor: ‘‘In all the Gulf States the women wear the full robes, and there’s 
more sexual harassment there than here. Let’s talk about the promiscuity in taxis where 
women sit close to the window while the men sit in the middle and spread their legs wide 
open.’’ 
 
Young Islamist women form groups marked by their clothing and distant attitude, 
thereby creating a protected space for themselves. Men take care not to sit next to women in 
group taxis. They make sure to avoid having a woman sit between two men − by changing 
places if necessary − and do not sit at the same tables in cafeterias.  
Furthermore, being involved in women’s organisations within Islamist movements −  
to which the management of charity activities for women are generally assigned − has in fact 
helped introduce them into the public arena to the extent that gender differences are carried 
over into it. This is clearly the method used by Islamist ‘‘feminism,’’ and its own self-
restriction; but it cannot be deemed as devoid of any short-term results for women. By carving  
 114 
out an exclusively female space in the public arena through a strict separation of the sexes, 
Islamist movements have enlarged the possibilities for women, who can move around in a 
legitimate and protected manner. Nonetheless, this mobility comes at a price. Women are 
essentialized there and reduced to an image of complementarity with men.215 While 
promoting an Islamic organisation of society may challenge current definitions of gender in 
Palestinian society, it also increases pressure to a considerable degree on women hoping to 
promote an image based on equality. ‘‘Whoever wishes to liberate women must allow them to 
be active on all levels of society and in all economic areas. Islamist associations limit 
women’s work to only one area. They are never allowed to represent this movement on 
television. They are taught to keep doing their women’s work, to produce more children who 
believe in Islam, and to put pressure on other women to enforce Islamist instructions. When I 
meet Islamist women, their first question is about my reasons for not wearing a head scarf and 
whether or not I pray. They tell me I’m not a real Muslim.’’216
As religious matters are not unequivocal, and yet are a key reference in the Palestinian 
experience, the power issue at stake for the Islamists lies in their ability to define themselves 
and compel recognition as having a monopoly on religious interpretation. Contrary to those 
who are striving to make religious issues a private matter − in order to carve out their own 
space and keep external moral controls at a distance − the Islamists are trying to impose their 
collective interpretation and acquire social status through their own moral conduct, based on 
the fact that they have a hold on ethical criteria. At the same time, through that orientation 
they have rearticulated their experience around the strict enforcement of self-discipline, 
offering young Palestinians a solution to their dissociated experience. In this regard, mutatis 
mutandis, the reference to religion as providing structure through such self-discipline brings 
to mind some of the youth in French suburbs.
  
217
                                                 
215 A feminist trend found in other groups besides Islamists. 
 
216 Interview with Shadia Sarraj, director of a women’s centre in Gaza, March 1997. 
On this issue, see also Islah Jad, ‘‘Les Palestiniennes face aux mouvements islamistes’’, mujeres 
in red, 1998. http://www.nodo50.org/mujeresred/palestinas-isalh_jad.html. 
 
217 Farhad Khosrokhavar, L’Islam des jeunes, Paris, Flammarion, 1997. 
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For young Palestinian men and women religion may refer − depending on the 
particular configuration involved − to their own personal ethical code, to a model for social 
organisation, to an acknowledged means of obtaining legitimacy in an attempt to broaden 
their possibilities, etc. Depending on the case, it will involve one field of experience rather 
than another; or, on the contrary, it may be an active principle unifying them all. Can it really 
help to rearticulate the young Palestinians’ range of experiences, and reduce tensions between 
their personal projects and the national struggle? It is true that religion can empower 
unification through self-discipline and following outer rules that provide a kind of preliminary 
resolution of an individual’s trials and tribulations. The resulting self-image subsequently 
introduces another experience of oneself marked by a greater or lesser ‘‘will’ to stick to the 
rules and resist temptation. The individual internalises experiential dilemmas and casts them 
in a moral light. Yet the relationship to religion can only resolve the tension between personal 
projects and the national struggle at a cost − when that struggle enters the alternative time 
frame and symbolic system of jihad. The individual can then cast the national struggle in a 
victorious perspective; but that change is also a negation − or at the least a loss of importance 
− of the time frame of his life’s narrative. Crossing over into political Islam prompts a fusion 
of the two poles rather than their articulation.  
 
Young Palestinians’ experiences are not limited to these two poles of the national 
struggle and personal projects. As the meaning of the national struggle evolved from the first 
to the second Intifada, the existence of a ‘‘personal’’ space was at stake in the tensions arising 
between a person’s belonging to a community and the association of individualisation with 
Westernisation. Communitarian logic provided a precise definition of the individual as having 
a specific role to play within the hierarchical network. Acknowledging its importance meant 
introducing a dimension that was not to be confused with the national issue or with one’s 
personal life. As a key frame of reference for Palestinian youth, the community defines the 
space within which an individual moves.218
                                                 
218 In La démocratie à l’épreuve Michel Wieviorka has developed a three-pronged construct which he calls a 
‘‘triangle of ethnicity’’: the three poles allude to the national frame of reference, the community frame of 
reference and to the individual moving between them in an attempt to build up his own references. This construct 
was elaborated to account for the identity constructs of minorities. The idea of community takes on a different 
meaning with respect to the Palestinian case in the Territories in that they are the majority. Michel Wieviorka, La 
démocratie à l’épreuve, Paris, La Découverte, 1993, p 125. 
 
 In the case of Palestinian youth, communitarian 
logic cannot escape 
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the specific dramatization of the national struggle, which has become a ‘‘life or death’’ issue. 
The experience of domination is not just within Palestinian society. It is part of the regional 
conflict with Israel and, more generally, in the confrontation with the Western world − not as 
a civilisation, as Samuel Huntington posits,219
                                                 
219 Samuel Huntington, Le Choc des civilisations et l’ordre mondial, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1997. 
 
 but rather as a dominant figure in a power 
struggle of which Israel is the concrete manifestation in the eyes of the Palestinians. Western 
values are perceived within this power struggle.  
For this reason, their introduction into Palestinian society is also an issue at stake. This 
situation has led to the fragmentation of the individual’s experience, which he can no longer 
organise around his own personal logic due to being so totally dispossessed by the amplitude 
of that domination. But at the same time, in an apparent paradox, the domination has 
prompted a kind of reunification, turning the individual − through real and symbolic violence 
− into what the dominant power’s vision ‘‘says’’ about him. For him, the relationship then 
involves rebuilding his self-image, by engaging in a formative conflict to ensure a re-
evaluation of the balance of power and to satisfy the need for acknowledgement. Thus the 
sustained effort to develop a new interpretation based − as is often the case i n the ‘‘loser’s 
vision’’ − on producing a mythical, non-historical and transcendent form of reasoning which 
has the advantage of symbolically removing the individual from a historical process that has 
caused him to fail.  
As that failure has been gradually acknowledged and has led to despair, the reference 
to mythical reasoning has become increasingly unequivocal, eventually resulting in the vision 
of a sacred nation. However, while religion has become a key frame of reference for 
Palestinian youth, the uses of religion cannot be summed up simply through its patriotic 
aspects − far from it. It comprises a variety meanings, depending on whether it is ‘‘pulled’’ in 
the direction of nationalism, the private sphere or the community. 
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Part Two: How to Respond: by Merging, Reconfiguring or 
Dissociating? 
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Fragmentation is so great within the experience of Palestinian youth that it seems increasingly 
difficult for them not just to integrate its various levels, but even to juxtapose them. There is a 
huge gap for individuals who are pressured by contradictory, yet simultaneous, ways of 
thinking. Thus, the nationalist objective and the private sphere arise from different forms of 
reasoning but are in effect brought together and made contradictory through death. There are 
several ways in which young Palestinian men and women can ‘‘respond’’ to these pressures 
and move between these contradictory focuses. We have examined the main processes in this 
complex attempt to develop coherence. But there are other trends involved in this dynamic. 
Beyond the infinite diversity of individual cases, three main ones can be highlighted. We shall 
present them as archetypes which also correspond to identifiable social groups, even though it 
may not always be possible to sum them up in specific socio-economic categories. 
Particularly identifiable socially as ‘‘generational units’’, the ‘‘responses’’ provided 
by these archetypes cannot account for all trends among Palestinian youth. An individual may 
go from one to another − from being a Fatah militant to a ‘‘martyr’’ figure for example. 
Furthermore, not all Palestinian youth can be linked to generational units − far from it. 
We have shown the role of the community focus and the types of reasoning associated 
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with it. But, clearly, the key area of tension for Palestinian youth is in the interplay between 
the nationalist objective and the private sphere. Lacking the ability to connect them, one 
extreme solution to the contradiction is through merging them, which evokes the ‘martyr’’ 
figures that we shall analyse in the next chapter. 
Another trend consists in trying to reconfigure them, like during the first Intifada, but 
in a different way because the latter was based on the belief that national objectives could be 
achieved in the relatively near future – a belief that has vanished today. We have linked this 
trend with the figure of the Fatah militant. 
Finally, the third trend for resolving the tension consists in dissociating the two 
objectives, which can only be carried out at the cost of actually removing oneself from the 
territory. 
 
 
 120 
Chapter 6 
 
‘‘Martyrs’’220
‘‘Cheering and demonstrations of anger echoed throughout the funeral ceremony of 
the Al Aqsa martyrs. An angry group demanded that their blood be avenged and this insult to 
the community washed away. I cheered with the group; but I did not state that I would bring 
honour through vengeance.’’
 
 
221
                                                 
220 Part of this chapter has already been published in Pénélope Larzillière, ‘‘Le ‘martyr’ palestinien, 
nouvelle figure d’un nationalisme en échec’’, in Alain Dieckhoff, and Rémy Leveau (ed), Israéliens et 
Palestiniens : la guerre en partage; Paris, Balland, 2003, pp 80-109. 
 
221 Testament of Hamad Abou Hajla; a student in Nablus and a member of Hamas, he was the perpetrator of a 
suicide attack on 1 January 2001 in Netanya that wounded 55 people. 
 
 
The Al Aqsa Intifada, in particular in its second year, resulted in an increase in suicide 
attacks and an expansion into new categories of ‘‘martyrs,’’ no longer just young men but 
also young women and forty-year-old fathers. In the Palestinian discourse, these ‘‘martyrs’’ 
are ‘‘national heroes,’’ figures made sacred as grim models. Their success with Palestinian 
youth is assured since they have helped them resolve the current dissociation between the 
national objective and their personal plans. On the one hand, these young people support the 
creation of a viable and independent Palestinian State, which is seen as their only way out and 
their only chance to achieve decent living conditions. But, on the other hand, they no longer 
believe that goal can be achieved within their lifetime. They can no longer 
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connect it with their personal expectations. By merging the two levels −  national and 
individual − the martyr figure has emerged as a means of resolving that dissociation. 
The term shahid (martyr) is used indiscriminately by Palestinians to designate all 
deaths from the conflict with Israel − from families who have fallen under Israeli bombs to 
suicide bombers. A reflexive form of that root word (istishhad), which originally meant to die 
as a martyr, is being increasingly used to specifically designate suicide attacks in which the 
perpetrator ‘‘made himself a martyr’’ and is designated by the word shahid after the attack. 
In this chapter, we are exclusively concerned with that category. 
The ‘‘martyr’’ designation for suicide-bombers has been the subject of debate within 
the Arab world, where some religious condemnations have appeared.222
                                                 
222 Regarding this subject, see: Dyalah Hamzah, Intifâda’s Fidâ’ : Suicide or Martyrdom? (Trans)Nationalist 
Icons, Islamic Consultation and Some Notions of Modern Polity, in Armando Salvatore and Mark LeVine (ed.), 
Religion, Social Practice, and Contested Hegemonies: Reconstructing the Public Sphere in Muslim 
Majority Societies, New York: Palgrave MacMillan (forthcoming). 
 
 They have mainly 
come from members of the clergy close to their governments. In the public arena in Palestine, 
the term has given rise to discussions about the issue of the religious legitimacy of suicide 
attacks and the meaning of martyrdom. Can perpetrators of suicide attacks against Israeli 
civilians be deemed martyrs? And how should the issue of post-mortem rewards promised to 
the martyrs be interpreted? Independently of religious condemnations, the debate has also 
focused on the strategic opportuneness of the suicide attacks. Thus, in June 2002, Palestinian 
intellectuals and politicians launched a petition against the suicide attacks: ‘‘We maintain that 
these operations have done nothing to advance our national project, which calls for freedom 
and independence. On the contrary, they have strengthened the unity of the enemies of peace 
on the Israeli side and provided excuses for Sharon’s aggressive government 
to pursue its harsh war against our people. This war has targeted our children, our elderly, our 
villages, our towns, our hopes and national successes. (…)The military operations cannot be 
judged as exclusively positive or negative, outside the general context of the situation. They 
must be evaluated based on whether or not they have enabled us to achieve our political goals. 
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That is why these acts must be re-evaluated, considering that encouraging an existential war 
between two peoples living in the holy land will lead to the destruction of the entire region.’’ 
The authors of the petition were severely criticised on the Palestinian side, where they 
were blamed for objecting to the Palestinian suicide attacks without explaining the occupation 
that has led to them, and without an equivalent condemnation of Israeli military operations 
against Palestinian civilians. The debate, however, was given a limited reception by the 
Palestinians. 
One side’s national heroes are the other side’s terrorists. The reference to martyrdom 
is made within the framework of a struggle for legitimacy in which that very allusion is one of 
the modalities. But faced with such an extreme phenomenon, sociological analysis − and 
especially within the framework of comprehensive sociology − must continue to see the 
meaning of these acts from the actor’s viewpoint. For this reason the word ‘‘terrorism’’ will 
not be found in this book. It is true that, as Michel Wieviorka has shown, 223 the use of this 
term may be helpful in analysing conduct such as suicide attacks. According to his 
categorization, Palestinian suicide attacks are terrorist methods, although the reasoning behind 
their action is not, at least in the case of the Al Aqsa Intifada attacks (contrary to those 
perpetrated in 1996): ‘‘as long as it is the result of actors sustained by a real community and 
recognised by it as a more or less legitimate expression of its actions, and as long as it is a 
demonstration of a break experienced or desired by the community, then it does not belong in 
the category of a terrorist act.’’224
                                                 
223 For a discussion of this issue, see Michel Wieviorka, ‘‘Terrorismes, une rupture historique ?’’ in Thierry de 
Montbrial and Philippe Moreau Defarge, ‘‘Les grandes tendances du monde’’, Ramses, 2003, p 31. 
 
224 Michel Wieviorka, Sociétés et terrorisme, op. cit., p 20. 
 
  However, the term terrorism poses a problem in that it 
brings into the description a judgement about the legitimacy of the act. It generally prejudges 
the meaning and purpose of the act, and by developing a security-related approach in many 
cases it assumes a desire on the individual’s part to employ a psychological strategy designed 
to instil terror within the enemy camp. But that aspect is often a consequence of the person’s 
act and not always his goal. There are differences as to this point from one group to another. 
 123 
Moreover, instilling terror does not necessarily involve perpetrating suicide attacks. For this 
reason, the idea of sacrificial violence used by Hamit Bozarslan seems more appropriate, in 
particular because it also enables us to better examine the constructs of meaning underlying 
the use of the term ‘‘martyrdom.’’ 
When we use the terms shahid and jihad here, it is not for the purposes of entering a 
theological debate requiring us to examine the meaning of these terms, particularly with 
regard to Muslim religious definitions. What interests us is the way in which they are used 
and constructed by these individuals and the meaning they give to them. 
It is thus a matter of accounting for the generalisation of a singular mode of action. 
Why has the figure of the martyr constructed by the Islamists become the key reference for 
Palestinian youth in their representation of the conflict with the Israelis? How is it that this 
mode of action has been taken up by certain Fatah groups that were originally opposed to it? 
And how can one account for the fact that individuals initiate such acts independently of any 
organisation? 
 
 
The National Hero Made Sacred 
 
In the Palestinian context, the martyr figure corresponds to the sanctification of a type 
of national hero. It arises from an association between the Palestinian national cause and a 
system of beliefs.225
‘‘Shahid’’: a tool in the national cause 
 The Palestinian martyr is a national hero because his purpose mainly 
alludes to the struggle against Israel; the figure is sanctified because it is part of a religious 
belief system. Martyr-heroes are linked to jihad, conceived as a religious duty to fight against 
enemies appropriating Muslim lands. But the ‘religious witness’ dimension alluded to in the 
root of the word shahid is clearly overshadowed by their role as strategic tools in the national 
struggle. 
 
 
Martyrdom is presented above all as the weak man’s weapon − the capacity for 
sacrifice transformed into a weapon. The Palestinians see the ‘‘martyr’’ as ‘‘the poor man’s 
                                                 
225 François Géré, Les volontaires de la mort : l’arme du suicide, Paris, Bayard, 2003. 
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atom bomb’’ − the only way to turn the struggle around in their favour. Israel’s withdrawal 
from Lebanon reinforced their idea that this is the only kind of language Israel understands. 
‘‘This is the only option we have. We have no bombs, no tanks, no missiles, no planes, no 
helicopters. We have only light weapons and our kamikazes, and we will continue to use them 
because it’s our only alternative. That has been proven by the failure of ten years of 
negotiations. We shall resist with every means we have.’’226
‘‘The Americans are being hypocritical when they criticise our use of suicide as a 
weapon. We are at war and we have no choice. If we had the kind of weapons the Israelis 
have, then we would kill them in a way that is acceptable to the Americans.’’
 
227
This is a tactical method of attack, and sometimes of defence. On 14 August 2001, 
when Israeli tanks entered Jenin and, after some fighting and bombing, headed towards the 
refugee camp, a dozen political figures from the camp (and not just Islamists) stationed 
themselves at the gate wearing explosives around their waists and waited for the tanks. Here 
too, this was a military discourse: ‘‘I had only one idea in my mind: the tanks must not enter 
the camp.’’
 
 
Similarly, Hamas imagery overplays the military side, featuring ‘‘martyrs’’ posing 
with firearms or wearing all white, a white mask (associated with the ‘‘purity’’ of martyrdom 
which we shall discuss later on) and a belt of explosives, sometimes even blended with 
images of the results of suicide attacks. 
228
                                                 
226 Cheikh Abdallah Shami, one of the leaders of Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, interviewed in ABC, 21 August 
2001. The Spanish newspaper article does not include the original text. It is unlikely that the Sheikh would have 
used the term ‘‘kamikaze.’’ 
 
227 Dr. Nizar Rayan, a Hamas leader in Gaza. James Bennet, ‘‘The New Suicide Bombers: Larger and 
More Varied Pool’’, New York Times, 21 June 2002. 
 
228 Interview with a leader of Islamic Jihad in Jenin, September 2001. In April 2002, the camp was again 
threatened by an Israeli incursion. The militants – of all political stripes – took an oath at the mosque to fight 
until martyrdom 
After a week of resistance, however, the 35 survivors surrendered, having run out of ammunition and explosives.   
 
This does not mean, however, that suicide attacks have been part of an overall 
strategic vision intended to liberate the occupied territories in the more or less short term. 
While suicide attacks have made it possible to briefly reverse the balance of power and to 
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inflict some losses on the enemy, their short-term purpose is more about enabling reprisals 
after Israeli attacks and striking inside Israel. More generally, they are seen as a new type of 
action enabling them on the one hand to pursue the struggle and to escape their image as 
passive victims. On the other hand, the change of time frame and normative references by 
associating the ‘‘martyrdom operations’’ with jihad has endowed the struggle with the 
prospect of victory. Indeed, its future is no longer judged by short-term results or mid-term 
projections; rather, it is linked to eschatological expectations which no longer have anything 
to do with a single lifetime. 
 
 
Sanctification 
 
The shahid, a national hero, has replaced the fedayin. As a figure of the Palestinian 
resistance fighter, the fedayin were at their peak in the 1970s. They also represented self-
sacrifice, as people struggling for their fatherland willing to give up their lives. However, this 
figure faded completely into the background in favour of the shahid, more than the mudjahid. 
The latter, combatants in a war seen at the time as a religious one (jihad), grew out of the 
Islamist parties’ vocabulary and was not as widely used as the word shahid. It is true that after 
dying, the mudjahidin and even the fedayin become martyrs. Martyrs have always had a place 
among figures in the national struggle. But, among them, the shahid are currently in the 
forefront. They are characterised by two interconnected aspects − religious involvement and 
morbidity. 
As a Fedaï, the hero takes the risk of dying, while as a shahid he will die no matter 
what; and his only hope of victory − both against the enemy and in his personal life − is in 
paradise after he dies. All rewards for this second hero figure are postponed until after death, 
which is a crucial advantage in the Palestinian context where military victory is absolutely 
inconceivable for the moment.229
                                                 
229 Jean-François Legrain, Palestine : les bantoustans d’Allah, in Riccardo. Bocco, Blandine Destremau, 
Jean Hannoyer. (ed.), ‘‘Palestine, Palestiniens : territoire national, espaces communautaires’’, Les 
Cahiers du CERMOC; n° 17, 1997, p 93. 
 His sanctification and connection to religious references 
bring in the notion of the Beyond, enabling him to both accentuate and go beyond death. 
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The Palestinians have developed a feeling of being the losers in any case. In that 
context, being involved in the national struggle can only result in death, and the hero in that 
struggle can only be one who dies. Sanctifying death and associating it with a context of 
religious meaning has enabled them to gloss over it and, on the contrary, to make it a tool for 
victory and for a better future. For the personal destiny of the shahid promised a reward in the 
Beyond, and for the national struggle, each shahid must become a bit more connected to 
jihad, i.e. to the sacred struggle in which victory is certain in the long term. With martyrdom 
and the linking of the national struggle to religion, both the deaths of the combatants and the 
failure of the national struggle are surpassed in a double shift. With the religious non-
temporality and eschatological temporality of jihad, the current failure becomes a mere 
historical vicissitude before the assured victory. ‘‘The destruction of Israel is a Koranic 
inevitability.’’230
The impact of this reinterpretation is not restricted to the promotion of the martyr 
figure, and can also be seen in political vocabulary – particularly in fliers – which refers to 
religious notions on an increasingly frequent basis. Organisations originally opposed to this 
kind of action, such as the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, have now taken them up and are 
preparing them in the same way by stressing both the religious aspect of the act and its 
usefulness for the national struggle: ‘‘An intense 20-day period of religious studies and 
discussion follows between the commander and each candidate. Verses from the Koran about 
the martyr attaining paradise are constantly recited. The candidate is reminded of the 
happiness awaiting him in the presence of the prophets and the saints, of the amazing beauty 
of the huri, or beautiful young woman, who will greet him, and of his luck at being able to 
intercede on behalf of 70 loved ones on the Last Judgement day. He is also reminded of the 
service he will be rendering his compatriots through his sacrifice.’’
 
 
231
                                                 
230 An expression used by one of the spiritual guides in the Islamic Jihad movement: Sheikh Ascad 
al-Tamimi in Beyrouth, quoted in Jean-François Legrain, « La Palestine : de la terre perdue à la 
reconquête du territoire », Cultures et Conflits, n°21-22, Spring-Summer 1996, p 190. 
 
231 Interview with Abou Fatah, leader of one of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades groups in Gaza. Hanna 
Jaber, “Inside the World of the Palestinian Suicide Bomber”, London; Sunday Times, 24/03/2002. 
 
 
Hezbollah and the Shiite references it employs are another notable influence. It is 
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particularly noticeable in the change in propaganda material used by Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad. Posters have changed for example. From a simple military look (with the ‘‘martyr’’ 
wearing combat gear and holding a Kalashnikov or an M16), they have become more and 
more symbolic and closer to Hezbollah posters. Likewise, their wills have changed, becoming 
more like Hezbollah’s highly stereotyped ones with headings to be filled out − my people, my 
country, the martyrs who have preceded me, my family, etc. These elements as a whole show 
the increased emphasis on the national struggle as a sacred myth. 
 
 
Sacrifice and Competing Value Systems 
 
By being sanctified, the national struggle could be reinterpreted and its failure 
transcended. It also justifies the legitimisation of that struggle and the values it has conveyed 
in competition with Israel’s. On the one hand, associating the national conflict with a religious 
one through the martyrs has provided a mirror response to the Israeli religious argument, and 
it alludes to a sacred legitimacy above mere issues of territory. And, on the other hand, 
promoting the candidates for martyrdom − and thus for death in the name of the cause − is 
meant to show moral superiority over the adversary: ‘‘We are capable of sacrificing ourselves 
for our struggle because it is our land. The Jews are too afraid of dying. They don’t know 
what they are fighting for.’’232
                                                 
232 Nablus; an interview with a 19-year-old student in her 1st year of business school at Al-Qods Open 
University, December 2000. 
 
 
This position of higher legitimacy is also valid domestically. The martyrs are held up 
− to those who might doubt the need to engage in the national struggle − as figures who have 
sacrificed themselves and to whom the living ought to feel indebted. In their testaments, the 
‘‘martyrs’’ point out the lineage of their predecessors and call upon the people to struggle 
while denouncing traitors to the cause: ‘‘We’ve had enough torment from our wounds (…) 
We’ve had enough of seeing what we have had to undergo while remaining silent. The 
borders have been violated (…) The time has come to seek revenge for the town of Nablus, its 
commanders and combatants. We must not stop the shooting and we must not stop the martyr 
operations, whatever the consequences. He who strikes back after being struck is better than 
he who does nothing. There is no solution other than jihad, and whoever thinks that the blood 
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of the leader Jamal Mansour, of Jamal Salim,233 Ahmed Marshud234
Ayman Halawa
 and of the engineer 
235
 and of all our martyrs was shed in vain is sorely mistaken.’’236
Palestinian martyrdom has a double face. Highlighting a hero who dies corresponds to 
the figures of negative exemplariness typically found in narratives developed through the 
‘‘vision of the vanquished’’.
 
 
237 Heroes from defeated peoples are ‘‘victim-heroes’’ who 
die.238
The Impact of the Martyr Figure 
 But the Palestinian specificity is to have intrinsically added through death a victory 
over the enemy. It is not just because the hero has proven his higher moral value through his 
sacrifice, but also because through his death he succeeds in killing the enemy even though the 
balance of power was totally unfavourable to him. Death − impossible to prevent due to the 
balance of power − is transformed into an ambivalent victory because it comes at the cost of 
the ‘‘hero’s’’ life story. 
 
 
 
Suicide Bombers 
 
Why is this figure of exemplariness so resonant for Palestinians and how far does their 
attachment go? Can one define a sociological portrait of Palestinian martyrs? Shin Beth 
thought it could draw their profile in 2002 − a youth aged 18-22 from a poor background, 
                                                 
233 Jamal Mansour and Jamal Salim were two Hamas political leaders in Nablus. Aged respectively 47 and 40, 
and originally from the Balata and 'Ein Beit El-Ma' (Nablus) refugee camps, they were both subjected to an 
‘‘extrajudicial execution,’’ the responsibility for which was claimed by the Israeli army when a missile was fired 
from a helicopter on their office on 31 July 2001. 5 other people were killed by the explosion: two militants, one 
journalist and two children. 
 
234 A 29-year-old Hamas activist from the Balata refugee camp. He was killed along with another militant when 
his car exploded on 15 October 2001. Palestinian sources assert that it was an Israeli execution, which has been 
denied by the Israeli army.  
 
235 A 26-year-old Hamas activist from Nablus killed by a missile fired on his car from a helicopter on 22 
October 2001; responsibility for the execution was acknowledged by the Israeli army. 
 
236 The testament of Maher Habicha, a 21-year-old Hamas militant and plumber in Nablus, perpetrator of a 
suicide attack on a bus in Haifa on 2 December 2001. The attack left 15 victims. 
 
237 Wachtel Nathan., La vision des vaincus, Paris, Gallimard, 1997. 
 
238 Christian Giordono, ‘‘Gérer l’exemplarité : les saints, les héros et les victimes’’; in Pierre Centlivres 
(ed.); Saints, sainteté et martyre : la fabrication de l’exemplarité; Neuchâtel, Recherches et travaux de 
l’Institut d’ethnologie n°15, 2001, p 129. The author has developed these categories from Balkan victim-hero 
figures. 
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usually from a refugee camp, single, with no prospects and not the eldest in the family.239 
However, one cannot help observing that a large portion of the Palestinian population is in 
that category, since 60%240 of them are below the poverty line, 16% live in refugee camps, 
and 21% are between the ages of 15 and 25. Furthermore, a good number of ‘‘martyrs’’ do not 
correspond to these criteria. Thus, they are not always recruited among the most 
disadvantaged or those with the least prospects. One of the perpetrators of the Beit Lid attack 
in 1995 had just landed a steady job as a physiotherapist.241
had refused his brother’s offer to pay for him to study in Germany and leave behind his wife 
and two children.
 Another (in Gaza in October 
1994) 
242 There are many more examples among the kamikazes in the Al Aqsa 
Intifada, in which new categories of people became involved in such operations. An elderly 
father, a bus driver in Israel who was originally from Gaza, drove his bus into some passersby 
on the road between Gaza and Tel Aviv.243 An Israeli Palestinian from Haifa became a 
kamikaze after training in Jenin. Young women − sometimes students − are sent out by the 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Fatah), or more rarely by the Izziddin el-Qassam Brigades 
(Hamas). In fact it is impossible to describe a specific social configuration, as the Israeli 
secret services have recognised.244
                                                 
239 According to Defence Ministry spokesman Yarden Vatikai, Khaleej and Times, 30 January 2002. 
 
240 UNSCO, The impact of Closure and Other Mobility Restrictions on Palestinian Productive Activities 
January 2002-30 June 2002, October 2002, http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/econ-report-final.pdf 
 
241 Philippe Lemarchand, and Lamia Radi, Israël/Palestine demain, op. cit., p 47. 
 
242 An interview with one of his brothers in Berlin, October 1999. 
 
243 14 February 2001, the (35-year-old) driver had been working for the Israeli company Egged since 1996 and  
escorted Palestinian workers when there were no roadblocks.  
 
244 ‘‘Indeed, Israeli officials were concerned by an Israeli national security services study precisely because no 
specific configuration was identified. All perpetrators of suicide attacks, or attempts at them, were Muslims, and 
mostly single, but their age and level of education varied.’’ James Bennet, ‘‘The New Suicide 
Bombers: Larger and More Varied Pool’’, New York Times, 6 June 2002. 
 
 
 
It is not just that the martyrdom phenomenon cannot be reduced to an exact social 
category; it is that the range of categories involved is also becoming broader. There is one 
certainty which stands out, however. Belonging to a refugee camp may be considered as a 
criterion that is important, although not necessary. Yet that condition seems to allude more to 
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an ideological and material environment than to a specific condition for the kamikaze, who 
may very well belong within that camp to the category of ‘‘those who have coped’’ and found 
work. The refugee camps are also ‘‘places of memory’’ in Palestinian history, particularly for 
the 1948 and 1967 exiles. Their living conditions, the most difficult experienced by any of the 
Palestinians, are a daily reminder of that history. From the Jenin refugee camp one can see the 
villages, located inside Israel, from which the inhabitants came. I have already mentioned 
how their association with that history of exile has also given them an identity with respect to 
the rest of the Palestinian population. 
Ahmed, a 27-year-old student, lives in a refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. He belongs to 
the category of ‘‘living martyrs,’’ who are preparing to commit a suicide attack. When he 
does commit it, he wants to be holding the keys to his house in Jaffa, which belonged to his 
grandmother who went into exile in 1948: “My grandmother represents the history of the 
Palestinian people. She talked to us about Jaffa, its grapes and its seashore. Through her tears 
she told us stories about life in Palestine in the old days. I always hoped to visit that place one 
day. But I let go of my dreams about Jaffa and never claimed my grandmother’s house. I 
never thought about destroying Israel. I gave them the land that originally belonged to me, but 
instead of acknowledging that, they have continued to deprive me of my right to live freely 
and at peace in those few square metres.’’245
Perpetrators of suicide attacks are not among the poorest people in the refugee camps. 
On the contrary, our interviews with families have led us to believe that the attack may occur 
just at the time when they had carried out their plans. Statements such as ‘‘he had just found a 
job two months earlier,’’ ‘‘he had just assembled enough money to be able to get married,’’ 
‘‘we had finally managed to build a room for him and his future wife’’, etc. were recurrent.
 
246
                                                 
245 Hanna Jaber, Inside the World of the Palestinian Suicide Bomber, op. cit. 
 
246 Interviews with families of suicide bombers. Jenin, Balata and Jabalya refugee camps, April and September 
2001. 
 
 
Here, two aspects can be evoked as an explanation. They ask the question of the possibility of 
associating political and private worlds within the Palestinian context. Young people from the 
refugee camps highlight two sentiments that arise once the goals they have been focusing on 
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− work and marriage − have been attained.  The first alludes to their acute feelings of 
disappointment regarding the Palestinian context: ‘‘I wanted a job, and that’s all I could think 
about. It was my whole life; our lives revolved around everyday life, so I didn’t think about it 
anymore. But now I have a job and, in the end, what was the point of taking so much trouble. 
The occupation is still here, and the situation hasn’t changed for us; we have no future.’’247
Nevertheless, this broadening of the categories associated with martyrdom shows how 
involved the latter is in the general context of Palestinian society. Thus, strikingly, 
experiences at military roadblocks are often considered to be triggers by the ‘‘martyrs’’ 
themselves, or by their entourage. This observation confirms the crucial nature of such 
experiences in the Palestinians’ daily life. Thus, a thirty-year-old woman who was an aspiring 
suicide bomber recruited by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades highlighted an incident that 
occurred at a military roadblock − just one among many, she added:
 
The second feeling alludes to guilt arising from a lack of solidarity for the collective 
fate due to one’s success. While ‘‘escaping from the camp’’ is the wish of some of its 
inhabitants, this may appear to be abandoning the group identity upon which their own 
identity was built. Participating in an attack then becomes a way of declaring the fact of 
belonging again. 
248
The father of Darin Abou Aisheh, a 21-year-old woman who committed a suicide 
attack on 27 February 2002,
 ‘‘An Israeli soldier 
forced me and a man to sit amongst the filth at a military roadblock for an hour. He gave me 
no explanation for the delay. He began verbally insulting me. The way he looked at my 
identity card was humiliating, not to mention the advances they make towards us women. Life 
is not worth living when our people are humiliated on a daily basis.’’ 
249
                                                 
247 Interview with a 24-year-old who had been hired by an NGO two months earlier; Gaza, October 
2000. 
 
248 Interview conducted by a journalist at the Tulkarem refugee camp. Gregg Zoroya, ‘‘Her 
Decision To Be a Suicide Bomber’’, USA Today, 22 April 2002. 
 
249 While she was in a car with two members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, they were stopped at a roadblock 
near Maccabim in Israel. The young woman blew herself up, wounding three policemen. The two others were 
killed by policeman. Her brother had been killed a month earlier by Israeli gunfire. She had gotten engaged one 
week earlier. Associated Press, 28 February 2002. 
 
 also spoke about an incident at a military roadblock: ‘‘I think 
that what pushed her over the edge was when she saw a pregnant woman being injured at a 
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checkpoint near Nablus on 25 February. That was the breaking point, without a doubt. She 
talked about it constantly.’’250
Women Kamikazes: a Specificity? 
 
 
 
 
The last development in the suicide attacks during the second Intifada involved young 
women − some of them students −  who were sent out by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades 
(Fatah), and quite recently by Islamic Jihad251 and Hamas.252
Darin Abou Eisheh lived in the Balata refugee camp and was studying English. She 
was a member of the student council and a Hamas militant. Hamas and Islamic Jihad appear 
to have refused to allow her to commit a suicide attack, which is why she is thought to have 
turned to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Hamas and Islamic Jihad did not at first send women 
out to commit suicide attacks, although they had never expressed any public opposition to the 
idea and later changed their strategy: ‘‘It is the right of Muslim women to fight against the 
occupation and there is no fatwa forbidding them to join the fight.’’
 Can the paths and motivations 
of these young women be considered specific with respect to their male counterparts? 
253
                                                 
250 Daniel Williams, ‘‘Young Bombers Nurtured by Despair,’’ Washington Post, 23 March 2002. 
 
251 This first attack by Hiba Daraghmeh, a 19-year-old student of English, was committed on 19 May 2003 in a 
mall in Afula, killing three Israelis and wounding 90 others. 
 
252 In an attack on 14 January 2004 for which joint responsibility was claimed by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades 
and Hamas, a 21-year-old student and mother, Rim Salih al-Rayasha, blew herself up at the Erez checkpoint 
(Gaza), killing four Israeli soldiers.  
 
253 Cheikh Hassan Youssef, Hamas, Khaleej and Times, 30 January 2002. 
 
 
In talking about their motives, they displayed no difference from the men. However, 
with respect to the aspirants’ preparation, it would seem that the male militants in the Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades have a hard time adapting their ‘‘training,’’ which could be associated with 
our previous analyses on the relationship between involvement and gender. Two suicide 
attack aspirants who gave up the operation evoked the way they were ‘‘trained’’ by the Al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades as their reasons for giving up. Arin Ahmed, 20, a business student 
from near Bethlehem, gave up a first time. She was removed a second time while 
accompanying another volunteer, a 16-year-old who blew himself up after hesitating, 
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according to Arin Ahmed.254 She backed down again before being arrested by the Israelis on 
29 May 2002. She was engaged to Jaad Salem, 26, a Tanzim Fatah leader from the Dheisheh 
(Bethlehem) refugee camp who was killed by the Israeli army on 8 March 2002 according to 
Arin Ahmed, who wanted to avenge him. The Israelis maintain that a bomb he was making 
accidentally exploded in his car. ‘‘I was expecting to be trained and asked questions about 
why I wanted to kill and die. Instead, they told me I was going to join my fiancé in paradise. 
Even at the time, I thought the idea was completely idiotic.’’255
Thauriya Hamamra, 25, a seamstress and florist, lived in a village on the outskirts of Jenin. 
She tried to join the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. They advised her to think it over. As her 
motive, she spoke of personal reasons which she didn’t want to talk about in detail and ‘‘the 
daily trials imposed upon my people.’’ She confirmed her intention a few days later. Due to 
the lack of explosives in the Jenin area, she was put in touch with a group in Nablus four 
months later. After a one-hour ‘‘training course,’’ she was sent out towards Jerusalem 
wearing a belt full of explosives. She changed her mind on the way and went to her aunt’s 
house in Bethlehem, where she was arrested a few hours later. ‘‘After the training, I had a 
change of heart and decided not to carry out the plan. I wasn’t afraid. I’m not afraid of dying. 
I left for personal reasons. I was afraid of the way God would see me if I did it for impure 
reasons. But the main reason for my change of heart was during my training, when they told 
me to blow myself up if I was found out – even if no one was there. Blow myself up for 
nothing? What’s that about?! I felt like they were cutting deals with the blood of the martyrs. 
Walking in the blood of the martyrs, just so my leaders could say they had carried out the 
operation!’’
 
256
                                                 
254 Issa Bdeir, Rishon Letzion attack on 22 May 2002, two deaths. On his farewell video he said: ‘‘I am 
preparing to commit this act in order to avenge the constant Israeli aggression still being committed against our 
people. Farewell, mother, farewell, father and farewell to my family.’’ 
 
255 James Bennet, The New Suicide Bombers, op. cit. and Associated Press, 31 May 2002. 
 
256 Associated Press, 31 May 2002. 
 
 
Although the female aspirants are strategically useful given their greater freedom of 
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movement (in the past), it appears that in fact the Brigades’ male ‘‘trainers’’ have a hard time 
giving the female volunteers the same attention as their male counterparts. They see female 
involvement as second-hand in comparison to male involvement − as a rather ineffective 
afterthought due to its incompatibility with the social role of women. This image of a gap 
between social roles and involvement is also manifested in the discourse on the ‘‘shame’’ of 
men who have not become involved, whereas ‘‘even women’’ have, acting outside their 
traditional role. In the context of competition among armed groups, the Brigades’ men have 
been reproached for sending out women because they weren’t brave enough to go themselves. 
Paradoxically, suicide attacks appear to be easier for women. Due to their unique character, 
the attacks do not require the women to be militants beforehand, which might challenge the 
norms of female behaviour. 
 
It is always difficult to explain in sociological terms the circumstantial conditions and 
personal motives that have driven one person to commit an act rather than another. But the 
massive nature of the suicide attacks justifies an analysis re-establishing the social logic 
behind martyr figures and their broad inclusion within the scope of Palestinian identity. That 
specific configuration explains the overall impact of ‘‘becoming martyrs,’’ as initially 
elaborated by the Islamists. 
 
 
Fusion vs. Political Deadlock 
 
The ‘‘martyrs’’ among Palestinian youth have chosen to break through the deadlock 
we have described − between supporting nationalist principles and scepticism about the 
possibility of achieving them − by transcending that strug gle and including it within a 
religious context and time frame. Entering that new time frame situates the Palestinian 
struggle within the victorious and millenary perspective of jihad, making it possible to deny 
defeat and raise the young ‘‘martyr’s’’ status from victim to hero. Secondly, it resolves the 
contradiction observed earlier between supporting the goal of creating a State as the primary 
objective and scepticism about the possibility of achieving that goal in the short term, making 
it impossible to associate one’s own personal story with that goal. Young men who take on 
the perspective of sacrifice are able to suppress that opposition between supporting 
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nationalism and self-actualisation because they transcend their own personal story by 
associating it with that of the victorious shahid figure. The argument might be posited in the 
following way: ‘‘my fulfilment will occur through the national struggle which undoubtedly 
will not succeed now, but that’s not important because I’m willing to sacrifice myself for a 
goal that reaches beyond me.’’ The shahid responds to the disconnection between the various 
personal and political levels − characteristic of the Palestinian identity issue − by merging 
those different levels. On that point, there seems to be a clear parallel with the fusion process 
in ‘‘social antimovements’’ analysed by Michel Wieviorka: ‘‘the transformation of this 
principle of totality is often brought about by constructing communitarian utopias or myths 
which assimilate whatever cannot be reconciled with reality in an imaginary fashion.’’257
Imposing Unanimity 
 
However, the Palestinian case represents an additional step in the fusion process. Indeed, the 
extreme nature of the Palestinian situation has created a contradiction not merely in certain 
political and social values, but also in everything connected to individual lives on the one 
hand and the national objective on the other. Thus, the process of merging with myth that is 
aimed at surpassing these contradictions − existential ones for Palestinian youth in that they 
have split up their experience as a whole − must also include the level pertaining to their 
individual lives. Therefore, resorting to violence also involves a suicidal dimension. 
 
 
 
This fusion carried out by the Palestinian ‘‘martyr’’ at his own level is also intended 
for the social arena, where it is designed to dispel opposition within Palestinian society 
through a newfound unanimity around the national struggle. I have shown how young people 
experienced the period during which the Palestinian Authority was established as a ‘‘return’’ 
to divisions among the Palestinian people. These divisions were political (opposition between 
the Authority and Islamists), social (returnees against those who had remained) and 
generational (youth against community authorities). In their discourse, and particularly in 
their testaments, the ‘‘martyrs’’’ have expressed a strong desire to establish social unanimity 
(or rather to re-establish it according to their vision, relating to the supposed ‘‘golden age’’ of 
national struggle during the first Intifada) and to reject divisions within 
                                                 
257 Michel Wieviorka, Sociétés et terrorisme, op. cit., p 18. 
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Palestinian society. ‘‘Traitors,’’ ‘‘the falsely pious’’ − i.e. the inside  enemy who refuses to 
fight, pursues combatants, or is a wheeler-dealer and forgets the national cause − have been 
repeatedly criticised. ‘‘My soul is crushed when I see the negligence of Muslims regarding 
jihad on the path of God the Most High. (…) They stand at a distance, gloating and 
pondering, without moving forward to free the oppressed from their oppression.’’258
It also alludes to self-affirmation as an independent individual with respect to the Palestinian 
community.
 
There is thus a desire on the part of the ‘‘martyrs’’ to transcend social differences by 
calling for the reunification of Palestinian society around the national struggle. But their 
gesture is also a symbolic way to reclaim society, both internally and externally, and to 
achieve recognition. Since that retrieval is only possible through their death, it will indeed 
never be accomplished; but that doesn’t stop them from asserting their identity in this way. 
259 The ‘‘martyr’’ is no longer associated with this or that Palestinian family, and 
thus with belonging to a specific local ethnic group. The ‘‘martyr’’ is no longer the son of his 
father or subject to his authority, but rather ‘‘the son of Izziddin el-Qassam’’260
                                                 
258 Testament of Ismail al-Ma’suabi, a member of Hamas who carried out an attack on 22 June 2001 at the Eretz 
checkpoint (Gaza) in which 2 soldiers were killed. 
 
259 As Farhad Khrosrokhavar has also underscored regarding Iranian martyrs, there is an aspect of affirmation of 
the ego’s sovereignty in the death of a martyr. Farhad Khosrokhavar, (1995), L’islamisme et la mort, Paris, 
L’Harmattan, p 112. For a comparative analysis of Palestinian and Iranian martyrs, see also Farhad 
Khosrokhavar (2002), Les nouveaux martyrs d’Allah, Paris, Flammarion, 2002 and Pénélope Larzillière, Le 
"martyre" des jeunes Palestiniens pendant l'Intifada al Aqsa :analyse et comparaison" ; Politique étrangère 
4/2001; Paris; October-December 2001; p 937-951. 
 
260 In the early 1930s Sheikh Izzidin el-Qassam preached holy war against British rule, considered to be solely 
responsible for the Zionist aggression in Palestine. He founded a secret military organisation which had about 
200 members in 1935. His death that same year during a clash with the British police gave him the status of a 
martyr for the national cause. Nadine Picaudou, Les Palestiniens : un siècle d’histoire, Brussels, Complexe, 
1997, p 88. 
 
 and part of a 
line of previous ‘‘martyrs.’’ 
 
Martyr figures are always associated with a process of legitimisation around a 
cause, and the fact of being able to promote aspiring martyrs is seen as proof of the higher 
value of that cause. This characteristic endows them with particular importance within the 
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framework of national struggles, where nationalism is construed in relation to an opposing 
nationalism, and where there is thus direct conflict and competition between values. That 
aspect flourished in Europe during the First World War.261 Today, the rejection of all-
embracing ideologies and the emphasis on individual independence have disqualified 
processes leading people ‘‘to die (and kill) for ideas.’’262
context where two sanctified forms of nationalism are clashing has remained particularly 
favourable to this kind of construct. In this context, and in a way comparable to other 
experiences, promoting martyrs as national heroes − ones who die − seems typical of the 
defeated side’s vision. According to Elias Khoury, deconstructing the martyr figure was only 
possible in Lebanon after positive prospects had once again developed.
 But the Israeli-Palestinian 
263
                                                 
261 Annette Becker, La guerre et la foi; Paris; Colin, 1994. 
 
262 Nadine Picaudou, ‘‘Mourir pour des idées’’, Paris, Libération, 23 October 2000. 
 
263 Elias Khoury, Terminology and Change, a paper at the Martyrdom and/in Modernity symposium 
organised by Friederike Pannewick, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, 6-8 June 2002. 
 
 The Palestinian 
‘‘martyr’’ remains a figure of despair in that he has no vision or hope for a reversal of the 
situation, except in the very long term, within an eschatological religious temporality which 
only makes human temporality all the more insignificant. 
The merging of the two levels − national and ind ividual − and the reference to that 
eschatological temporality are an extreme way of dealing with meaning. Another method 
consists in relying on an attempt to reconfigure the national objective and the private sphere, 
which creates a completely different relationship with temporality. The militants went from an 
eschatological stance to the most extreme form of immediacy characteristic of the constructs 
of Fatah militants. 
 
 138 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7   
 
Armed Militants  
 
 
‘‘Clandestinity and the use of weapons involve habits, they shape ways of being and 
thinking, and ultimately produce a specific culture and particular attitudes, far more than 
they are determined by them.’’264
Armed militants were the new actors in the second Intifada. With them, the dividing 
lines between groups were due less to ideological criteria (groups from this or that party) than 
to local and familial distinctions.
 
 
265 Militants from different parties or factions could even be 
found within the same groups. Membership in a party could also be a function of family 
traditions, certain families belonging to Islamic Jihad, others to Fatah, etc. These militants 
showed no fundamental disagreement in their discourse about modes of action. This could be 
seen in how methods of operation moved from one group to another. Among other examples, 
suicide attacks − initially reserved for Hamas and Islamic Jihad − were taken up by the A l 
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Fatah),266
                                                 
264 Michel Wieviorka, Sociétés et terrorisme, op. cit., p 486. 
 
265 On this point, see in particular Jean-François Legrain, J-F, ‘‘Les phalanges des martyrs d’Al- 
Aqsa en mal de leadership national,’’ in Jean-François Legrain (ed.), ‘‘En attendant la Palestine,’’ 
Maghreb-Machrek, n° 176, Summer 2003, pp 11-34. 
 
266 Who carried out their first suicide attack on 21 March 2002, after 18 months of the Intifada. 
 
 and phenomena of secular ‘‘martyrdom’’ were on the 
increase. Symmetrically, the Islamists attacked military camps and settlements on the model  
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of the PFLP − through infiltration and then more or less blind shooting until running away or 
being shot down. Furthermore, we should point out that while these militants stand out 
through the fact of bearing arms or having access to them, one cannot refer to them as true 
professionals in the armed struggle. In the first place, Palestinian security forces have not 
been massively involved in activism. On an extremely limited territory with few resources, 
there is no real training or material. Most of the time their activities have been mixed in with 
those of traditional militancy − distributing flyers and posters, organising demonstrations and 
meetings, supervising aid distribution to the population, etc. Group leaders also devote a great 
deal of their time to management. Finally, most of their energy is focused on dealing with 
local conflicts rather than on the one with Israel. Groups coming from parties such as Fatah do 
not have the same clandestine culture as the Islamist groups and didn’t undergo the same 
repression. The result was a mixed, unprofessional side that was also part of the lack of 
strategy during the second Intifada.  
One cannot say that Palestinian parties became involved in the armed struggle in a 
massive, well-thought-out way. It was more a matter of disorganised resistance carried out by 
small groups more or less formally connected to this or that party. Their initiatives were 
uncoordinated, sometimes − but not always − evoking armed resi stance. Their objective was 
above all to gain visibility for Palestinian resistance. Often the groups decided to ‘‘go have a 
shoot-out’’ after a day in which a large number of deaths had been announced on the 
Palestinian side, particularly if the deaths involved people from their area. Before Israel 
reoccupied A Areas,267
                                                 
267 Based on the Oslo II Accords, the A Areas included the large Palestinian towns in the West Bank and were 
under total Palestinian control.  
 
 ‘‘having a shoot-out’’ usually meant ‘‘strafing’’ the settlements with 
old M16s from the A areas, thus at a distance that was far enough to keep the settlements from 
being hit. The same settlements responded with tank fire on the neighbourhoods, leading the 
Palestinians living there to abandon them. Another mode of action consisted in trying to hit 
settlers driving on West Bank bypasses and soldiers at roadblocks. After the Israeli army  
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responded by reoccupying the A Areas, another form of resistance consisted in shooting at 
tanks and trying to blow them up. 
 
 
Reconversion of the Shabab 
 
What social categories do these militants in the armed struggle correspond to? In fact, 
they are the same as during the first Intifada. Laetitia Bucaille’s observations on Nablus, 
through an analysis of the itinerary of shabab from the Balata refugee camp (Nablus) from the 
first to the second Intifada, can be generalised.268 The armed militants belong in their vast 
majority to the working class sector of the refugee camp. They have generally followed the 
path of the young militants and stone-throwers from the first Intifada − from the difficult 
adaptation when the Palestinian Authority was established to the resumption of the struggle 
during the second Intifada. This does not mean that it included all the same categories of 
militants from the first Intifada – far from it. On the contrary, there was very little 
participation in the second Intifada by the middle-class militants who had taken part in the 
first Intifada: ‘‘The only time I demonstrated was at the Bir Zeit demonstration. It was a very 
unusual demonstration in any case.269 But I went down because from my office window I 
could see women and children carrying rolled-up blankets and heavy loads across the fields − 
carrying heavy loads like that on foot.270 I felt like I was back in ’48 watching the refugees, as 
if we had suddenly gone backwards to the same exact situation. So I was really irritated and I 
went down to throw stones as I had during the first Intifada. We’re the generation that carried 
out the first Intifada, but none of us are getting involved.’’271
                                                 
268 Laetitia Bucaille, Générations Intifada, op. cit. 
 
269 An allusion to a demonstration held on 12 March 2001 on a road cut off between Ramallah and Bir Zeit 
University. The peaceful demonstration was an attempt to fill in the trenches dug by the Israeli army’s 
bulldozers. It was mainly composed of students, professors, trade unionists, etc. It has been called unusual 
because it was a turning point in the Al-Aqsa Intifada − one of the rare occasions when a different kind of 
mobilisation occurred both in terms of the mode of action and the segment of the population involved. However, 
after succeeding in filling in one of the trenches, the demonstrators were dispersed by tear gas, as well as rubber 
and real bullets. A member of Fatah was killed and a dozen people were wounded.  
 
270 Since the road was blocked off, the Palestinians walked through the fields below it.  
 
271 Hilal, 27, an engineer in Ramallah, the grandson of 1948 refugees, interviewed in May 2001. It’s interesting 
to see how the memory of 1948 and 1967 has been transmitted. Hilal speaks of ’48 as if he himself had 
experienced the exile.  
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The armed militants were indicated both by their social background and personal 
history. Generally speaking, they were already among the most committed in the first Intifada. 
They had followed its evolution when the social movement broke up and the movement was 
gradually restricted to groups that were increasingly limited and violent. Laetitia Bucaille272 
has specifically shown the difficulty experienced by militants most involved in the first 
Intifada −  who belonged to or were leaders of small groups − in adapting to ‘‘civilian’’ life 
after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. To this group must be added another 
category, the mutaradin, or ‘‘wanted.’’ After escaping arrest and going into exile, they were 
not authorised to return under the Oslo Accords. Some of them received military training 
while in exile. Many came back secretly, in particular through the tunnels between Egypt and 
Gaza.273
                                                 
272 Laetitia Bucaille, Générations Intifada, op. cit., p 163-172. 
 
273 Toufiq Haddad, ‘‘The Mutaradeen,’’ Jerusalem, Between The Lines, July 2001, p 13. 
 
  
The stone-throwers, or ‘‘little brothers’’ as L. Bucaille calls them, were no longer the driving 
force behind the second Intifada, whereas the armed militants belonged to the same 
generation as those in the first Intifada, and were even composed of older leaders. The ‘‘little 
brothers’’ were much younger and mainly from the refugee camps and poorest segments of 
society. They were aspiring to a heroic self-image, which led them to take greater risks in 
order to assert themselves vis-à-vis the others, and even the Israelis. Some of them would 
walk forward all alone to throw stones, although the other young people had all withdrawn, 
taking off their tee-shirts in a dramatic gesture. This gesture is also a teenage ritual of self-
affirmation that helps them build a positive image of themselves. For children of refugees in 
Palestinian society, young people − without work or money − have become a symbol of 
courage. They conspicuously deny the Israeli soldiers’ military advantage by refusing to take 
it into account in their own actions.  
However, these young stone-throwers were aware of no longer being the key figures in 
the uprising, contrary to those involved in the first Intifada. They were now stone-throwers 
waiting to have a weapon, and it was not unusual to see them move on to a Kalashnikov when  
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they could get one. Nowadays militants no longer identify with the heroic figure of the 
shabab, widely deconstructed due to the change in perception of the conflict with Israel. The 
shift to armed engagement, while remaining more or less involved in other forms of 
militancy, was an attempt to reintroduce committed figures. Nevertheless, these figures were 
not cast against the same background of hope as during the first Intifada. This lack of a 
defined set of expectations explains the extremely uncoordinated nature of their armed 
struggle. These groups operate from highly individual initiatives, on the basis of their local 
setups.  
The goal has also changed. It is no longer a matter of harassing soldiers, but of killing 
them if possible − as well as the settlers and, gradually, the Israelis in general. The lack of a 
strategic outlook and the high civilian Palestinian losses − also the work of militias of armed 
settlers − are gradually erasing the distinctions between civilians and the military. This is 
about showing that it is more or less feasible to offer resistance to the Israeli army. In fact, the 
Palestinians do not believe in the possibility of really challenging the occupation in the middle 
term. Failing the ability to imagine a winning strategy for themselves, they are acting under a 
kind of ‘‘as if’’ rule. This is illustrated by the way people applaud the Palestinian resistance 
when Israeli incursions are withdrawn.  
Before the real reoccupation of A Areas with a permanent curfew, the Israeli army 
made incursions, i.e. they entered these residential areas with tanks − after bombing them − to 
‘‘clean out the terrorist infrastructure.’’ The incursions lasted from ten hours to several days. 
In any event the − planned − withdrawal would be celebrated on the Palestinian side as a 
victory of the resistance, namely the few groups with ill-assorted weapons mixed in with the 
stone-throwers who had tried to confront the Israelis. The balance of power was so 
disproportionate that one couldn’t say the Palestinians had the capacity to pose a real threat to 
the Israeli army. Similarly, the young people who strafe the settlements beyond their reach are 
acting ‘‘as if’’ they were conducting armed resistance.  
It should be noted that the Palestinians have always alluded to the armed struggle. But, 
as for many theoreticians around the world, it is a double reference to both a practice and a 
myth: ‘‘The armed struggle denotes an overall approach to a regime of occupation or 
oppression that is designed to get rid of it. (…) It has been embodied in the 20th century by its  
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own myth. It matters little here whether or not the myth corresponds to the reality in the 
field.’’274
Michel Wieviorka.
 As in other contexts, being connected to myth helps them to forget the lack of a 
strategic and practical base for their actions. This is the ‘‘impossible war’’ referred to by  
275
However, some of the older militants project themselves not into their own time of 
life, but into that of their children: ‘‘Do you think I like it when my daughter comes home and 
asks, ‘Daddy, what’s that?’ about my M16? I’d prefer it if she asked me questions about 
computers or the Internet, like children in France. My future is over now. I’m fighting for my 
children. We have a lot of horrible things in our heads. If they [the international community] 
had a real solution, like in Kosovo, we’d lay down our weapons immediately. The only reason 
we’ve taken up arms is to offer our children a better future, so they can live in safety, get an 
education and think about enjoying themselves.’’
 Unable to actually wage it, they display its attributes.  
In fact, the stakes lie elsewhere for these actors. For them, as for most Palestinians, the 
middle term, when things are planned, has more or less disappeared. Thus, they have been 
thrust into a time frame of immediacy where the real stakes revolve less around this lost 
struggle than around the internal Palestinian positioning gained from engaging in such acts.  
The end of Palestinian prospects, like the extreme division of their territory, has sharply 
restricted the temporal and spatial dimensions they live in. Their space is mainly local – even 
at street level – and they live in the present moment. Beyond that, they move directly into 
eschatological time, into which the martyrs merge. There is hardly anything left in the middle, 
especially for young people.  
276
                                                 
274 Roger Heacock, Système international et création de l’Etat, in Nadine Picaudou (ed), ‘‘La Palestine 
en transition,’’ Les annales de l’autre Islam n°8, Paris, ERISM, INALCO, 2001, p 24. 
 
275 Michel Wieviorka, Sociétés et terrorisme, op. cit., p 406. 
 
276 Tanzim Fatah leader, Balata refugee camp (Nablus), January 2001 
 
 The militant who said this is 38 years old 
and is actually one of the mid-level officials who has been more involved in planning than the 
young people.  
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Acquiring a Social Position 
 
One of the factors that triggered the second Intifada was the desire of some of the Fatah ‘‘new 
guard’’ to use the reconfiguration of the political sphere both to win back status within Fatah 
and to deal with their loss of legitimacy among the population. At the same time, the 
relationship to charismatic leader Arafat was maintained, and it was those around him who 
were challenged. Is it enough to see this as the classic outline of a revolutionary sub-elite 
whom the revolution has passed by and who are trying to get back to centre stage, while 
maintaining their trust in the charismatic leader to avoid admitting failure? This kind of 
analysis has been highly contested by Jean-François Legrain277 who criticizes it for putting 
forward a non-existent generational factor and for not acknowledging the local structure of 
Palestinian society: ‘‘while the local warlords − the leaders whom one only hears about when 
they are assassinated278
                                                 
277 Jean-François Legrain, Le fantôme d'Arafat, op. cit., p 47. 
 
278 This depends, however, on the circles involved. Most of the ‘‘warlords,’’ as Jean-François Legrain calls 
them, are well known by the people in the camps on a local level and transversely by their ‘‘peers.’’ 
 
 − are quite emblematic of the young leadership in the Intifada, their 
identity does not involve belonging to a structured group that is antagonistic towards a 
socially and politically coherent ‘old guard.’ Their approaches to reality are not fundamentally 
different, and the potential fracture lines have nothing to do with generational and 
sociological identity. Like their elders, the emerging leaders are simply the expression of the 
power struggles operating within every group with shared aims in its relationship to the 
central power structure.’’  
It is clear that Palestinian groups are set up on a local basis, both in their way of 
recruiting and in their positioning. In this sense, the local identity has clearly supplanted what 
could be called a generational conscience. But the latter’s scarcity does not mean there is no 
generational phenomenon. Indeed, the ‘‘new guard’’ sees itself above all on a local level, but 
from one town to another one can see a common discourse on the part of these militants 
against the returnees and bosses in the Palestinian Authority. This convergence has also been 
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expressed in the networks created among organised groups in the West Bank, particularly 
around Marwan Barghouti.279 ‘‘I’m in touch with Marwan every day, and with Jihad too.280 
We keep each other informed.’’ This relationship is not a hierarchical one, but rather a 
transverse one. ‘‘Marwan is probably number 30. We have a hierarchical organisation, and 
Arafat is the one who makes the decisions. The difference with the others is that Marwan is a 
popular leader. It’s like everywhere else in the world here. There are personality conflicts, but 
the national cause goes beyond that, and the conflict is a civil process leading to progress in 
decision-making.’’281
Entering the armed struggle is a way of acquiring or maintaining social status for some 
young men from the refugee camps with no degree nor any ‘‘vitamin waw.’’
 
282 Militants have 
daily experiences there with peer groups involving a specific mode of existence and the 
acquisition of power: ‘‘People come to see me when there’s a problem to be solved. They 
come to me to find out what’s going on.’’283
                                                 
279 Marwan Barghouti, 44, a Palestinian MP, was arrested by the Israeli army in April 2002 and condemned to 
life in prison. He had already spent six years in Israeli prisons before going into exile in 1987. During the first 
Intifada, he was a liaison official for the PLO in Amman and Tunis. He returned in 1994 at the time of the Oslo 
Accords. He is a key Fatah figure in the West Bank, and his popularity goes beyond his actual duties.  
 
280 A leader of the shabiba (Fatah youth) then of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Jenin refugee camp, September 
2001. He was imprisoned during the Israeli army’s last incursion into the camp (April 2002). The other person 
he quotes is a colonel in Palestinian security and a (46-year-old) Fatah leader in Nablus. He escaped an 
attempted extra-judiciary execution by the Israeli army on 23 August 2001 when a ground-to-ground missile was 
fired at his car. 
 
281 Head of the PLO People’s Committee at the Balata refugee camp (Nablus), January 2001 
 
282 Waw, for the first letter of “wasta”: which means connections. 
 
283 Tanzim Fatah militant, Balata refugee camp, April 2001. 
 
  
The power acquired doesn’t come solely from bearing arms. What is required above 
all is to have the largest possible group of young people behind you. Yet this is only possible 
for a group leader who is sure of having enough resources to distribute, such as money, 
weapons, etc. Otherwise, there’s a good chance those young people will go elsewhere. But 
Palestinian resources are rare outside Fatah and the Authority. For instance, one activist talked 
about how he and a team mate ran out of petrol during one operation, and neither one had 
enough money to fill the tank. So these little leaders spend a great deal of their time  
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cultivating relationships with various people in the political apparatus of Fatah and the 
Palestinian Authority who might obtain resources for them. One leader saw his authority 
challenged when he was unable to find any money to finance certain members of his group 
who were wanted and in hiding up in the hills. They must also prove their ability to establish 
authority and particularly to assert themselves in conflicts between theirs and other groups. 
But the leader doesn’t follow his young people in every operation. He proves himself by 
taking part in an operation from time to time. As Goffman has underscored, ‘‘once his 
strength of character has been proven, it isn’t necessary to prove it again; the actor can rest on 
his laurels for a while. He can count on the others to assume that, if the need should arise, he 
won’t fail to draw on his character.’’284
The same kind of relationship plays out at higher levels. If the leaders solicited prove 
to be incapable of ensuring even basic logistics, then group chiefs will knock on other doors. 
Given the scarcity of resources, most of them seek multiple contacts and allegiances while 
trying to keep the various leaders in the dark about it: ‘‘If Marwan Barghouti only knew I’m 
also going to see Hassan al Cheikh!’’
  
285
                                                 
284 Erving Goffman, Les rites d’interaction, op. cit., p.194. 
285 Marwan Barghouti and Hassan al-Cheikh were competing for the Fatah leadership in the West Bank at the 
time. Barghouti was far more popular, but Hassan al-Cheikh had greater support from Arafat. 
 
 Power is measured here in terms of financial, 
logistical and human resources. A little chief trying to promote himself to a leader will 
emphasize the number of young people he can muster. The group chiefs bring in the numbers, 
while the leaders bring in financial and logistical means. And since nearly all resources on 
this political front went through Yasser Arafat, their ability to obtain his financing had a great 
deal of influence on their position. During this period, when Yasser Arafat felt that Marwan 
Barghouti was gaining too much influence, he accepted almost none of the latter’s many 
requests (such as to pay the hospital bills for a certain militant, etc.) while answering all of the 
ones from Hassan al Cheikh. A transfer of allegiance quickly occurred at the base. However, 
the group chiefs also tried to get as close as possible to Yasser Arafat by going around the 
intermediary level of these leaders. To that end, they could also activate ties with the hamula.        
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One of the group chiefs regularly sends his kind regards to Arafat’s cabinet secretary, a 
member of his hamula: ‘‘I haven’t asked him for anything yet, but it’s a good thing that will 
be of use to me.’’286
Manoeuvres are made more complex through cooperation between Palestinian security 
forces and Israel. Indeed, the activists must obtain resources and highlight their mobilisation 
capacity, while at the same time making sure they aren’t turned over to Israel in the 
framework of the security cooperation: ‘‘Leave the area immediately or I’ll have to put your 
name down in the register!’’
 
287
Militants and Traditional Power 
 screamed one Palestinian Authority official into the cell phone 
of one of his protégés. According to the militant involved, such indications can be used as a 
means of pressure on the activists. Rather than a direct hierarchical line, it appears to be a 
subtle game of power and opposition forces. The little chief who is just a cog in the wheel 
must also take into account this shabab’s moods. Involvement in the armed struggle is also a 
way to shed one’s self-image as a mere victim and reclaim one’s dignity. In accordance with 
that image, the shabab must therefore react in the event of serious Israeli attacks. If at the 
same time the Authority wants a minimum of incidents due to Yasser Arafat having declared 
a ceasefire, the game becomes particularly tricky for the group chief who has to hold it all 
together. So the decision-making line between Arafat and his groups was far from direct. To 
summarize, Arafat could push them to act, as he did just after Sharon’s election (in February 
2001). However, it is much harder to control them in the opposite direction. The instructions 
will be relayed in Ramallah and Gaza City, but with far more difficulty in the other regions.  
 
 
 
Armed youth groups constitute a relative parallel power, enabling them to become 
heavily involved in local conflicts and the way they are dealt with. Judicial resolutions of 
these conflicts are delicate matters in the Palestinian territories. Independently of the religious 
tribunals which regulate laws regarding individual rights, there are ordinary jurisdictions for  
                                                 
286 Tanzim Fatah militant, Ramallah, February 2001. 
 
287 Tanzim Fatah militant, Ramallah, March 2001. 
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civilian, penal, administrative and commercial affairs. Nevertheless, in addition to the lack of 
means or training, and the problems posed by the multitude of overlapping judicial references, 
Palestinian courts of law have a hard time establishing themselves as an independent judicial 
power due to the frequent intrusions on the part of the executive branch which sometimes 
quashes decisions.288 Moreover, the Palestinian Authority has set up military courts and 
government security courts whose sphere of competence is constantly increasing. Finally, the 
effectiveness of the courts has been handicapped by Israeli hindrances which prevent the 
judges and lawyers from getting around.289 Thus, ‘‘before the second Intifada broke out, the 
Palestinians already rather willingly sought out substitute avenues of justice, such as the 
district governor’s office in charge of security, or the security forces themselves.’’290 Between 
the Palestinian Authority, the traditional mode of resolution with a sulha,291 and armed 
groups, the Palestinians have seen an increase in the powers and opposition forces operating 
at a local level: ‘‘They had organised a sulha to settle a quarrel over money between my 
brother and another family. I charged into the sulha, turned everything upside down with my 
shabab and we fought with the other family. My father was furious. It was like when he saw 
me in the street carrying weapons and said: ‘what are you up to?’’’292
                                                 
288 One typical case was the refusal to free students imprisoned without charges in 1997. 
Stéphanie David, ‘‘La construction d’une justice palestinienne’’, in Nadine Picaudou (ed), ‘‘La Palestine 
en transition’’, Les annales de l’autre Islam n°8, Paris, ERISM, INALCO, 2001, p 89 and Rema 
Hammami, Jamil Hilal. and Salim Tamari, Civil Society and Governance, in Nadine Picaudou (ed), La 
Palestine en transition, op. cit., p 207. 
 
289 Stéphanie David, La construction d’une justice palestinienne, op. cit., p 87-88. 
 
290 Stéphanie David, La construction d’une justice palestinienne, op. cit., p 88. 
 
291 A meeting of reconciliation between families that calls upon recognised local figures.  
 
292 Tanzim Fatah militant, Ramallah, June 2001 
 
 
This increase in the number of small local power structures involving armed groups 
that interfere in conflicts – supported by an organisation or clan – has led to an increasingly 
chaotic situation for the Palestinian people. Israel’s systematic elimination of all the 
intermediate officials in Palestinian organisations has also led to the loss of people with the 
necessary authority and experience to limit these groups’ uncoordinated initiatives, and has 
also radicalised them. The more chaotic the situation becomes, the more the power held by 
these little groups increases. Thus the growing number of events, which recalls the end of the  
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first Intifada and shows the groups’ increasing sense of freedom as the situation gradually 
deteriorates and the Palestinian Authority falls into decay. Presumed collaborators suspected 
of having supplied information leading to the assassination of an activist by Israel are 
summarily executed. On 7 October 2002, Rajeh Abou Lehia, a colonel in charge of the 
Palestinian riot police, was killed in Gaza by a group of masked men probably belonging to 
the Izziddin el Qassam Brigades. The act was carried out to avenge the death of the brother of 
one of the group’s members, killed a year earlier in a demonstration when the riot police were 
ordered to fire on the crowd.293
Indeed, the prevailing relationship is not exactly one of trust. The competing groups 
steal each other’s feeble resources in weapons and cars: ‘‘We eat, sleep and shoot together. 
We’re like a family. But you know you can’t trust anyone. There’s always a chance someone 
may stab you in the back to take your place. You have to be on your guard at all times. It’s 
hard − really hard.  The only place I feel safe is in this neighbourhood, where the tanzim 
guarding the street is our family and I feel at home.’’
 The increase in this kind of event − as the situation becomes 
more chaotic − shows how the power wielded by these groups has grown, as well as the 
danger they represent for each other. 
294 As this militant demonstrates, the 
hard core affiliation is to the local area, not to the party or to one’s team of operations: ‘‘I left 
the PFLP because all the ones from my street were with Fatah.’’295
                                                 
293 The man was Youssef ‘Aqel. Two other people were killed and 90 wounded while the demonstration broke 
up on 8 October 2001. His family refused to accept condolences until the assassination of Abu Lehia, indicating 
its desire for revenge. Palestinian Center for Human Rights, Press Release, Gaza, 7 October 2002. 
 
294 Tanzim Fatah militant, Ramallah, June 2001. 
 
295 Former Fatah militant, 30, Berlin, April 2002. 
 In the previously cited 
example, the territory overlapped with his hamula, but this is not always the case. The 
‘‘local’’ space doesn’t necessarily refer entirely to community networks. The ‘‘street’’ may be 
the source of a common space around which small groups of young people are organised, 
without these neighbours belonging to the same hamula. This ‘‘local’’ level is often a mixture 
from the hamula and the territory. A particular configuration will win out depending on the 
militants, places and circumstances. 
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‘‘LOCAL’’ IMPORTANCE 
 
Localism is key in several respects. As we have just seen, it acts as a ‘‘sanctuary’’ −
the only safe place. But its importance shows through even more in one specific phenomenon. 
The more the relationship to the territory is structured and independent form the Palestinian 
Authority, the more the armed groups will show themselves to be organised and less divided. 
The clientele-oriented system operating around Fatah and the Palestinian Authority is 
particularly entrenched in areas where the power of the Authority and Arafat is strongest − in  
Gaza-City and Ramallah. Groups in the other areas operate in a way that is far less connected 
to this pyramid. The Palestinian Authority’s local contacts, not as close to Arafat, have a role 
as actors but with less power and less to hand out. Their own position within the Palestinian 
Authority is based on their deep roots in the local area. This phenomenon has increased as the 
West Bank and Gaza have gradually been divided up and the Israeli blockade intensified. It 
can also be seen in geographical images. Whatever the distance in kilometres, anything 
outside the area is now ‘‘far off.’’ Border areas like South Gaza and Jenin facilitate financial 
independence due to easier access to the outside world. In Nablus, the power of the major 
families constitutes another clientele network since they have maintained their business 
resources.’’296
                                                 
296 ‘‘For the most part, entrepreneurs (in Nablus) have been able to pursue their business and protect themselves 
from economic interventionism by members of the Authority, who did not show the same restraint with 
businessmen from Gaza (...) Between 1996 and 2000, the shabab from the Intifada introduced themselves  into a 
social and political order dominated by the major families.  Through their control of charity works, they have 
tried to stem the dissatisfaction of the underprivileged. The mayor of the town has succeeded in getting the 
Palestinian Authority and the local bourgeoisie to coexist.’’ Laetitia Bucaille, 
Générations Intifada, op. cit., p 77. 
 
 The same is true for Hebron.  
Above all, the more the local system is independent and structured, the more the 
groups are too. Refugee camps, homogenous and well-defined spaces, are the base of an 
organisation that more or less transcends political rifts and allegiances. Most of the Popular 
Resistance Committees are organised at this level. They bring together all the factions and are 
more or less operational and have considerable power, although that varies depending on the  
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area. For instance, in the Jenin refugee camp, before the incursion in April 2002, activists 
were organised and well-structured. There were no small groups of the kind that were so 
typical in Ramallah. The discourse there is far less opportunist than elsewhere and much more 
ideological. There is a direct linkage between the camp itself and nationalism, without any 
intermediaries: ‘‘We’ve got to get organised on our own. No one is going to come and help 
us. As inhabitants of the camp, we all stick together. We all know each other. We support one 
another and work together. The Sheikh is with Jihad, I’m with Fatah, and he’s my best friend. 
When they tried to enter the camp, we all went together. In any case, we can’t count on 
anyone other than ourselves. Our liberation lies on our own shoulders. People in town have 
their comfortable lives, so it isn’t important to them.’’297
‘‘The rest of the Palestinian population doesn’t support us. They can’t feel the same 
things. A person whose finger is in the fire doesn’t feel the same thing as one whose finger is 
not. But we refugees are the ones leading the struggle against the occupation. We’re the ones. 
And we won’t give up. We’ll take it to the end. We have nothing to lose in any case.’’
  
298
Toufiq Haddad analyses the same phenomenon in South Gaza (Khan Younis and 
Rafah): ‘‘ Here « localness » implies quite simply the immediate neighbourhoods and 
communities within which Palestinians are born and grow up. In southern Gaza, the clannish 
traditions of original villages that have been carried over into the refugee camps, is now 
imbued with a street-toughened collective refugee consciousness that is steeped in the 
colossal failure of the Oslo agreements. Gaza’s hermetic sealing over the past ten years 
together with the internal siege policies implemented throughout this Intifada have greatly 
contributed to the importance of the local scene (...) It is where the importance of the 
extended marginalisation of certain localities gains significance : Quite simply, certain things 
become possible at the bottom, which are not possible at the top.’’
  
299
                                                 
297 Leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades at the Jenin refugee camp, quoted above, September 2001 
 
298 A member of the shabiba, 26, a waiter in a small restaurant, Balata refugee camp, January 
2001. 
 
299 Toufiq Haddad, The Mutaradeen, op. cit., p 12. 
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This group organisation around a territory – which had become a more important 
reference than political rifts – was observed by Michel Seurat in Tripoli, where he 
underscored the links between neighbourhood and shabab:300
With regard to the case analysed by Seurat, there is a kind of scale of modifications, 
ranging from the neighbourhoods most integrated inside the Palestinian Authority’s area of 
power to the other areas. The closer the groups are to the Palestinian Authority’s centres of 
power, the more small armed groups you see − changing allegiance from one to the other and 
heavily involved in the local scene. The actors’ discourse is often focused on their internal 
positioning. They are highly involved in the quest for immediate benefits, while highlighting 
their marginal lifestyle with its dangers, constraints and rules, as well as powerful 
experiences. The farther one gets from these centres of power, the more the groups emphasize 
the national issue − while maintaining a form of organisation rather tightly structured around 
local resistance committees that cross over political rifts − hus superseding their local 
positioning and the immediate benefits of their actions. In fact, for actors involved in a highly 
structured local system, the desire for independence from the Authority’s power is a given, 
and they express it in a direct manner. Individuals may then be seen to move from the 
Authority’s apparatus to the Popular Resistance Committees:
 ‘‘Beyond the ups and downs of 
politics, neighbourhoods (...) remain the ‘holy of holies’, the symbol of ‘purity’ and 
‘authenticity.’ While everything may be negotiable in the end, a function of the political 
equation of the moment and the ‘line’ it imposes, it is not permissible on the other hand to 
compromise on this role of ‘sanctuary’ or the inviolability of the territory. And the shabab 
know it well because – as one of them has explained to us – they want ‘to be able to walk 
through the streets of the neighbourhood with their heads held high.’’’ 
301
                                                 
300 Michel Seurat, ‘‘Le Quartier de Bâb Tebbâné à Tripoli’’, in L’Etat de barbarie, Paris, Seuil, 1989, 117- 
118. 
 
301 Lijân al muqâwama al-sha’biya. These committees bring together all the parties, including the Islamists.  
 
 “How did the Authority react 
to your training? − At the time, they couldn’t really do anything about it because there were a 
great many (Palestinian) deaths every day. We are aware that there are limits to what the 
Authority can do, and we don’t necessarily expect them to act with complete militancy. At the 
same time, we want to have our own freedom and to fulfil our  
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responsibilities in defending our homes and our children, and in our resistance to the 
occupation.’’302
‘‘The resistance committees are now beyond the point where they could be eliminated 
or influenced, although there were attempts by certain officials in the Palestinian Authority at 
one time, but they failed. Their work has no more value than the blood of our martyrs.’’
 
303
The most key areas regarding the Palestinian Authority’s power are clearly those 
where its presence is the most discernible in terms of infrastructure and achievements. The 
militants’ discourse has tended to strongly uphold the ‘‘old man’’ (Yasser Arafat), as a leader 
who led the complex dance with Israel and must not be hampered. This aspect is considerably 
less present in peripheral areas. The ‘‘abandoned’’ militants have no actors other than 
themselves to identify with the national struggle. Consequently, they asked the Authority not 
to hinder their actions, not to interfere, and to provide support for members of the party 
apparatus who want to ‘‘redeem themselves’’: ‘‘Many of our members also work for the 
Palestinian Authority and have remained honest throughout all these years. These people 
either join our forces or stay in their uniforms and provide assistance from inside, without 
publicizing it of course.’’
 
 
To a certain extent this independence has stifled the clientele phenomenon and the 
resulting extreme competition between groups in a context of scarce resources. Furthermore, 
it neutralizes the Authority’s repressive capacity during negotiations, when it tries to enforce 
ceasefires it has proclaimed. Community integration around a particular place − refugee 
camps being the archetype − has been passed down to the organisation of armed groups. 
304
                                                 
302 Interview with an official in the Popular Resistance Committees in Khan Younis. Toufiq Haddad, 
The Mutaradeen, op. cit., p 14. 
 
303 Interview with Awni Za’noun, in charge of the Popular Resistance Committees in Rafah. Salah al - 
Masri, ‘‘Politics is Shaped Through The Barrels of Guns’’, Jerusalem, Between The Lines, July 2001, p. 17. 
 
 
304 Interview with an official in the Popular Resistance Committees in Khan Younis, Toufiq Haddad, 
The Mutaradeen, op. cit., p 14. 
 
 
Thus militants in the second Intifada built up their self-image through a double 
reference to the struggle for the liberation of Palestine and to their neighbourhood. The latter 
is where the benefits provided have been identified and concretized, not through the success  
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of the national struggle, but rather through everything surrounding their actions and what has 
been gained from belonging to these circles.  
 
 
Group Culture 
 
The change in social position through entering one of these groups also involves 
embracing a collective lifestyle with its own particular rules. A specific culture develops there 
on the margins of Palestinian society with its own appeal, despite − or because of − the risks. 
That aspect is often underscored by the youngest militants. Resorting to armed struggle 
requires facing fear and accepting the risk of death, but also means access to powerful 
experiences. The essentially nocturnal lifestyle is based on putting oneself in harm’s way and 
a culture focusing on the body. Beyond its operational dimensions, the fact of exaggerating 
this nocturnal lifestyle and emphasizing that one is never at home is intended to highlight their 
voluntary marginalization with regard to the norm in order to underscore the special status 
acquired. Once inside one of these groups, it is extremely difficult to get out. When the 
fiancée of the leader of the Deisheh camp urged him to leave Tanzim, he replied: ‘‘It’s too 
late.’’ ‘‘They would take him for a collaborator,’’ she explained.305
Not sleeping and courting danger is exhausting, but it generates an exciting everyday 
life.
 
306 Furthermore, young people feel they have taken back the initiative with respect to 
Israel that way. At the same time, they appropriate images of strength associated with the 
Israeli army by imitating the ‘‘look’’ of the Israeli soldiers (dark glasses, bits of uniforms, 
etc.), their stance and gait. Comments and comparisons about each other’s musculature are 
common within such groups. All aspects of ‘‘face’’307
                                                 
305 James Bennet, The New Suicide Bombers, op. cit. 
 
306 One may observe here to a certain extent the analyses by Farhad Khosrokhavar on ‘‘playful martyrs’’: ‘‘the 
playful dimension of war is highly present. Because it is so cruelly lacking in everyday life, they cling to war for 
entertainment and thrills. They become playfully free through an inversion of the social hierarchy.’’ Farhad 
Khosrokhavar, L’Islamisme et la mort, op. cit., p 61-62. 
 
307 ‘‘The term face can be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims through a line of action 
which others assume he adopted during a particular contact. (...) The degree of feeling attached to each face and 
the frequency of that feeling among the whole are determined by group rules and by how the situation is 
defined.’’ Goffman, Les rites d’interaction, op. cit., p 9. 
 
 
 − evoking signs of strength and self-
assertion with regard to a potential use of violence − are carefully cultivated against an image 
of  
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weakness and victimization. The militants themselves have a clear perception of this image 
management. In the words of one leader who was asked to settle a dispute between his group 
and another: ‘‘I was exhausted. I couldn’t get motivated.’’308 He indicated what he meant by 
the word ‘‘get motivated’’ by thrusting his shoulders forward. It is also a question of hiding 
any signs of weakness, knowing how to deal with your fears, and not flinching about resorting 
to violence. One militant evoked the feelings of nausea he felt when some members of his 
group beat up a young man they arrested for stealing (another example of the internal 
importance of these groups). He was careful to slip out without being noticed or suspected.309
                                                 
308 An Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades leader, Beit Jala (Bethlehem), April 2001. 
 
309 Ramallah, June 2001. 
 
 
While certain groups have turned more professional than others, armed activities are far from 
being strictly separated from other militant activities, contrary to what is practised by Hamas, 
which is a great deal more ‘‘professional.’’ Being known and recognised is one of the 
symbolic benefits of taking up the armed struggle, and it is not uncommon for activists to 
proclaim their ‘‘high deeds’’ of the night on the following morning. However, as Israeli 
repression has intensified, these distinctions have become more pronounced. Above all, 
resorting to an armed struggle has radically changed the meaning of traditional militancy. 
 
I have evoked the failure during the second intifada at using the peaceful mobilization 
of the masses associated to the first intifada. This was also true for militants. Not all of them 
resorted to armed struggle; but those who persevered with traditional militancy did not 
suggest it as an alternative solution. On the one hand, many of them − particularly the 
youngest − were fascinated by the culture of weapons, even if they did not feel particularly 
concerned by the armed struggle. On the other hand, the militants experienced these activities 
− distributing flyers, food, etc. − as marginal participation in the resistance effort. The armed 
groups encompassed an ambivalent reality. Some sought local profits and power, evoking 
mafia-type  
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phenomena, while others, who put themselves at great risk in their confrontations with Israel, 
were closer to the ‘‘martyrdom’’ phenomenon.  
But the first kind of group needed a minimum of involvement in the national struggle 
to preserve a certain legitimacy vis-à-vis the people as well as in their own eyes. 
 
Slipping into Martyrdom: ‘‘Alive due to a Lack of Death’’310
 
This expression, used by an armed militant from Hebron, shows that the most 
committed militants in the armed struggle against Israel are close to the identity patterns of 
‘‘martyrs.’’ Death remains their only prospect. They do not believe that a relative 
reconfiguration by becoming involved in the armed struggle will bring any real hope for the 
national struggle. But it ‘‘restores their honour’’ while facilitating a change in social status, at 
the cost of putting themselves at great risk. It does not erase the death prospect. On the 
contrary, it accentuates it as soon as the militant leaves the time frame of immediacy through 
which the reconfiguration was made possible. The more the national discourse takes 
precedence over the idea of immediate benefits, the stronger the expectation of death. Death is 
referred to constantly, through a refusal to fear it. The martyr’s desire for fusion is clear. 
Thus, some militants deliberately put themselves at even greater risk, abandoning basic 
measures of precaution and concealment. The near absence of such measures is one of the 
evolving characteristics of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. It reveals a lack of training with 
regard to clandestinity, a group culture where courage has to be demonstrated, and a desire to 
be involved in the public arena. Indeed, if becoming an armed militant also helps acquire 
status, then this new role must be acknowledged. This also alludes to an awareness of the 
derisory nature of such measures against the Israeli army, perceived as all-powerful. One can 
see the proximity to martyrdom when abandoning such − highly relative − measures of 
protection becomes a systematic approach, paired with the increasing risk of the operations.  
 
                                                 
310 ‘‘â’ish min qilat al mût.’’ This expression is difficult to translate, but basically means: I ought to be dead, but 
have been given a reprieve.  
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The infiltration operations − particularly in the settlements −  are the most striking 
example of this shift. They are not conceived as suicide missions. The activists do not write 
their testaments before going on them, and their perception is different: ‘‘There is a huge 
difference between conducting a military operation where you have one chance in a million of 
surviving, and blowing yourself up where you have 100% chance of dying. I for one am 
willing to lead a military operation where I have very little chance of surviving, but not to 
blow myself up and be certain to die. You have to have psychological problems and problems 
in your life to do that. Take that student from Bir Zeit.311 He was a simple person who prayed 
and didn’t talk much. His family had a lot of problems because they’re so poor. He was more 
in need of a psychologist than anything else.’’312
                                                 
311 Dia Tawil, 19, a Hamas militant and electrical engineering student who committed a suicide attack in 
Jerusalem on 27 March 2001 that wounded 30 people.  
 
312 Tanzim militant Ramallah, June 2001. 
 
 
Nonetheless, the succinct plan for these attacks − going in and shooting a hail of 
bullets − doesn’t really include any possibility for withdrawal. While some actors rush 
towards their increasingly certain death, there are also some swings in the other direction. 
After frequently exposing themselves in highly dangerous operations, some of them ‘‘take a 
rest,’’ abandoning their missions and focusing on their local positioning. They can then 
capitalize on the reputations acquired through such missions to have more authority and 
power over young people, and to strengthen their group while no longer taking a direct part in 
their feats of arms.  
The equilibrium fashioned in this way is extremely precarious. Militants acquire it at 
great risk, and practically without any strategic image that might enable them to create a 
purpose during their lifetime – although perhaps for the next generation. Thus, the greater the 
reference to the national struggle and the more blurred the reference to local positioning, the 
more one observes people resorting to the construct of martyrdom, which merges the private 
sphere and the national struggle. The means of connecting the two still seems to be weighed 
down by the impossibility of relating nationalism to positive prospects. At the same time, the 
national objective lives on in the form of a mythical image that is essential to an 
‘‘honourable’’ reinterpretation of everyday experience. Distancing oneself from Palestinian 
territory becomes the necessary condition for dissociating a person’s two goals of the national 
struggle and the private sphere.  
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Chapter 8  
 
 
Exile 
 
 
Returnees, expatriate engineers and students abroad all stand out through their 
prolonged experience of having lived far from Palestinian territory − the  sine qua non for 
breaking away from the national reference. Indeed, distance is the only way to escape from 
the humiliating experiences and their crucial reinterpretation through a more or less mythical 
reference to the national struggle. These identity issues are particularly compelling with 
regard to young returnees. Upon arrival they strongly rejected ‘‘conservative’’ Palestinian 
society at first. They were in turn rejected by the Palestinians who had remained there and 
were critical of these ‘‘rich and decadent’’ young people. However, after spending more time 
in the Territories and seeing the situation change, in particular with the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the 
returnees showed a renewed interest in nationalist themes.  
Armed with degrees and jobs in keeping with their qualifications, the ‘‘engineers’’ 
have taken the opposite route. In comparison to the rest of the population, they could be 
qualified – in highly relative terms – as ‘‘golden youth,’’ like the returnees. Leaving the 
territory is the only way for them to accept their own rejection of the national struggle as it 
has been conducted − characterised by its grim commitment and lack of strategy. 
Nonetheless, the very distance that enables the individual to separate the national objective 
from his personal life opens up the issue of his lack of solidarity with the collective fate. 
Engineers who become expatriates are confronted with the same questions as Palestinian 
students abroad, as we have seen in Germany.  
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Young Returnees 
 
Most of the young Palestinian returnees grew up in Arab countries, mainly in Tunisia. 
The majority went back − often unwillingly − when their fathers, PLO officials, followed 
Arafat and helped to set up the Palestinian Authority in 1994. The total returnee population is 
estimated at between 50 000 and 60 000 since the signing of the Oslo Accords.313 PLO 
personnel are the largest category, made up of 38 000 people. This category includes PLO 
officials (18 000), policemen recruited among Palestinians with Egyptian travel documents or 
a Jordanian passport (12 000), and their family members (8 000). The latter figure is low 
because many officers, especially those in security departments, went back without their 
families. Added to this are the far smaller categories of beneficiaries of the family regrouping 
programme authorised by Israel (6 000314
Finally, there are the ‘‘American Palestinians.’’ This group, the size of which has not 
been calculated, is composed of Palestinian families that emigrated to the United States after 
the 1967 exile. Some of them took advantage of the creation of A areas to go back, although 
the fathers generally stayed in the U.S. for professional reasons. While it is impossible to 
calculate their exact number – well under the previous categories – they are a striking 
phenomenon through their concentration in Ramallah and the surrounding villages. They have 
American passports and, contrary to the previous categories, do not have real residency 
permits delivered by Israel. As a result, they enter with a tourist visa which must be renewed 
every three months, unless they choose to remain illegally. The returnee population as a 
whole is young (47% are between the ages of 15 and 39) and has a higher level of education 
than the average Palestinian: 14% have a BA or higher (against 4 % for the Palestinian 
population).
) and political prisoners freed by Israel (6 000) after 
the Oslo Accords were signed. 
315
                                                 
313 NicholasVan Hear, ‘‘Reintegrating Returnees : Opportunities and Constraints’’ in Nicholas Van Hear 
et alii Reintegration of Palestinian Returnees, Ramallah, Shaml- Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee 
Centre, Publication n°6, 1997, p 35. Same source for all subsequent figures. 
 
314 The quota was fixed at 6 000 per year. The programme hasn’t really continued. 
 
315 Majdi el-Malki, Social Monitor, Special Issue 1995-1999, op. cit., p 14. 
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Culture Shock  
Coming to the territories was an ambivalent step for these young people. First of all, it 
meant being torn from countries they liked and didn’t want to leave. Nostalgia for Tunisia and 
Jordan was a recurring theme when they talked about it in 1997. In some American-
Palestinian families the young people weren’t told it was a permanent move, in order to avoid 
any refusal on their part.316 Furthermore, this transplanting also resulted in a conflict between 
the memories transmitted to them and the reality in the Palestinian Territories. In their 
memory, Palestine was glorified as an idyllic and heavenly land from which they had been 
expelled. This memory was indeed passed down, as well as an attachment through trans-
national links intensified by communications technology such as the internet. Contrary to 
what occurred for their parents, however, it was not translated by a sense of nostalgia for life 
in Palestine.317
                                                 
316 Tamara Tamimi, ‘‘Al Awda : The Negotiation of Identity among Palestinian-American Returnees,’’ a paper 
for Palestinian Return Migration : Socio-economic and Cultural Approaches, a symposium held by Sari Hanafi, 
Meawards (Population Council) and Shaml, Ramallah, 13-14 June 2002, p 7. 
http://www.shaml.org/agenda/2001/workshop_1206/tentative/tamimi.htm 
 
317 Tamimi, Al Awda, op. cit, p 5. 
 
 And so, between their idealised memories and the well-being experienced in 
the countries they grew up in, their shock upon arrival was particularly great. They found 
themselves in an ambivalent situation between their obligation to live in a society that was 
suddenly against everything from their former way of life, and their attraction for the Israeli 
lifestyle that was more like what they had known before.  
The contrast was particularly intense for young women. Indeed, their fathers wanted to 
prove to Palestinian society that they had remained integrated and had preserved their 
identity. This was expressed mainly through an ‘‘honourable’’ lifestyle that was measured 
above all through the behaviour of young women. Thus their criticism of Palestinian society 
involves issues of reputation, whereas the young men stress the lack of infrastructures, 
organisations, activities and so on.  
Before the second Intifada, some ‘‘problem’’ children were repatriated by their 
families. They thought they could deal with them more successfully in a far stricter 
environment. In the  
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Palestinian diaspora in the United States, for instance, some families decided to return to 
Ramallah when their teenagers began taking drugs. Paradoxically, as Tamara Tamimi has 
shown,318
Aviv.’’
 some young women have stressed their greater freedom of movement in Palestine. 
Reassured by the coherence between the environment and the behavioural expectations they 
have for their daughters, parents impose less restrictions than in ‘‘dangerous’’ American 
society. 
Various strategies are then employed by the young people to hold onto or regain their 
former lifestyle. First, they create homogeneous circles of returnees that are publicly visible, 
particularly at university, and through taking part in activities such as going to cafes and 
parties that would have been part of their former lives. Furthermore, they use their foreign 
passports to take regular trips to Israel, where they find more freedom and a greater choice of 
entertainment such as shopping, going to cafes and clubs, far from the watchful gaze of their 
own society: ‘‘There’s nothing here. It’s so boring! The only thing that interests me is to drive 
over to Tel 
319 Apart from such diversions, the boredom of a society where there’s nothing to do is 
a recurring theme: ‘‘I’m going crazy here −it ’s just back and forth between the university and 
the women’s residence. I’ve made a few friends, but it’s not the same. I’m used to the 
American way of life and mindset. Take clothes, for instance. I don’t notice if I’m wearing 
green pants and a red sweater. But, here, they all make comments about it. Everything’s so 
superficial here.’’320
Simultaneously, there is an intense rejection of Palestinian society, criticised for its 
underdevelopment, conservatism and social controls. This social difference is powerfully 
marked and felt: ‘‘We have no more than two children in our families −  not like the people 
from here. They’re crazy here, you know.’’
  
321
                                                 
318 Tamimi, Al Awda, op. cit., p 8. 
 
319 A 21-year-old student who was born and raised in Tunis, and came to the Territories when his father returned 
in 1994. 
 
320 Sana, originally from Amman. She refers to this lifestyle as American, but in fact came into contact with it at 
the university in Amman.  
 
321 A student at Bir Zeit University who grew up in Tunis. 
 
 
 
The social clash between the returnees and native Palestinians is reciprocal. While the 
returnees feel their way of life is being restricted, most of the Palestinian population feels  
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it is an insolent show of wealth and decadence. They are criticised for not having lived 
through the hardship of the Intifada and of profiting from the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority by monopolizing all the jobs and living the high life. This antagonism has led to 
some violent clashes. 
At first these conflicts were such that the young returnees couldn’t be included in the 
generation of young Palestinians. They proved to be clearly different in terms of financial 
resources and in their freedom of movement −  a crucial element in Palestine − as well as 
regarding their self-image and identity. Their relationship to the national objective developed 
in a different way. While their fathers had come back to ‘‘build’’ the country, most of them 
were highly detached from this vision and stood out rather for their highly apolitical stance. 
They all wanted to leave and had absolutely no intention of living in the Palestinian 
territories. Yet, unpredictably, their antagonism did not grow stronger. On the contrary, the 
returnees developed a greater ‘‘understanding’’ of Palestinian society, and their own 
references became visible in the Palestinian public arena.  
 
 
From Rejection to Adaptation 
 
Indeed, although these young people had the necessary resources to have greater 
freedom of movement and access to consumer goods and leisure activities, their return also 
meant being confronted with the reality of Palestinian life. Their rejection of Palestinian 
society gradually became more nuanced as their relationship to the national identity changed 
and they made their ‘‘mark’’ on the territory. ‘‘People don’t treat us the same way as before. 
They no longer say: ‘what are you doing here?’ I couldn’t stay in a country where the people 
asked me ‘what are you doing here?’ This is my country. I can do as I like. But now they’ve 
changed because they realise we’re better than they are. We’re the ones who have done 
everything here. It was a mess. People were selling their vegetables wherever they could on 
the road. We built a market. That street with the cafes and restaurants didn’t exist before, for 
example.322 We’ve done everything here, and we’ve changed the mindset too.’’323
                                                 
322 The ‘‘we’’ refers to the Palestinian Authority, his father being an official in that organisation. 
 
323 The 21-year-old student previously quoted. 
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Clearly these young people have embraced their fathers’ objectives and taken pride in 
the Palestinian Authority’s achievements. That sense of pride has not suppressed their feeling 
of belonging to a different or superior social group. But by identifying with these 
achievements they have developed an attachment to the land, which is gradually becoming 
theirs in a literal sense. The “American Palestinians” have found their way into the Palestinian 
social arena in a different way. Ramallah, for example, has been literally transformed by the 
presence of the returnees, who have created various areas with restaurants, cafés, internet 
cafes and American shops where young people congregate. Intifada slogans are juxtaposed 
with American-style tags.  
Thus their connection to the Palestinian collective memory has been changed by their 
relationship with a space which they have modified and to which they have developed a 
certain attachment. Despite their greater freedom of movement, they have been gradually 
faced with the reality of the occupation. This is particularly true since the second Intifada 
during which they lived through the curfews, bombings and increased checkpoints with the 
rest of the Palestinian population. 
As for the American Palestinians, their trips back and forth to the United States have 
proven to be considerably more difficult since being blocked more frequently at the airport by 
the Israelis. These changes have led them to modify their identity constructs as they relate 
more and more to the Palestinian national objective. One rare but significant case involves the 
young man who used to talk about his ‘‘joyrides’’ to Tel Aviv and became one of the stone-
throwers in the Intifada: ‘‘I’ve been going to the clashes, but now the head of the university 
has forbidden it. But I wasn’t stopping anybody from getting to their studies. I said I was 
going to the clashes, but I left them alone if they wanted to study.’’ 
But for most people this greater identification with the Palestinian national objective 
was not manifested by this kind of involvement. Those who became more involved did so in a 
civil and peaceful way: ‘‘We need new ideas. We can’t continue with these demonstrations 
where it’s all talk. I go because I support the idea that we must come together, but not like 
that. For example, the people here who aren’t working in Israel anymore should go plant trees 
to replace the ones Israel has uprooted. I have a plan with some friends for next semester. It’s 
about creating a club where we’d organise things like planting trees, and two- to three-day 
seminars about  
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Palestine for students. Most people don’t know about the history of Palestine because it’s 
forbidden to teach it in school.324
                                                 
324 A ‘‘Tunisian’’ studying at Bir Zeit University and working on a water purification project as part of a civil 
engineering apprenticeship with the town of Al Bireh. Interviewed during a night-time demonstration after the 
Israeli army killed Abu Ali Mustafa, secretary general of the FPLP, on 27 August 2002. 
 
 More aware of the international context, they feel concerned 
by the way the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is presented in the foreign − especially American − 
media. When they try to intervene, it is often at this level, particularly through the internet. 
There has also been an evolution in morals. People have gone from a total rejection of 
this ‘‘crazy’’ society that imposes extremely powerful social controls on them to a greater 
sense of ‘‘understanding,’’ which indicates that they are ‘‘coping’’ rather than signalling any 
real acceptance on their part. This attitude recalls the resignation felt by young women. 
Contrary to their brothers, they generally are not permitted to pursue their studies abroad. In 
1997, Assala emphasized the fact that she would never live in the Palestinian Territories and 
intended to go back to Tunis or Amman as soon as her studies were completed. In 2001, she 
had a different attitude, which may also have been influenced by a budding relationship. ‘‘I 
have a friend. We see each other, and I’ve gone to his family’s house. My parents know about 
us. But my father doesn’t know everything. He doesn’t know that I’ve been to his family’s 
house. He told me straightaway: whatever you do, don’t go to his family’s house. Because his 
honour is the most important thing to him. So if it turns out we’re not made for each other, 
people will say: she went to his family’s house, and so on. But I’ve only been when his 
mother was there. We get along well. Our relationship has helped me to put up with the life 
here. I love this country, but I’m still not used to the mindset. The good thing is that people 
don’t know me yet. They don’t talk about me. I’m a stranger in my own town and in 
Ramallah too. But I’m careful. I know I’m not doing anything wrong. If you start worrying 
about what other people want, then you never do anything. But I think a foreigner has to adapt 
to the country’s customs. I don’t know what I’ll do when my studies are over and I have to go 
back. I like my town because it’s very green and beautiful. But I don’t like the life here. I 
don’t know anyone and there’s nothing to do. Last summer I stayed for two months and at the 
end I couldn’t bear it anymore. I asked if I could take a break in Jordan for  
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a week, but my parents didn’t have any money. I went anyway, with just 250 shekels in my 
pocket. 
- Can’t you stay in Ramallah? 
- It would be hard. I haven’t talked with my father. I haven’t broached the subject yet. 
Actually, the only way I’ll stay in Ramallah is if I find a job or get married. But I’m working 
on it. My friend and I are thinking about it. We want to get engaged and married, but not until 
I finish my studies.’’   
One issue that should be stressed in this interview is the specific nature of the city of 
Ramallah in the Palestinian public arena. It has been widely modified by the presence of the 
returnees and seems to be a town with greater freedom of conduct, and the possibility of a 
certain anonymity. It also has sports and cultural infrastructures which increase the number of 
potential activities. Indeed, some young Palestinian artists and engineers from Jerusalem have 
found its cultural life richer than in East Jerusalem and have chosen to move there.  
 
 
A Trans-national Identity 
 
The Palestinian collective memory has been transmitted among the diaspora. Thus, the 
basis of Palestinian identity, their history of exile, is just as present among returnees and has 
been reinforced by their trans-national social geography. Yet that identity was only associated 
with the goals of national construction with their gradual attachment to Palestinian territory 
and involvement in the everyday Palestinian reality of occupation. Nevertheless, the young 
returnees have remained strongly attached to the countries they grew up in. Many of them 
hope to return there, in particular the young men, who have more freedom in this regard than 
young women. 
Maintaining this reference to the outside world appears to be a crucial resource for these 
young people, especially as the situation in the Territories has become more difficult. It has 
allowed them to hope for a personal trajectory, whatever the ups and downs of the Palestinian 
situation. Their self-image involves a coming and going between the Palestinian Territories 
and the country they have ties with. This movement between identities leads them to see 
themselves as part of a double elite with links to the diaspora and the nation. Added to the 
concomitant resources (passports, financial means, degrees, etc.), it spares them the kind of 
confinement that typifies the constructs of young Palestinians from the Territories. Thus, 
when their relationship to the  
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national objective is reinforced, it isn’t necessarily associated with a hopeless future. Among 
them, the American Palestinians have a more nuanced view of the West, which they are more 
familiar with. They believe in the possibility of influencing Western opinion and can orient 
their actions in that direction. On the other hand, the young people who have grown up in 
Arab countries and been involved in establishing the Palestinian Authority have found 
themselves squeezed more tightly by the collapse of that plan. Their self-image is closer to 
that of the Palestinians who remained, even if they possess greater resources to escape from 
the situation. 
 
 
Engineers 
 
There are no precise statistics on this subject, but it is a noticeable phenomenon. 
Young Palestinians who are able to − engineers being the most typical example − tend to 
leave the Territories for the United States and Canada for the most part. This mainly involves 
young men, who have greater access to higher education of this kind and especially to work at 
their level of skill. Due to issues involving one’s image in society, on the other hand, it is 
extremely difficult for a young woman to go abroad alone to work. 
Their desire to leave involves two aspects. First, it quite simply expresses the wish to 
escape from a closed situation and to use their assets to that purpose − their skills and, if 
necessary, funds accumulated in their first professional experience or possessed by their 
family. These engineers can rely on the Palestinian diaspora to organise their departure; after 
that, there are university and professional channels, which lead some of them to American 
universities for specialised skills and others to join the Canadian workforce. Their desire to 
leave does not mean permanent exile in their minds, but rather a temporary removal in order 
to achieve something in one’s line of work. Nevertheless, if they want to go back, they are 
dependent on the economic and political situation in Palestine which may or may not allow 
them to return under favourable conditions. 
The second aspect of their desire to leave involves the national struggle. These 
engineers massively support the Palestinian national objective and are committed to it. They 
were often stonethrowers during the first Intifada. But their perception of how the struggle has 
been led  
 167 
is often highly critical. On the one hand, they know more about − and take into account to a 
greater extent − the international impact of the Palestinians’ methods. Furthermore, being able 
to imagine a future outside Palestinian lands has made them less susceptible to the grim logic 
embraced by others. ‘‘Our problem is that this is a conflict between a nation with an army and 
individual people. No one wants to wage an Intifada. Everyone wants the Intifada to stop. The 
Israelis − who are right about this point −  say it’s the Authority that has waged the Intifada. 
People just want to live normal lives − to have a glass of beer in peace, go out with their 
girlfriends, get to their jobs, and so on. They don’t want the Intifada to continue. We should 
have grasped − even before 1948 − that coexistence was the solution and then we would have 
changed society from within. It would have occurred naturally with the birth rate. In order to 
lead the fight, we must get rid of the Authority and start from the base. That way we’ll have 
international support, rather than hearing about how corrupt and dictatorial the Authority is. 
The Palestinians must get together and define what they want.’’325
                                                 
325 May 2001. 
 
  
The class aspect of the Intifada is once again noticeable here. The Palestinian 
hydraulic engineer who earns a good living and was partly trained and socialized in Israel 
does not perceive the specific demands of people in the refugee camps. He is critical about 
Israel. Through his profession he is constantly faced with the limits imposed on Palestinians 
with respect to water resources. But, being more familiar with Israeli society, he posits reform 
from within rather than confrontation. His position of challenging the Intifada as it has been 
conducted has not stopped him from having as his best friend a student in charge of the 
Tanzim in Bir Zeit. His idea is to reform Israeli society from the inside, fostering 
cohabitation. This approach would also be based on promoting a rich cultural identity that 
wouldn’t prompt fears about assimilation, but would rather be the basis for dialogue. A well-
known poet, he has chosen to settle in Ramallah to profit from the cultural environment there. 
At the same time, he has participated in several poetry contests and performances at Israeli 
universities. He is very proud of the success of his poetry there, despite the language barrier.  
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On a personal level these engineers display a certain detachment vis-à-vis the national 
struggle. They are not always so critical, however. Some of them support the armed struggle 
and even Hamas, as a nationalist movement. But even when they are supportive, they don’t 
seem interested in being involved personally in any of the groups.  
As with the returnees, the dissociation here between the national objective and their 
personal lives comes from the prospect of living far from the Palestinian territory, which 
appears to be the only resource likely to afford them any openings for the future. At the same 
time, being involved in an international arena associated with a positive image of their future 
also allows them to imagine other potential ways to achieve the national objective. It seems to 
be part of a more widespread phenomenon. Kamal is a young man in a wheelchair who is a 
professional table tennis player. He is also a member of the Hebron city government. He too 
has changed his approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after spending time abroad, 
and has focused all his energy on the issue of information and communication: ‘‘People in the 
West don’t know what goes on here because the Israeli news is more influential in the West. 
They have only a very small idea of what’s going on in Palestine. There are people who don’t 
even know about Palestine; they only know about Israel. They must find out more about the 
situation, or come and see what’s happening here. The Western media say that it’s the 
Palestinians who are creating the problem and who are terrorists. But I’m trying to change 
these ideas through my relationships with volunteers.326
                                                 
326 International volunteers with whom he is in contact through his organisation.  
 
 We’re not terrorists, and we have our 
rights. I try to convince young people that books and magazines aren’t the only channels for 
information. They should come and see for themselves who is responsible. For instance, they 
know nothing about ’48. They know some things about Israel, but not about Palestine, as if 
there was nothing here before ’48. The Europeans don’t know how to respond. It doesn’t 
matter if you are Jewish or not. If you’re a good person, then we can talk. As far as the 
Palestinian people are concerned, if you think we have no identity and no claim to this land, 
then kill us because we don’t want to live on a land that’s not ours. It’s our right to be here. 
The Palestinians like peace, but peace doesn’t mean defeat, surrendering and giving 
everything up. We need peace that’s fair. The  
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people in Europe are good. We can change their point of view by giving them more 
information. We can be like the Jews and give more information to try to change their point of 
view – like the Israelis do. We’re a nation like any other. We’re normal. We’re not terrorists. 
(...)I hope to become a spokesperson for the Palestinians and learn from the Israelis about how 
they talk about their problems, how they succeed in transforming the murder of Palestinians 
into acts of self-defence and how they make Palestinians out to be terrorists. So I need to learn 
from the Israeli experience and from their way of communicating information. I need to be an 
eloquent spokesperson who can convince the European community about what’s really 
happening.’’ 
The relationship to other countries here seems to be a crucial resource that fundamentally 
modifies people’s self-image. What happens when someone succeeds in leaving, when a 
young Palestinian really settles abroad for a long time? How does he deal with the issue of 
navigating between his personal life and the national objective? To answer that question, I 
studied the case of some young Palestinians who went to study in Germany, their main 
European destination 
statistically speaking. 
 
 
Palestinian Students in Germany 
 
Germany has a large Palestinian community, which has been formed in three waves.327
                                                 
327 It is hard to measure the population concerned here in an exact way. The Palestinians often have Jordanian, 
Syrian, and sometimes Israeli passports, or Egyptian, Lebanese and Palestinian ‘‘travel documents.’’ Local 
administrations and European universities have no registration code for Palestinian nationality. I have contented 
myself with reproducing the approximate figure provided by the Palästinensische Gemeinde Berlin-
Brandenburg E :V After the Oslo Agreements and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (1994), Israeli 
travel documents for Palestinian from Gaza and the West Bank were replaced by Palestinian ‘‘passports’’ (in 
Arabic it says 
jawaz al safar, and in English, Passport/ Travel Document). However, since the final status of the autonomous 
territories had not been established during that agreement, these passports must not indicate Palestinian 
nationality. For a complete explanation of the complex judicial issue of Palestinian nationality, see Mu’taz 
Qaficha, ‘‘La nationalité palestinienne selon les principes du droit international’’ in Nadine Picaudou, N.(ed), 
‘‘La Palestine en transition,’’ Les annales de l’autre Islam n°8, Paris, ERISM, INALCO, 2001, p 39-77 
 
 The 
first wave was part of the Gastarbeiter programme in the 1960s. The second, by far the 
largest, was composed of refugees in the 1970s and ’80s. It has been estimated at 30 000 to 
35 000 people. 
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Most of them (25 000) came from Lebanon, where they had been refugees after 1948 and 
1967 and from which they were once again expelled by the civil war. The last and smallest 
wave (around 5000) is made up of students from the West Bank and Gaza, who should be 
distinguished from the children of immigrants from the second generation (estimated at 15 
000/20 000), very few of whom have reached the university level. An efficient local support 
network connected to a settled community and to the possibility of financing one’s studies by 
working − facilitated by the German system − has enabled numerous middle-class and even 
poor families (in particular from the refugee camps) to send their sons to study in Germany. 
These young people mostly opt for engineering degrees in all fields, including computers, 
electrical engineering and construction, as well as in medicine and pharmaceuticals.   
This is an essentially male population. With a few exceptions, the only Palestinian 
women in the last wave are ones who have come to be with their student husbands. Some of 
them have pursued studies, but they are a very small minority.  
 
 
Opposite Reasons for Going Away 
 
What are the reasons that have prompted people to leave for Germany? There was a 
noticeable evolution between 1990 and 2000. Indeed, leaving at the end of the first Intifada or 
having spent several years under the Palestinian Authority would involve significantly 
different plans with regard to Germany. For some of the most recent arrivals, going abroad 
corresponds to a new desire that is more about fleeing an unbearable situation than about 
acquiring new skills: ‘‘I want to stay in Berlin because you can’t live in Gaza. There’s nothing 
there. And everyone watches you and your every movement. You can’t do anything. You 
can’t go out. I don’t mind studying and working. I want to be somewhere else.’’328
                                                 
328 Mussa., 24, Berlin, July 1998. 
 
 It is no 
longer a question of studying in order to acquire better status in Palestine or to contribute to 
preparing the future of Palestinian society. Now it is a matter of finding a way out of the 
situation at any cost: ‘‘I want to go to the US to get my MA. My uncle lives there, and then 
I’d go back there to live. (...) I don’t want to spend the future here. There are so many 
difficulties and problems. I have no dreams here  
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because there are no dreams here due to the problems with Israel. My dream is to go to any 
other country because there are no dreams here.’’329
                                                 
329 Kamal, 20, is studying English. His father is a labourer in Israel and his mother a teacher. He lives in the area 
with new buildings for inhabitants of the Jabalya refugee camp (the ones who can afford it), August 1999. 
 
 
Interactions between the recent arrivals and the students living in Germany for several 
years already − who a re more concerned with returning to the Territories and undertaking 
projects there − highlight the great lack of understanding between them. Those who have 
remained in the ‘‘spirit’’ of the first Intifada speak of a united people who are fighting and 
moving forward. The recent arrivals evoke the failure of the Oslo Accords and thus of the 
Authority, the collapse of the economy, the deadlock and giving up. This doesn’t mean the 
recent arrivals will not develop projects within German society. But compared to the other 
students, it will take them far more time. Having left above all to ‘‘escape’’ from the situation, 
they are in fact totally caught up in it. They follow the news and the latest developments back 
home by the hour, and they have a great deal of difficulty concentrating on their studies and 
planning their future. It often takes them several months, and even up to a whole year, before 
starting to elaborate plans they can believe in. With time, their geographical distance from the 
Palestinian situation helps them to rebuild a private life that is less permeated by the sense of 
deadlock associated with it. 
The students who came during the very early years, when the Palestinian Authority 
was being set up, did so within the context of the first Intifada. They left with the idea of 
returning laden with new skills. Their analysis basically hasn’t changed with the evolving 
situation. Challenging it would also upset their image of their own role and their situation 
abroad. Yet these images are also a way to ‘‘neutralize’’ the issue of lacking solidarity for the 
Palestinian collective destiny. However, as the situation in the Territories gradually worsened 
during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, one change did become clear. But this time it didn’t lead them to 
question their presence abroad; and the attitude of their families towards these stays abroad, 
which they had previously wanted to shorten, also changed. It was less about coming back 
with more skills now than about building up an external resource for the family. Their priority 
was no longer to finish their  
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studies, but rather to wire home money, however little, which also meant increased pressure 
on the students. It was part of the Palestinians’ strategy to gain or keep a foothold abroad in 
order to have a less uncertain source of income than their investments in the local Palestinian 
economy330. As has been shown by Majdi el-Malki,331
What is a Western Society? 
 the deterioration of the economic 
situation in the Territories and the destruction of the Palestinian Authority’s infrastructures 
led the Palestinians to turn to forms of solidarity and reorganisation that followed along 
family lines. These do not operate according to territorial divisions. A hamula outlines a kind 
of social geography here that is far from the fragmented physical geography of the Palestinian 
Territories and the diaspora. It is made up of support networks that may be more or less 
‘‘dormant,’’ but are reactivated during times of hardship, such as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. 
 
 
 
For Palestinian students, the values conveyed by German society, and by the West 
generally speaking, are individualism, materialism, technological modernism and amorality. 
They situate themselves within a more or less nuanced rejection of these values. The only one 
that is never rejected is technological progress, which is in any case the main motive for going 
to Germany in the first place. In fact, they manoeuvre between a desire for individualism and 
freedom, and a rejection of the Western credo of ‘‘every man for himself.’’ Likewise, while 
saying they reject materialistic society, they also seek to take part in consumer society and are 
attracted by brand names. In this sense, like the young people in Gaza − but with more access 
and greater knowledge about the latest fashions −  they are also part of an international youth 
culture. 
                                                 
330 The total contribution of the Palestinian diaspora to the Palestinian economy was estimated at 410 million 
dollars in 1997, 76 % in the form of investments and 24 % in the form of donations (although transfers of funds 
within families remains extremely hard to evaluate). It is almost equal (95%) to international aid for the same 
year (432 million dollars). Sari Hanafi, ‘‘Contribution de la diaspora palestinienne à l’économie palestinienne’’ 
in Bernard Botiveau, (ed.), ‘‘La Palestine d’Oslo : les avatars d’une construction nationale’’, Monde Arabe 
Maghreb-Machrek, n°161, July-September 1998, p 64-65. 
 
331 Majdi el-Malki, ‘‘Soutien social informel et néo-patrimonialisme’’ in Nadine Picaudou, ‘‘La Palestine 
en transition’’, Les annales de l’autre Islam n°8, Paris, ERISM, INALCO, 2001, p176-179 and ‘‘La 
sociologie en Palestine. De la sociologie des politiques sociales à la sociologie du ‘tenir bon’’’, 
a paper for Palestine : sociétés, normes et institution, a seminar organised by Bernard Botiveau and Edouard 
Conte, Programme PICS, Aix-en-Provence, 18-19 October 2002. 
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Their rejection of materialism and exaggerated individualism can also be seen in their  
judgement about the destruction of the family occurring in the West in their view. This is the 
most commonly cited example to highlight the nonsensical turn of Western societies on the 
decline. In this way, these students attempt to make contradictory references hold together. 
They tinker with them to produce various identity constructs in order to combine: religiosity, 
in the spiritual rather than in the customary sense; the individualisation process; a rejection of 
Western values synonymous with social anomie and moral perversion; consumerism; the 
community as a solidarity network and model for society; Arab cultural references and 
technological modernity. 
The Islamist model stands out among potential configurations of identity for two 
reasons. It is a general model expressed by a whole group of students, and not simply by 
individuals. And it has great legitimacy for the entire population, even if it hasn’t been 
embraced or expressed by everyone. The religious reference suggests an image of total Islam, 
in the sense that it provides guidelines for all aspects of life including politics. From the 
resulting notion of Islamic modernity, based on an image of the West, aspects considered 
positive are chosen, while the negative aspects are counterbalanced by a reinvented Islam 
removed from its traditional form. The West, fascinating for its technology and consumer 
products, is rejected for its materialism and moral depravity. 
The image of that perversion is crystallized around the issue of gender relations, with 
Palestinian students stigmatizing their playful and transitory nature. In its place they put 
forward an Arab tradition founded on the community, mutual aid and solidarity, as well as on 
moral and spiritual elevation. Thus the idea of Islamic modernity consists of an attempt to 
blend these two dimensions: ‘‘Technology and the improvement of material conditions are 
part of a process of modernisation that we support and are trying to bring into our own 
societies. They have gone hand in hand with a huge increase in individual freedom here, 
without any moral limits. I don’t want to integrate that into my life, and I filter things 
according to my values. For instance, modesty is important in Islam, and I definitely don’t 
appreciate all the advertising billboards displaying female bodies.’’332
                                                 
332 Qandil, 28, a student and Islamic intellectual married to a converted French woman. Berlin, January 
2002. 
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But that idea must be understood for what it contributes in building up a proud 
identity, which is also a way of obtaining recognition. The Western media, and especially the 
television stations, play a crucial role here. Indeed, young Muslims constantly point out 
examples in films and TV serials − particularly American ones − where the Arab plays the 
bad, ridiculous or stupid person with the related stereotypes, such as having numerous women 
and camels. ‘‘This is a Big Brother society.333 Television only shows you a tiny part of reality 
it has chosen. Over a two-week period there are necessarily times when you are stupid, others 
when you’re funny, interesting, likable or annoyed. If they only show the stupid moments, 
everyone will think you’re stupid. That’s exactly what happens with Arabs. Take any 
American film. The Arab is always stupid, violent and bad, with lots of camels and women 
around. News about Palestine is even worse. The Israelis are occupying our land and killing 
us, and we’re the ones they call terrorists!’’334
The principle of identification upon which film and television productions are based 
works in reverse here. These images appear to them as an injunction to identify with 
humiliating caricatures. Their virulent discourse against the media shows the extent to which 
these young people perceive them as the vital basis of Offentlichkeit. ‘‘The war between 
civilisations means nothing. In any case, there has been a globalisation of American culture. 
I’m not even surprised by what I see here − the same brand names, the same films and the 
same Big Macs. But what really gets to you is the disinformation about the Middle East.’’
  
335 
As a result, even if this kind of discrimination is compensated by access to the social system, 
it strikes them as a basic assault on their dignity and causes a great deal of bitterness. ‘‘They 
talk about democracy, which does exist in terms of the law. But in reality we are never seen as 
equals. As an Arab, I am never given the same respect as a German.’’336
                                                 
333 A reference to a German reality TV show. 
 
334 A 27-year-old architecture student, Berlin, January 2002. 
 
335 Mahmoud, 26, who has a Master’s degree in applied mathematics and has been in Germany for six months. 
Berlin, January 2002. 
 
336 Jamal, 26, a pharmaceutical student. Berlin, January 2002. 
 
 
 
Islamic ideology plays on these two levels by associating a technological mastery of 
the modern world and a rejection of its ‘‘corrupt’’ values − a rejection that is to a large extent 
the  
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result of their refusal to accept the domination of those who promote these values. This vision 
of the Western world is widespread throughout the Arab world, extending beyond the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, although the latter is a crystallisation of it. Palestinian students in the 
West take issue with their lack of recognition, a stance that comes from their particular status 
and the everyday incidences of domination they may experience; but it should be seen in a 
more general framework. The issue of recognition, ordinarily reserved for minorities within a 
country, exists for them on a worldwide scale. Thus Israel might appear to them more 
generally as an outpost of Western domination. The issue of recognition goes beyond the 
framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reaching into the broader context of their 
relationship to the West.  
This phenomenon intensified after the 9/11 attacks, which had the secondary effect of 
making all Muslims more or less suspect. According to a rumour that went around in Muslim 
circles, certain students stopped going out for a while out of fear of hostile reactions against 
them. They all felt an increase in hostile looks. ‘‘How do you expect me to feel in my 
company now? When the towers started collapsing on 9/11, they were all very agitated and 
rushed into my office saying, come and see, the Palestinians have bombed New York! I didn’t 
understand anything. Later, I was really relieved to find out that there were no Palestinians in 
the commando. But now it’s finished. I know I’ll never have the same status as the other 
engineers.’’337
                                                 
337 A computer engineer originally from Gaza, who has been in Germany for 10 years. 
 
 
Ties between the Palestinian community and German society are thus strongly 
affected by the behaviour of a few people and security requirements that render an entire 
population suspect. In this way, they have reinforced the lack of recognition − one of the 
reasons why people join the Islamists.   
 
 
In the exile experience, the distance created results in a re-evaluation of the national 
objective. The Palestinians have re-evaluated their options through greater knowledge of 
Western societies and the international system. But that knowledge, highly variable from one 
individual to  
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another, does not lead to only one kind of response or attitude. It appears to be accompanied 
by the development of a trans-national elite that is relatively at ease in Western societies and 
with the international media, and above all believes in the possibility of using the referential 
principles of those societies in its struggle − human rights, democracy, etc. These elites do not 
see Western societies and their leaders as unequivocal permanent fixtures. In that sense they 
agree with the analyses and attitudes of what could be qualified as the pacifist trend among 
Palestinians, which stresses civil forms of resistance and international communication. The 
increased knowledge has also fuelled confrontational attitudes towards that domination and 
the negative images conveyed about Muslims. The desire to rebuild an identity full of pride 
therefore finds support in the development of Islamic modernity, which advocates rejecting 
certain Western values in the name of spiritual superiority. This rejection has been expressed 
in a variety of ways and reached varying levels of intensity − from protecting o neself from the 
above-mentioned values to adhering to Islamist parties or engaging in head-on clashes. 
Moving between levels is far from automatic. Thus, some people assert their allegiance to 
Islamic organisations, whose social programmes they support, while being severely critical of 
violence: ‘‘These movements338
                                                 
338 Armed Islamist movements. Qandil, previously quoted. 
 
 have become a problem for their own societies. They thought 
they were providing solutions, and that’s why people followed them. But by creating groups 
that refer to Islam while being potentially violent, they only generate more problems.’’  
The Palestinian Islamists’ ideology, strongly oriented towards Palestinian nationalism 
and the Palestinian cause, greatly limits the probability of their adhering to the Al Qaeda 
network. Ben Laden has often been reproached for discovering the Palestinian cause at a late 
date and for using it as a justification rather than providing his own support: ‘‘The United 
States ought to ask itself why there is such hatred against it. They are responsible for the 
thousands of deaths in Iraq and in Palestine, and we won’t forget it. Unfortunately, it is very 
easy for extremist groups to use that hatred. I think a national liberation struggle such as the 
Palestinian one should be  
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differentiated from that type of action. Ben Laden never did anything for the Palestinian cause 
and only uses it as a reference to justify his actions.’’339
In the vast majority of cases, a more or less lengthy stay abroad means an increase in 
symbolic and financial capital − if it has not been a failure and the person doesn’t go home 
immediately after obtaining a degree. In the latter case, no capital is accumulated and the 
person risks being unemployed in the Territories. Not all of these young people will be part of 
the elite. It depends on where they started out. But all of them will rise further up the social 
ladder. Some of them will compose the trans-national elite previously mentioned, 
characterised less by their financial capital than by their ‘‘knowledge.’’
  
340
                                                 
339 Ahmed, an architecture student and Islamist sympathizer. Berlin, January 2002. 
 
340 ‘‘The way a person experiences, interprets and reacts to his environment varies from one individual to 
another according to his specific knowledge. Knowledge is the key because it defines our perception of the 
world based on our specific education and life experiences. It is plausible to conclude that this knowledge seems 
to be one of the most significant criteria for differentiating the two groups in our sample of politically relevant 
Palestinian elites.’’  
The first group in this sample of 9 people is composed of Mustafa Barghouti, Hanan Ashrawi, Salam Fayad, 
Ghassan Khatib and Ziad Abou Amr. The second includes Yasser Arafat, Marwan Barghouti, Ahmed Sa’adat 
and Sheikh Yassin. Ahmed Badawi, ‘‘Determinant of Change in Elite Behaviour and Relative Influence in 
Palestine,’’ draft paper for the Elite Change in the Arab World programme under the direction of Volker Perthes, 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, August 2002, p 14. 
 
 They are striving 
for a national objective characterised by independence and development, with an emphasis on 
the latter. In terms of power struggles, they will certainly have to deal with the local elites 
involved in the armed struggle who have different social prospects and very different 
experiences − including clashes and Israeli prisons . Their perceptions of international 
reactions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are vastly different. Relations between these two 
groups and their respective weight constitute one of the stakes in the reconfiguration of power 
in Palestine. 
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Conclusion: a Future with no Prospects? 
 
 
 
‘‘The word future doesn’t exist. Everything is black and blurred. Where will it all end? I hope 
for an improvement in the situation here, but I don’t believe it will happen.’’341
Between the rapid and disjointed time frame of everyday events and the symbolic time 
of memory-identity,
  
 
 
342 the middle-term of plans seems to have vanished from the experience 
of Palestinian youth. Their perception of space reflects that dichotomy. At the most local 
level, it signals their confinement and attempts at getting around Israeli roadblocks. But it also 
symbolizes the neighbourhood – a place of reference points, status and power. At the other 
extreme is the longed-for heavenly Palestine that has grown out of memories adjusted to 
counterbalance everyday experience in refugee camps. For Reinhart Koselleck, ‘‘the primary 
experience of defeated people is first of all that nothing has occurred the way they had 
expected or hoped it would. (...) This might lead them to seek long- and middle-term causes 
that would include – and perhaps explain – the randomness of their singular surprise.’’343
                                                 
341 A 19-year-old second-year physiotherapy student from Gaza, who also plays music for parties. His father has 
a small steel factory. Interviewed in August 1999. 
 
342 An expression coined by Nadine Picaudou. Picaudou, Identité-mémoire et construction nationale, op. cit. 
 
343 Reinhart Koselleck, ‘‘Mutation de l’expérience et changement de méthode’’  in L’expérience de 
l’histoire, Paris, Gallimard/ Le Seuil, 1997, p 239. 
 
 But 
here, the quest for a sufficiently powerful explanation has led more to the creation of a myth 
than to any  
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historical gain. The myth is also a response to any attempt by the victor to develop a 
‘‘retrospective teleology’’344
Caught between two spaces and time frames, the perspectives of Palestinian youth are 
highly contradictory. Furthermore, their situation is doubly defined − on the one hand by their 
relations with the occupier, and on the other hand by the inner configuration of Palestinian 
society. For the Israeli occupation strives to control the territory and people’s movements, but 
not how the population is managed. There is a place for internal issues involving the 
Palestinians, although the context itself is marked by Israeli domination. Thus, there was a 
dimension of internal social struggle in the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The local officials from the 
camps, young leaders of the Intifada who have also been in Israeli prisons, are to a certain 
degree opposed to the returnee Palestinians, themselves a heterogeneous category. On one 
side are the PLO officials, the ‘‘old guard’’ who have lived in neighbouring Arab countries. 
They were given a large number of important positions in the Palestinian Authority
 or to see their success as a historical legitimisation of their 
cause.  
345
                                                 
344 Reinhart Koselleck, ibid. 
 
345 Less hegemonic than is usually supposed, according to a survey being conducted by Jean-François Legrain. 
 
 and 
have experience cooperating with the Israelis. On the other side are the skilled diaspora with 
international experience, who see themselves as a trans-national elite. These divisions operate 
in local environments, the importance of which has been reinforced by the partitioning of 
Palestinian territory. The Palestinian Authority is nearly destroyed, but local administrations 
continue to function in part. Furthermore, these groups are not united and there are further 
divisions by neighbourhood and hamula. Local life is thus largely defined by clan-like 
networks. The latter have recently been reactivated to provide alternative resources which 
increase people’s ability to adapt. For their members, they represent a stable base in an 
uncertain environment. Through the diaspora, they have become trans-national and greatly 
contributed to the current recomposition of Palestinian society. 
Positions and interpretations regarding the situation vary among groups. The ‘‘young 
guard’’ is trying to obtain higher status on the Palestinian political scene. They see the 
situation  
 180 
as closed, and the more or less sacrificial violence is a ‘‘wild card’’ for them that restores 
their honour but doesn’t fundamentally change the balance of power. Its references are 
increasingly mythical. The younger these actors, the more this aspect prevails. As for the 
‘‘trans-national elite,’’ they possess resources (opportunities to travel, as well as qualifications 
and knowledge about international issues) which enable them to have plans for the middle 
term and often to develop a less pessimistic and more nuanced vision of potential foreign 
support and relations with Israel. This group has high visibility through its contacts with the 
international community, whose codes it understands, whereas the ‘‘young guard’’ has gained 
visibility through violence. But it is deeply disconnected from the self-image of most 
Palestinian youth.   
As for the ‘‘old guard,’’ it had control of the Palestinian Authority but suffered from a 
glaring lack of legitimacy. Nonetheless, family networks have crossed over these categories, 
engaging them in a dialogue and introducing vertical confrontations.  
 
 
In addition, the extremely complex situation in Palestinian society has become chaotic 
around the edges, where the powers that be and opposition forces have multiplied at the most 
local levels, including politicians, notables, security service chiefs, activists, etc. (the same 
person may fit into several of these labels). Such ‘‘fluid political circumstances’’346 tend to 
‘‘inhibit tactical activity’’347 among the actors. And so, as others may also have observed, 
‘‘strategic actions aim at the short term, while the middle- and long-term prospects seem to 
fade away. The space itself seems to withdraw to a mostly local level.’’348
                                                 
346 Michel Dobry, Sociologie des crises politiques, Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, 1992, p 140. 
The relevance of this definition to the Palestinian situation was pointed out by Aude Signoles, ‘‘Qu’en est-il du 
pouvoir local en ‘conjoncture politique fluide’?’’, Egypte Monde arabe, n°6/ 2003, p 37-54. 
 
347 Michel Dobry, Sociologie des crises, op. cit., p 150. 
 
348 Gilles Bataillon, ‘‘Analyser le chaos,’’ in Gilles Bataillon (ed.), ‘‘Survivre. Réflexions sur l’action en 
situation de chaos,’’ Cultures & Conflits, n° 24-25, Spring 1997, p 4. 
 
 But there is an 
additional structural uncertainty here coming from the Palestinians’ weak position with regard 
to Israel, a State which has a wide range of options at its disposal, whereas theirs are very 
restricted. Thus the middle-term prospects also seem hidden by current events. When a desire 
to launch new projects is hinted at, it always 
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comes with an immediate negation reaffirming that uncertainty: ‘‘I want to work as an 
engineer. And I want to do many things for my people. But it depends on the conditions. It all 
depends on conditions. It’s difficult when the conditions change all the time.’’349 Older people 
have interpreted the situation in a less gloomy way, but the latest opinion polls show them 
moving closer to the position of the younger people.350
Nevertheless, opposing a clearly defined adversary limits the level of fragmentation 
and structural collapse. It prevents the complete disintegration of society by restricting the 
increase in competing powers, despite all the factors leading to chaos such as a collapsed 
economy, readily available weapons, etc. A national identity is structured around the issue of 
conflict with the dominating power. That identity is the basis for greater unity among the 
population, as well as a focus for the actors themselves: ‘‘compensating the loss of a place (a 
village or territory) by a policy of exclusive (family, community or religious) ties as the 
condition for survival is both the risk and strength of identity-based motivation.’’
  
351
                                                 
349 Alya, 21,an electrical engineering student in Nablus, whose father was in marketing. Interviewed in October 
2000.  
 
350 Riccardo Bocco, Matthias Brunner, Jamil Rabah, “International and Local Aid During the Second 
Intifada. An Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ”, Report II, 
IUED- Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva, July 2001, p 5. 
 
351 Riccardo Bocco, Blandine Destremeau, Jean Hannoyer, ‘‘Les mouvements palestiniens : territoire 
national et espaces communautaires.’’ in Riccardo Bocco, Blandine Destremau, and Jean Hannoyer, (ed.), 
Palestine, Palestiniens : territoire national, espaces communautaires, les cahiers du CERMOC, n°17, 
Beirut, CERMOC, 1997, p 14. 
 
 This 
national conflict approach, associated with a memory-identity chiefly based on 1948 and 1967 
(memories of exile), has been one of the foundations of their identity-related strategies. It has 
afforded them an interpretation of interactions with the dominating power that has prevented 
them from being reduced to the real and symbolic violence done to them. The conflict, 
however, can only have that integrative nature pointed out by Georg Simmel when it is not 
being criminalized as such. In order for it to function, there must be a mutual recognition of a 
certain legitimacy. Yet that foundation has been vanishing in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
where, in a mirror effect, national narratives have developed as exclusive monologues. 
In an uncertain situation of extreme domination, the Palestinians had succeeded in  
 182 
developing a conflict approach that would make it possible for them to envisage a negotiated 
solution, while enabling a reinterpretation of everyday experience. The failure of the Oslo 
process took away all middle-term prospects and reduced the potential for strategic action. 
But it did not render reinterpretation useless, on the contrary. In order to preserve that 
function the Palestinians plunged into a course of mythical conflict which did not, however, 
rule out the strategic use of sacrificial violence by organisations trying to establish a new 
balance of power. This new narrative was characterised by references to a golden age, 
projections into a glorious future and the martyrdom cult.352
This last element is clearly essential because it legitimises and embodies the myth at 
the same time. The ‘‘martyr’’ or ‘‘victim-hero’’ figure is popular with Palestinians because it 
seems to express the nature of the power struggle while also transcending it. This highlighting 
of religion through sanctified nationalism is thus largely due to the ‘‘syntax of domination’’
  
353
These complex identity formations, which strive to re-establish the − quite relative − 
possibility of middle-term plans, have been made risky and costly through this uncertainty 
and domination. Thus, sacrificial violence signifying a merging with a mythical time and a 
symbolic place, has 
 
which this sanctified nationalism has enabled people to reinterpret.  
 
 
Caught in this double everyday uncertainty and divided between immediacy and 
eschatology, the local arena and the symbolic one, the experience of these individuals seems 
deeply split. Its fragmentation also corresponds to an identity-related strategy of resistance to 
domination. Individuals are thus moving in a different time and space involving a type of 
reasoning that appears contradictory to the observer − one connected to life, the other to 
death. That movement allows them to say simultaneously: ‘‘I want to die. Last night I went 
out shooting. (…) See that bush I planted? It’s an askubiyye. In ten years it will bear fruit.’’ In 
fact, Palestinian youth attribute different kinds of reasoning to different time frames and 
objects, thus avoiding the contradictions that would inevitably result from a desire to unify 
their identity. 
                                                 
352 Hamit Bozarslan, Violence in the Middle-East : From Political Struggle to Self-Sacrifice, Princeton, 
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2004. 
 
353 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, London, Sage Publication, 1995. Quoted in Bozarslan, From 
Political Struggle to Self-sacrifice, op. cit., p 9. 
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become increasingly appealing. But for most people, the solution is to leave the Palestinian 
territory if possible. The choice of one option over another is closely linked to class issues. It 
also depends on a comparison between social status in Palestinian society and in the host 
country, as well as on a possible identification with the collective destiny which may make 
personal success unimportant. Certain young people from the refugee camps who had the 
material means to go abroad through family support did not go. Some preferred to keep their 
status as leaders of an armed group despite the risks. Others, totally engaged in a sacrificial 
commitment, saw no real alternative because it only had a bearing on their personal life.  
The tremendous determination regarding the national struggle is largely the result of 
everyday life being pervaded by the occupation, leaving little room for other concerns. It is a 
constant in the Palestinian public arena. During the first Intifada, the public scene was 
monopolized by the issue of the national struggle. The sense of hope created when the 
Palestinian Authority was established then massively introduced the issue of state-building, 
and as a result, various questions about Palestinian society and which political and social 
programmes to set up. Deliberations on legislation and the constitution mobilized parties and 
organisations. The failure of the Oslo Accords and the worsening of the situation in the 
Territories put an end to these discussions and reset the focus on the issue of the national 
struggle. Any other discussion seems vain in the eyes of Palestinian youth, because it is 
disconnected from reality. Yet this lone preoccupation has not led to any reflection on 
Palestinian strategies, as the middle-term prospects necessary for such discussions do not exist 
for most Palestinians. Furthermore, the deaths, extrajudicial executions, houses destroyed, 
expropriations, curfews, roadblocks, etc. have produced a situation in which every day is 
comprised of events that seem to render peace strategies and negotiations laughable. In view 
of Israeli methods, many militants accuse Palestinians who challenge the suicide attacks of 
betrayal, thus neutralizing any strategic reflection.   
 
 
Is there a way out? With respect to the Palestinians, a crucial element would involve  
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rebuilding intermediate levels in all fields. First, Palestinian youth must have middle-term 
prospects again. Without that base, the sacrificial violence will never lose its legitimacy for 
the people. Rebuilding is the sine qua non for obtaining not the total disappearance of the 
‘‘martyrs,’’ but their marginalisation, which is an essential aspect of an effective crackdown. 
As Hamit Bozarslan has underscored, the more the dominant group seems to reject 
compromise, the harder it is to bring the dominated group to a pragmatic way of thinking. 
Restoring prospects in the middle term means decreasing structural uncertainties in the 
Palestinian context. This means acting on the uncertainty resulting from the degree of 
domination, as well as from the increase in local power.  
At the same time, the conflict should be decriminalized. Israel’s symbolic recognition 
of the Palestinian memory of exile seems an important point here. On the Palestinian side, 
establishing legitimate institutions could serve as a base for creating a new system of 
mediation both within Palestinian society and in its relations with Israel.  
Such institutions would ultimately have no legitimacy without a minimum of 
manoeuvring room. The process of dehumanisation induced by the teleological sanctification 
of the conflict is limited by the fascination with Israel. In the eyes of Palestinian youth, that 
State embodies strength as well as Western-style modernity. While they refuse to adopt a 
lifestyle they see as selfish and amoral, they are in favour of the consumer society and 
technological progress; this is a common basis upon which ties − especially economic ones − 
could easily be reformed. The political arena must lend itself to this process, however, and not 
simply reconfigure Israeli methods of control − in a form that might also be that of a kind of 
Palestinian State.  
Naturally, in order to be thorough, these orientations should be put into perspective 
through a precise analysis of Israeli society. But ignoring them as part of an entirely 
repressive solution doesn’t seem particularly effective either. Social science analyses bring to 
light certain issues here that are not the ones underscored by the media. To know if Arafat 
was a valid interlocutor, i.e. if he had the power and above all the will to suppress the armed 
groups – whether  
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they were Islamists or from the PFLP or Fatah – was only a key issue if one forgets that these 
groups had been mainly supported, despite their methods, by a population whose prospects 
have all but dissolved.  
Palestinian youth who have remained in the Territories are increasingly closed off 
inside a purely mythical interpretation of the conflict. This is the way of thinking that needs to 
be reversed. The current trend of Israeli operations in the Territories is not moving in that 
direction. 
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Annex: Palestinian Youth, a ‘‘terrain’’ like any other?  
 
 
 
Field Study  
 
The purpose of the study was to bring to the surface the field of reference in which 
these young people were operating, in connection to their field of possibilities and the singular 
configurations developed within that field. The interviews conducted with that aim cannot be 
seen as the results in a recording studio of a discourse produced out of nowhere. They are the 
result of an interaction between a foreigner presented as a researcher with a certain number of 
questions and a young Palestinian man or woman. These conditions most certainly had an 
influence on the kind of discourse developed. Far from an attempt to reify anyone’s identity, it 
was a matter of noting the patterns of movement among the different identities and dynamics 
in play. Thus the need to create a variety of contexts for interaction, in order to obtain the 
widest possible range of discourses used by the individuals about themselves.  
This study is thus based on a large number of interviews, from all social categories and 
among a young age bracket. But, given the specific conditions of the interviews, a variety of 
approaches were employed to broaden the spectrum of conditions in which the discourse 
could be pronounced. Thus, I carried out individual and group interviews, longitudinal 
interviews, as well as participatory observation with families, youth centres, universities, 
public places, etc. A variety of places were also included, such as towns, villages, and refugee 
camps, the West Bank,  
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Gaza and East Jerusalem. Young people in Gaza and Hebron were asking themselves the 
same questions; yet, while the importance of their local identity was the same, its content was 
different. That kind of comparison was based on an equivalence of function but not 
necessarily of content.  
Between 1998 and 2004, one hundred and nine354
Slippery Ground? 
 interviews were conducted and a 
longitudinal follow-up was undertaken with the young people. The vast majority of these 
interviews was held on a semi-directive model. Twenty-six questionnaires were also 
distributed in a student centre in Ramallah in 1997, as well as fifteen interviews with young 
women. Participatory observations were held in three sports clubs (Gaza), three youth centres 
(Ramallah, Jenin and Hebron), two student associations (France and Germany), one women’s 
association (Qalqilya) and two psychology work groups conducted by NGOs (Nablus and 
East Jerusalem). The field study took place between 1997 and 2004 during seven successive 
stays, for a total of twenty-one months. Two complementary field studies were conducted 
among Palestinian youth studying in France and above all in Germany. With regard to 
Germany, the field study was conducted during several short stays in Berlin in 1999 and 2000, 
and in particular on a research programme at the Marc Bloch Centre in 2001/2002. The 
studies were designed to follow the changes in identity among these young people temporarily 
in the West (and therefore not second-generation Palestinians whose identity constructs 
mainly involve other issues). It was particularly relevant in Germany, the main destination in 
Europe for Palestinian students. 
 
 
 
The Palestinian ‘‘terrain,’’ far from neutral, has particular features which do not make 
the task easy for a researcher striving above all to focus on sociology rather than getting 
involved in controversies. First of all, it is highly charged ideologically speaking.355
                                                 
354 56 in Gaza, 42 in the West Bank, 3 in France and 8 in Germany. 
 
355 Regarding the study of Islamist movements, François Burgat has shown how people’s ideological 
backgrounds generally introduce a bias into their analysis. François Burgat, L’islamisme en face, Paris, 
La Découverte, 2002. 
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Palestinian cause is associated with ‘‘Palestinians,’’ and in trying to bring forward these 
individual accounts,  
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wouldn’t it be above all an attempt to produce arguments for that cause? How could one 
preserve a scientific approach when each assertion can be used as a means of legitimisation by 
one side or the other? To be sure, scientific analyses do not take place on the same level as 
ideological assertions. They follow different rules – of coherence, a desire to combine all the 
representations in an integrated vision, an openness to dialectical discussion, being put to the 
test by one’s peers, a desire to account for one’s cognitive tools and position in the field, etc. 
Nonetheless, the researcher has even less hope here than elsewhere of glossing over his own 
position as a scientist in a field that is so emotionally charged. However intense his desire to 
produce science, he cannot ignore that there is a certain porosity between the scientific 
discourse and that of the actors involved. Explaining in sociological terms the identity 
constructs developed by a suicide bomber is not – in any manner – a way of legitimising his 
act. However, in this kind of context, even the desire to understand is often suspected of 
concealing an axiological position, and certain explanations may be used in an ideological 
manner by the actors. In so far as possible, all questions of engagement and position-taking 
have been rejected. Naturally, one cannot claim to be equidistant from the protagonists. On 
the contrary, as has already been explained, this research is intentionally focused solely on 
Palestinian society. Thus, it would be vain to see it as something it does not pretend to be – an 
analysis of Israeli-Palestinian representations regarding the conflict. Israeli actors appear only 
within the specific context of their interactions with Palestinians and their perceptions. Thus, 
objectivity here does not signify an attempt to report on both sides in a balanced manner. 
In this study, which deliberately seeks to provide an analysis of Palestinian society as 
such and not solely through the conflict, objectivity revolves not around equidistance but 
around intellectual ‘‘integrity’’356
                                                 
356 ‘‘The researcher constantly redefines his neutrality by striving to reconstruct on the basis of honesty rather 
than  equidistance because, as the expression goes, an anthropologist’s work always involves ‘participatory 
observation.’’’ Abderrahmane Moussaoui, ‘‘Du danger et du terrain en Algérie’’, Ethnologie française, XXXI 
January-March 2001, p 54. 
 
 linked to the conditions of the scientific approach described 
above. It is not a matter of excluding positions drawn from scientific research, but in so far as 
possible, and  
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in the interest of research, to separate different moments – as far as possible, because no 
researcher works without employing certain values. At that point, it is not a matter of 
standards or positions regarding a particular issue, but rather of fundamental values. Even 
considering the actors’ attempts to provide meaning is in itself taking a position.   
Beyond these issues, the Palestinian terrain is also ‘‘slippery ground’’357
                                                 
357 This expression was borrowed from Dionigi Albera (ed.), ‘‘Terrains minés en ethnologie’’, Ethnologie 
francaise, 
XXXI, PUF, 2001/1 January-March. 2001. 
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violent ground where the researcher is ‘‘exposed’’ in all senses of the word: caught in certain 
interactions, put in danger, affected psychologically or called upon to intervene. Human and 
ethical questions arise, similar to what is experienced by journalists in areas of conflict. A 
violent context is not like any other, and learning to operate in one is certainly not part of 
one’s university training. 
The protocol for a study cannot be conducted in the kind of ideal conditions 
advocated. Examples abound of curfews and roadblocks limiting one’s freedom of movement, 
and interviewees refusing to be recorded for fear of being in danger. Emotions are raw, arising 
from people’s fears. There is a feeling that one should judge and become indignant, which the 
researcher must surpass in order to keep on trying to understand. Through the interviews and 
his listening ear, he often opens up an ideal space for confidences. Well-informed enough to 
understand, yet without consequences due to his not being integrated, the researcher is 
charged with heavy stories involving much violence. What is he to do with them, beyond the 
research? Their vivid and difficult nature always seems to call for something further – some 
psychological or social reparation for instance – and challenges the researcher about the status 
of his work and his position as a citizen.  
Neither is the time frame here that of the ideal study – slow and gradual. The 
researcher is dragged into everyday events, and his time is composed of sudden jolts and 
consequences. Furthermore, the way events are perceived is not the same for Palestinian 
society and Western media, and there is friction between these two different time frames. It 
seems that being informed involves knowing all the subtleties of the latest diplomatic 
proposals, the ups and downs of  
 190 
Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics, and details about the most recent violence. How does 
the long time-frame of research fit in here? The terrain seems not only defined by a 
succession of events, but also in a process of perpetual motion in which you feel like you’re 
always missing the latest episode. As elsewhere, one must reject the pre-established questions 
and interpretations of a social study;358
One consequence of this proximity was that the interviewees were often eager to find 
out about the researcher’s analyses. Returning them at the end of the interview and 
discovering the interviewees’ reactions, according to the methods developed for sociological 
interventions, proved to be highly enriching. Still, one must accept and make acceptable the 
idea of not providing miracle solutions. ‘‘Talking about reality seems to presume a capacity to 
modify it,’’ highlighted Abderahmane Moussaoui.
 but because it is a matter of ‘‘life and death,’’ that 
distance seems less legitimate or acceptable than elsewhere, and is not easy to set up.  
Once all these obstacles have been considered and worked on, the characteristics of 
the ‘‘slippery ground’’ are not all handicaps. Living among a population when it is in danger 
puts the foreigner in a special position because he is ‘‘risking his neck.’’ They are grateful to 
him for being there, despite the situation, and this gives him special access which is different 
from other times. This was particularly perceptible in the change in my terrain from 1997 to 
2002. To be sure, he is also seen as a witness and they would like for him to be a 
spokesperson on the injustice of the conditions in which the Palestinians are made to live. 
During the interviews, a specific protocol had to be established in order to ‘‘neutralise,’’ in so 
far as possible, the production of an impersonal discourse designed to underscore for the West 
the Palestinian’s historical victim status. One good method consisted in showing sufficient 
specific knowledge of the internal Palestinian situation so this kind of discourse would no 
longer seem useful, since it was already known and presumed to be accepted.  
359
                                                 
358 Louis Quéré, Pour un calme examen des faits de société, in Bernard Lahire (ed.), A quoi sert la 
sociologie, Paris, La Découverte, 2002, p 82. 
 
359 Abderrahmane Moussaoui, Du danger et du terrain en Algérie, op. cit., p 55. 
 
  
Taken as a whole, these circumstances – relevant to all areas of conflict rather than 
specifically to Palestine – pose a greater challenge to the researcher as a person. They are far 
from insurmountable, but they do create a specific context requiring a great deal of thought 
about the conditions of the study, as well as a course of action appropriate for a tense and 
changing situation.  
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